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Remanufacturing, the process of restoring used material goods to like-new condition, has 
been lauded as “the next great opportunity for boosting U.S. productivity” and “the 
ultimate form of recycling” as it creates multiple iterations of the product lifecycle.  Yet, 
remanufacturing has remained largely untouched by technology, productivity, and quality 
advances of the last thirty-years.  Lean manufacturing, the principles, practices, and 
philosophies based on the real-life model of the Toyota Production System (TPS), has 
been benchmarked worldwide for the production efficiencies it creates through 
empowering workers to eliminate wasted time, material, and other resources.  Yet, lean 
remanufacturing, the marriage of lifecycle efficiency and production process efficiency, 
has remained a largely untapped opportunity.  This dissertation is a socio-technical study 
of lean manufacturing applications and deployment within the remanufacturing context.   
 
First, the application of lean production tools and techniques are examined in four unique 
contexts of the remanufacturing industry.  The organizational contingency design model 
of the product-process matrix is used to bridge the gap between manufacturing theory and 
remanufacturing application.  In each case study, lean methods are applied with 
significant benefits to operations.  It is recognized that lean methods must be adapted to 
fit the context in which they are applied.  High-variability and low-variability 
applications of lean methods are identified for remanufacturing context. 
 xi 
 
Second, the methodology by which lean production is deployed within a single 
remanufacturing organization is examined.  Two approaches are identified: (1) a 
mechanistic approach, prescribing widespread deployment, rigid organizational training, 
and infrastructure and (2) an organic approach, emphasizing focused deployment, 
organizational learning, and evolution of improvement initiatives.  Ultimately, successful 
deployment must blend organic and mechanistic implementation.   
 
Finally, the deployment of lean production throughout a large geographically diverse 
extended enterprise is considered.  Theories of organizational life cycle growth and 
development are examined and integrated with theories of enabling and coercive 
deployment.   The result is a greater understanding of mechanisms by which an 
organization can become subject to an internal deployment that is coercive, inhibiting 
true lean transformation, or one that is enabling, promoting true lean transformations. 
 
This dissertation is useful to an organization implementing lean methods in any 









A SOCIO-TECHNICAL STUDY OF LEAN MANUFACTURING  




The 20th century saw tremendous wealth created in the United States as American 
industry transformed vast raw materials into finished goods to be consumed domestically 
and shipped to lesser industrialized nations around the world.  The dawn of the 21st 
century presents a very different global economic landscape as some of the world’s most 
populous nations undergo rapid industrialization.  Global competition to American 
manufacturing has arisen in nearly every industry.  Raw materials goods, such as oil, iron, 
steel, copper, and plastics have seen a dramatic rise in both price and scarcity as they 
have experienced a significant spike in global demand.  And the environment, 
particularly the emphasis on developing a sustainable environment, is at the forefront of 
social conscience in many advanced nations.  This dramatic increase in scarcity of raw 
materials and increased emphasis on environmental responsibility places tremendous 
importance on the ways in which society reuses, recycles, and remanufactures material 
goods.   
 
 1 
Remanufacturing, the process of restoring used material goods to like-new condition, has 
been lauded as “the next great opportunity for boosting U.S. productivity.” (Giuntini and 
Gaudette, 2003)  It re-introduces a product to the marketplace in “like new” condition at 
costs typically 40 to 65 percent less than original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and 
can retain up to 95% of both the material and geometric (shape) value of a used product.  
(EPA, 1997; Bras and McIntosh, 1999) 
 
Remanufacturing has been termed “the ultimate form of recycling” for the way in which 
it prevents large industrial products and equipment from going to a landfill, and the way 
it requires only about 15 percent of the energy to produce a part as compared to an OEM 
process. (EPA, 1997)  From a societal perspective, remanufacturing could represent an 
opportunity for significant job creation in the U.S. as it is a labor intensive industry with 
tremendous efficiencies in logistics to be gained through production occurring near 
markets of consumption.  Germany is perhaps the world’s most aggressive nation in 
promoting remanufacturing, as each year a certain percentage of automobiles sold must 
be remanufactured, and by 2015 only 5 percent of a used automobile may be discarded in 
landfills.  (Giuntini and Gaudette, 2003)  Yet, despite wide-ranging benefits and 
opportunities, remanufacturing has remained largely untouched by technology, 
productivity, and quality advancements of the last thirty-years.  (Lund, 1996) 
 
Lean Manufacturing, the production processes, tools, and techniques inspired by the real-
life model of the Toyota Production System has been benchmarked worldwide for its 
ability to do “more with less” through efficient utilization of all resources in 
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manufacturing (manpower, material, energy, machinery and equipment).  (Womack, 
Jones, and Roos, 1990)  Toyota’s production system has proven to be a successful 
paradigm shift from traditional mass production in methods of production for mass 
markets.  Lean production, with its primary focus on the elimination of eight production 
wastes (overproduction, overprocessing, waiting, excess transportation, excess motion, 
excess inventory, unnecessary movement, defects, and unused employee creativity) has 
been applied successfully in non-automotive industries such as job shop manufacturing, 
service organizations, supply chain management, home construction, and government 
agencies.  (Liker, 2004; Womack and Jones, 1996; Ohno, 1978). 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Remanufacturing is benchmarked for its efficient creation of value in the product life 
cycle.  Lean manufacturing is benchmarked for its efficient creation of value in OEM 
operations.  The marriage of these techniques, lean remanufacturing, represents an 
opportunity to increase process efficiencies in the remanufacturing industry.  An increase 
in internal efficiency would create broader opportunities for remanufacture, and result in 
a potentially far reaching economic, environmental, and societal impact.  The primary 
objective of this research is to better understand the opportunities, challenges, and 
methodologies by which lean production tools and techniques can be successfully applied 
in the remanufacturing context.   
 
In order to achieve this research objective, lean remanufacturing application is considered 
from both a social and technical perspective, as well as at three distinct levels of analysis 
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within the organization, each representing a chapter of this dissertation: single process, 
single production facility, and extended enterprise.  A summary of lean remanufacturing 
research sub-objectives, at each of the three levels of analysis are: 
• Lean remanufacturing within a single process:  In chapter two, the research 
sub-objective is to better understand the appropriate technical design of lean 
manufacturing tools and techniques in the remanufacturing context.  This 
study seeks to de-mystify the question of if whether concepts of lean 
manufacturing apply in the remanufacturing context.  Remanufacturing, lean 
manufacturing, and lean remanufacturing are all placed within a popular 
organizational design contingency model to bridge their contextual gap.  
Additionally, the application of computer integrated manufacturing (CIM) is 
compared and contrasted with lean methods in the remanufacturing context.   
• Lean remanufacturing within a single facility/factory:  In chapter three, the 
research sub-objective is to better understand the methodology by which lean 
remanufacturing is appropriately deployed within the remanufacturing context.  
This study builds upon the research of chapter two to answer the fundamental 
question of “where do I begin?” once the technical design of lean 
remanufacturing is understood.  This study develops a roadmap for successful 
lean deployment within a single facility, giving appropriate emphasis to the 
social considerations of organizational change. 
• Lean remanufacturing within an extended enterprise:  In chapter four, the 
research sub-objective is to better understand the phenomenon by which a 
large and complex organization is transformed (or not) through deployment of 
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lean production.  The life cycle of a normative lean transformation is 
examined, as well as the impact an enabling or coercive deployment of lean 
production can have on the success or failure of that transformation.   
 
The linked results across the three levels of organizational analysis provide a 
comprehensive answer to the primary research question: what are the opportunities, 




This dissertation is the compilation of six years embedded research within REMAN, a 
large multi-divisional U.S. organization that repairs naval ships and their associated 
components.  The researcher was first introduced to remanufacturing in 2002 while 
working as a summer intern at a large REMAN naval ship remanufacturing depot.  At 
that time, REMAN was in the initial stages of what became a very large and successful 
deployment of lean production throughout their extended enterprise.  The particular 
remanufacturing depot hired the researcher to assist in the initial deployment of lean 
manufacturing tools and techniques.  The context for applying lean manufacturing 
principles to remanufacturing was unlike anything the researcher had previously seen or 
experienced.  A literature search found no previously significant application of lean 
manufacturing tools and techniques to the remanufacturing industry.  At that time, this 
dissertation was conceived.   
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The three levels of analysis parallel the researcher’s journey through lean 
remanufacturing.  The first few years were spent on the production shop floor, learning 
the applications of lean methods in remanufacturing.  This was a highly evolutionary 
period of discovery and learning within all areas of REMAN lean remanufacturing.  The 
researcher led many shop-floor lean initiatives in a variety of remanufacturing contexts 
and was considered an internal expert within the organization on lean production and was 
able to advance personal and organizational understanding through participant 
observation.  The lessons learned during this period form the theory and case studies 
presented in chapter two, “Lean Remanufacturing: Adapting Lean Tools and Techniques 
to the Remanufacturing Context.” 
 
As the maturation of lean grew within REMAN, the researcher became more engaged in 
managerial and strategic planning functions of the lean deployment.  At this time, the 
researcher had the opportunity to gain intimate knowledge of lean remanufacturing 
efforts within six repair depots (totaling $5B annual business; products ranging from 
helicopters to transport jets, small turbines to naval ship hulls), as well as a cursory 
knowledge of ten additional public and private remanufacturing depots.  A significant 
technical knowledge of lean remanufacturing had been garnered by the organization at 
this point, but significant questions arose as to the methodology for deploying such 
technical lessons.  It was during this period of learning that the researcher was introduced 
to the two uniquely different methodologies of lean deployment that are highlighted by 
the case studies of “Big Ship” and “Little Ship.”  This period of learning represented a 
maturation of complexity for lean deployment within REMAN, the researcher, and this 
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dissertation, all of which culminated in chapter three: “Comparative Cases of Lean 
Manufacturing Deployment: Organic versus Mechanistic Approaches.” 
 
After success as an implementer of lean remanufacturing at the production level and 
strategic management at the facility level, the researcher was “promoted” to a desk job at 
REMAN divisional headquarters to act as a program manager for the lean 
remanufacturing efforts within a large division of the enterprise.  Corporate program 
management of lean deployment was a tremendous challenge as lean production learned 
on the shop floor came in direct contact with bureaucratic corporate directives, policy 
deployment plans, point papers, and cost-reduction reports.  Despite all the best 
intentions to create positive transformation, among senior managers lean was not well 
understood, and endorsement of lean transformation was seen as a method to gain favor 
politically as much as it was a paradigm of process improvement.  The researcher spent 
two years observing lean production within REMAN from this corporate perspective, 
which significantly influenced chapter four: “Developing a Lean Bureaucracy: Enabling 
versus Coercive Transformation from an Organizational Life Cycle Perspective.” 
 
INTRODUCTION TO REMANUFACTURING 
This section introduces the remanufacturing market, the remanufacturing process, value 
in the product life cycle, and key differences between manufacturing and 
remanufacturing.   
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The remanufacturing market in the U.S. alone has been estimated to be $53 billion in 
annual sales, with direct employment of 480,000 personnel.  The Department of Defense 
is the largest sector, spending $10 billion annually on remanufacturing; followed closely 
by transportation ($8 billion), automotive/light truck ($6 billion), and electric generation 
($3 billion). (Giuntini and Gaudette, 2003)  In recent years, remanufacturing has grown 
significantly in the United States, offering an alternative to landfill disposal of used 
products, bringing high-quality used products to market at cheaper costs with less energy, 
and lowering demand of increasingly rare raw materials such as precious metals.  
 
Products that are remanufactured will typically share the characteristics of: (1) a non-
consumable core, (2) slow product obsolescence, (3) a market for remanufactured 
products, and (4) an available supply of cores.  (Lund, 1984)  A component’s “core” is 
typically the central piece of product geometry, the “guts” of a product.  In many 
instances, a product’s core is made of a solid long-lasting material and will not wear out 
as quickly as its sub-components, software, or other materials.  An example of a product 
core would be the body of an electric motor or an airplane fuselage.  Many 
remanufactured products are quite expensive, such as military assets or airplanes, 
resulting in a closed-loop market for product re-use through remanufacturing.  For lesser 
priced goods, such as automotive part and printer cartridges, financial incentives are often 
given to the consumer for remanufacturing a product as opposed to disposal, enabling a 
profitable market for remanufactured products.   
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While many companies have established themselves as after-market suppliers of 
remanufactured goods; remanufacturing is quickly becoming an integral part of a 
lifecycle product ownership business strategy for many companies, as industrial giants 
such as General Electric and Boeing offer integrated manufacturing and life cycle 
maintenance packages to customers of their power turbines and aircraft, respectively.  
Lifecycle support becomes increasingly popular as OEM’s are able to take advantage of 
concepts such as “Design for Life Cycle Maintenance” to both decrease life cycle costs to 
the final customer and for OEM’s to recognize recurring profits from sales of large 
equipment through contractually planned and unplanned maintenance.  (Amezquita, et al., 
1995) 
 
The Remanufacturing Process:  
Remanufacturing will occur at one of two fundamental levels, those of component 
remanufacturing and system remanufacturing.  A component remanufacturing process, 
the most fundamental level, is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  A remanufacturing process can 
be initially triggered in one of two ways: the customer relinquishes possession of a 
specific product to the remanufacturing organization (closed-loop cycle, in which case 
they will wait to receive the same product in return), or the remanufacturing organization 
may take possession of a standard core asset for processing to an unknown customer 
(open-loop cycle).  Both forms of customer-supplier relations are common and are 
























































































Figure 1.1 – Component Remanufacturing Process  
 
Upon receipt of the core asset, the remanufacturing agent will disassemble the component 
(to the degree technically necessary) to determine the status of all critical surfaces and 
pieces.  During component evaluation, the core is closely examined for deterioration or 
wear and all smaller pieces are evaluated for re-use.  Often smaller, less expensive parts 
(nuts/bolts/o-rings), or parts with short obsolescence cycles (electronics) will be pre-
determined for automatic replacement, regardless of condition.  During the component 
evaluation process, it is determined what pieces must be replaced, repaired, or 
remanufactured.  At this point the necessary material preparation and acquisition of 
materials, tools, and technical instructions will take place such that the core and required 
parts are prepared for re-assembly.  Once all pieces resemble, in function if not form, 
those provided by an OEM, the assembly and test processes are completed.   
 
A particular challenge in the remanufacturing process is that processing required to repair 
and replace parts may vary significantly, as a function of the components incoming 
 10 
condition.  Incoming condition may be impacted by a variety of factors, including age, 
environment, usage, and regular maintenance.  As a result, the component evaluation 
process brings inherent variability to the remanufacturing process.  In the remanufacture 
of some products, this variability can be so significant it is not economically reasonable 
to remanufacture on a large scale, or in some cases a high-percentage of returnable cores 
are not eligible for remanufacture.   
 
Remanufacture can also be completed at a second, more sophisticated level, that of 
systems remanufacturing.  Systems remanufacturing differs from component 
remanufacturing only in that a system must be disassembled to its necessary components 
and sub-systems before material processing can occur, resulting in the potential for many 
components and sub-systems for remanufacture.  Systems remanufacturing is illustrated 
in Figure 1.2, in which the system must be deconstructed and each component/sub-
system evaluated individually.  An example is the difference between the remanufacture 
of a single hydraulics pump (component manufacturing) and the remanufacture of a 
hydraulics system on a Boeing 737 (system of components).  As would be expected, the 
complexity of a remanufacturing operation is greatly variable with respect to the number, 
size, and intricacy of subsystems and components that must be evaluated and repaired or 







































































































































































































































Figure 1.2 – Systems Remanufacturing Process  
 
Creating Value in the Product Life Cycle through Remanufacturing:  
As has been mentioned, remanufacturing is growing in popularity for a variety of 
economic (new products at a lower cost, sustained value of product, life cycle 
maintenance contracts), environmental (less waste in landfills), and societal (more jobs, 
less dependence on rare raw materials) reasons.  (Giuntini and Gaudette, 2003)  To 
illustrate the value created in the product life cycle through remanufacturing, Figure 1.3 






















New Product  
(OEM) New Product with OEM Capability 
Modernized Product 
(Remanufactured and Modernize) Like-New Product with Newest Capability
Worn/Repairable Product with OEM Capability
Significant Geometric Value 
Zero Value 100% OEM Value
Raw/Scrap Material Value 
(Disposal/Decontamination Expense) 
Figure 1.3 – Value in the Product Life Cycle 
 
Utilizing a newly manufactured product as a baseline, this represents 100% of the OEM 
value.  That same product, which is damaged yet repairable, would have a decreased 
relative value in that it could be repaired and put back into service at a relatively minimal 
cost.  Recycling of scrap materials creates significantly less relative “value” to repair or 
remanufacture; recycling sacrifices all geometric value existing in a product, ultimately 
requiring a significant processing investment to retain a useable commodity.  In many 
instances, material disposal, simply throwing a product away, has a negative value as 
costs are associated with disposal and decontamination of product.  Remanufacturing 
offers a new set of options in the product lifecycle; a part which is damaged or worn 
beyond repair has less relative value than a repairable product, however, it represents far 
greater value than basic raw materials of recycling.  In the event the component core is 
remanufactured, the resulting value is often higher than original manufacture, as the base 
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component is typically restored to like new conditions, plus the latest materials, 
technologies, and advanced capabilities may also be integrated into the product.   
 
A common example of these concepts in every day living would be in considering 
disposal of a plastic water bottle.  In 2004, the United States consumed approximately 
154 billion liters of bottled water, it is estimated that as much as 84-percent of these 
bottles become garbage or litter.  (Arnold and Larsen, 2006)  A plastic water bottle is a 
common consumer item which can be disposed of, recycled to raw materials, or 
reprocessed (remanufactured) for re-use.  Recycling would suggest the water bottle is 
broken down into its fundamental materials and re-formed to make a new water bottle.  
Remanufacturing suggests the water bottle can be safely cleaned and sanitized for reuse.  
Disposal in a landfill takes up significant room, however, the bottle will likely biodegrade 
within hundreds of years.  This is a simple example of bottled water, but the same 
example can be used for heavy machinery, military equipment, beer bottles, and many 
other products.   
 
In many cases, such as with plastic water bottles, the U.S. consumer is not price sensitive 
to the point of desiring remanufactured goods, but it has been identified that almost 40-
percent of “recycled” water bottles in the U.S. are shipped to China and other developing 
nations for both reuse and disposal.  (Arnold and Larsen, 2006)  These nations are also 
consuming large amounts of bottled water, by cleaning bottles (essentially 
remanufacturing them), these nations are able to create a cheaper, and ultimately more 
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environmentally friendly water bottle, thus creating jobs for the local economy 
(processing bottles) and greater national wealth (less money spent on water bottles).   
 
Understanding Key Differences between Remanufacturing and Manufacturing: 
At a macro-level, the remanufacturing industry could best be termed as an industrial 
hybrid between original equipment manufacturing and a service organization.  Figure 1.4 
illustrates many of the similarities and differences remanufacturing shares with both 










• Production and consumption take 
place simultaneously
• Labor and Knowledge Intensive
• High customer interaction
• Human element is very important
• Quality is perceived and difficult to
measure
• Rapid response time is usually
necessary
• Site of facility is extremely important
Manufacturing Processes
• Tangible output
• Production can be inventoried for
later consumption
• Capital asset-intensive
• Low customer interaction
• Human element may be less important
• Quality is directly measured
• Longer response time is acceptable
• Site of facility is moderately important
Remanufacturing Processes
• Tangible output
• Production and consumption take 
place nearly simultaneously
• Labor, knowledge, and capital Intensive
• Moderate customer interaction
• Human element is very important
• Quality is directly measured
• Rapid response time is usually
necessary
• Site of facility is extremely important
Source: Service, Reichheld and Sasser, 1990; Manufacturing, Bowen, Siehl, Schneider., 1989.
Figure 1.4 – Remanufacturing as a Product/Service Hybrid 
 
Remanufacturing is similar to a manufacturing process in that it has tangible outputs, is 
capital asset-intensive (often requiring a large capital footprint), and quality of product 
can be directly measured.  However, remanufacturing differs from classic manufacturing 
most significantly in the relationship between customer and supplier.  In many instances, 
as observed earlier in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, the trigger for a remanufacturing process is for 
the customer to relinquish possession of the product to the remanufacturing organization.  
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With this relationship between customer and supplier, rapid response time is very 
important as production and consumption take place nearly simultaneously.  
Remanufacturing also tends to be very labor and knowledge intensive, while not as 
capital asset intensive as classic manufacturing.  As observed in many instances, 
tradesmen in the remanufacturing industry have advanced from earlier jobs as tradesman 
in original manufacturing and possess a broader and higher skill set.  In part due to the 
skilled workforce, also due to work content, the human element of production is very 
important in remanufacturing and less emphasis is typically placed on automation.  
Finally, due to the relationship between customer and supplier, a greater emphasis is 
placed on the geographic location of operation; it is more important that remanufacturing 
be located near customers for a rapid product turnaround. 
 
In considering differences between remanufacturing and manufacturing at a more 
process-oriented level a key consideration is predictability of processing.  A 
manufacturing process is relatively consistent and straightforward in that you acquire the 
necessary resources (manpower, raw materials, and equipment), technical instruction, and 
independently align them to customer demand.  This may vary according to the 
complexity of the product or specificity of customer requirements, but manufacturing 
generally lends itself towards a highly-predictable repetitive process, as shown below in 
























Figure 1.5 - Component Manufacturing Process  
 
Over the course of decades, leading manufacturers like Toyota have been able to master 
manufacturing processes to the point of appearing as an “industrial symphony of moving 
parts and machinery” by continuously eliminating sources of variability in processing.  
However, as was discussed earlier, in the case of remanufacturing, product and process 
variability is naturally inherent as a function of the quality and condition of incoming 
parts.  Whereas manufacturing can optimize productivity for a dependable set of 
operating conditions, remanufacturing organizations must be prepared to efficiently 
process the expected, while effectively processing the unexpected.   
 
INTRODUCTION TO LEAN MANUFACTURING 
The Toyota Production System is the real-life model from which all understanding of 
lean manufacturing originates.  Lean will be introduced throughout this dissertation from 
a variety of perspectives and contexts.  This introductory discussion is focused on the 
single most fundamental of being a lean producer; the ability to produce with minimal 
amounts of muda (Japanese word for waste.)   
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Toyota’s Vision – The Fundamentals of Lean Manufacturing: 
The Machine that Changed the World (Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990), a summary of a 
worldwide benchmarking study of the automotive industry conducted at MIT’s 
International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP), introduced the concept of lean production 
as a new paradigm of manufacturing.  This study identified the Toyota Motor company as 
a world-class manufacturer of automobiles for their product quality, production cycle 
time, annual inventory turns, employee turnover rates, and overall efficiency.  An IMVP 
researcher termed the organization as being “lean”, having the ability to do more with 
less.  
 
The term lean has become a popular corporate buzzword, associated with lowest cost, 
highest quality, and shortest lead-time, all desirable outcomes for any organization.  Yet 
the most fundamental definition of a lean production operation is: to create value to the 
customer with little or no waste existing in operations.  (Womack and Jones, 1996)  
Waste is considered as the expenditure of any resource (time, money, material, 
manpower, opportunity) that does not add direct value which a customer is willing to pay 
for.  Waste, also termed non-value-added activity, has been characterized by Toyota 
according to seven major types, with an eighth added later, they are:  
• Overproduction; producing an item at an earlier time, or in greater quantity 
than a customer desires to consume. 
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• Waiting (time on hand); workers, materials, machines, or other resources 
sitting idle as another operation completes or as in waiting for material or 
information.   
• Transportation; more than the minimum required movement of material goods 
during processing and delivery to the customer. 
• Overprocessing or incorrect processing; producing a component which has 
more value added than the customer desires to consume (overprocessing), or 
does not meet customer defined requirements (incorrect processing). 
• Excess inventory; possessing more than the minimum required quantity of 
parts or raw materials to meet customer desired consumption. 
• Unnecessary movement; more than the minimum required human movement 
during processing and delivery to the consumer. 
• Defects; production of parts which do not meet set specifications for quality 
and/or customer defined requirements, often resulting in corrective action.   
• Unused employee creativity; lost ideas, skills, improvements, and learning 
opportunities by not engaging or listening to employees.    
 
One model used to illustrate Toyota’s methodology of waste elimination is that of the 
“Waste Reduction Model”, developed by Liker and Meier (2006), show in Figure 1.6.  
This model illustrates the iterative process by which Toyota promotes waste reduction.  
Beginning with the fundamental philosophy of waste elimination will lead an 
organization to seek out continuous flow of value.  Creating continuous flow of value 
will have the effect of reducing lead time, a significant value unto itself, but more 
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importantly it will allow the producer to begin looking at their production system as a set 
of interdependent “connected processes.”  These would be the remaining process steps 
that can not be combined, condensed, or eliminated to produce continuous flow of value.  
These interdependent processes shall be connected by pull systems, so as to maintain 
minimal inventories and establish disciplined linkages between operations.  Pull systems 
can be created using the lean tools of kanban (inventory card system), supermarkets, and 
first-in, first-out production lanes.  As a result of disciplined adherence to pull system 
parameters, and an effort to continually reduce the size of the pull system so as to more 
closely approach a continuous flow system, problems (abnormalities) are clearly and 
quickly identified and dealt with to maintain production.  As a result of rapid and 
disciplined problem solving, organizations are better able to both maintain production 
(band aid fix) and conduct root cause analysis and correction, all of which will lead to 
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Figure 1.6 – Waste Reduction Model (Liker and Meier, 2006) 
 
Moving forward with Research: 
This chapter has introduced the research objective and research methods.  It also provided 
a background concerning both remanufacturing and lean manufacturing.  Chapter two 






LEAN REMANUFACTURING: ADAPTING LEAN TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 




Remanufacturing, the process of restoring used material goods to like-new condition, is a 
$53 Billion annual industry in the United States.  Remanufacturing has been lauded as 
“the next great opportunity for boosting U.S. productivity” (Giuntini and Gaudette, 2003) 
and “the ultimate form of recycling” (EPA, 1997) as it creates multiple iterations of the 
product lifecycle.  Yet, remanufacturing, an industrial product-service hybrid, has 
remained largely untouched by technology, productivity, and quality advances of the last 
thirty-years.  In that time, computer integrated manufacturing (CIM), lean manufacturing, 
advanced mass production, and other techniques have significantly advanced original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) strategies, structure, and technology.  (Lund, 1996) 
 
Lean manufacturing, the principles, practices, and philosophies based on the real-life 
model of the Toyota Production System (TPS), has been benchmarked worldwide for the 
production efficiencies it creates through empowering workers to eliminate wasted time, 
material, and other resources; all towards the goal of reducing lead time from customer 
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order to product delivery.  (Liker, 2004)  The creators of the term “lean” estimate 
dramatic improvements of lean manufacturing over traditional mass production to 
roughly ½ the human effort in the factory, ½ the manufacturing space, ½ the tool 
investment, ½ the engineering hours, and ½ the time to develop new products as 
compared with non-lean competitors (Womack and Jones, 1990).  The benefits of lean 
production have not been limited to the automotive industry.  Lean has spurred improved 
efficiency and growth across many diverse industries; including job shop manufacturing, 
service organizations, supply chain management, home construction, and government 
agencies.  (Liker, 2002, 2004, 2008; Womack and Jones, 1996). 
 
Yet, lean remanufacturing, the marriage of lifecycle efficiency and production process 
efficiency, has remained a largely untapped opportunity.  The remanufacturing process 
(which fundamentally consists of product teardown, product evaluation, component 
repair and replacement, assembly, and test) presents many unique processing challenges 
compared to an original equipment manufacturing process. (Lund, 1984)  A traditional 
manufacturing process often is highly repetitive, allowing for a reduction in process 
variability through precise specification of standardized work, sequencing, process times, 
and work in process, all supporting a required takt (demand pace) time.   In 
manufacturing, variability is most commonly a result of internal processing, while in 
remanufacturing variability is naturally inherent as a function of the incoming component 
condition such as age, environment, usage, and regular maintenance. In a sense, a 
remanufactured component is like an engineered-to-order product with different 
specifications and unique work content for each unit of production.  The inherent 
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differences of each unit complicate the application of lean manufacturing tools and 
techniques to remanufacturing.   
 
This chapter examines the challenges, opportunities, and methods, for successful 
application of lean production tools and techniques within the remanufacturing context.  
This is done through a combination of adapting theories of technical system design and of 
real-world case studies in which lean methods were implemented in a remanufacturing 
context.  Lean production is commonly recognized as being socio-technical in nature, in 
that successful deployment of tools and techniques must be both socially (cultural) and 
technically (process) oriented.  Later chapters of this dissertation focus on the application 
of lean as a socio-technical system to remanufacturing.  This chapter sets the stage by 
focusing primarily on the technical challenges of developing lean solutions in a 
remanufacturing context.   
 
The introductory chapter of this dissertation discussed some of the fundamental 
differences between remanufacturing and manufacturing.  This chapter builds upon this 
discussion to focus more closely on differences that may effect application of lean 
methods.  This chapter goes further, utilizing the organizational design contingency 
theories, adapted from classic manufacturing, to describe (and ultimately prescribe) 
appropriate utilization of lean methods in a variety of remanufacturing contexts.  The 
popular organizational design contingency model of the product-process matrix (PPM) 
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979a) is used to bridge the gap between the manufacturing 
theory and remanufacturing context. 
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Using this model, four unique contexts of remanufacturing are identified, a function of 
product variability (volume, standardization, dependability of condition), ranging from 
high to low.  Case studies of lean remanufacturing application in each of these four 
contexts are examined to better understand the successful application of lean methods.  
The cases demonstrate ways lean methods must be tailored to each unique context.  The 
result is an understanding of lean methods as applied across the spectrum of high-product 
variability to low-product variability remanufacturing.  In the case of high-product 
variability remanufacturing, lean methods are applied to create greater efficiency and 
flexibility.  In low-product variability remanufacturing, lean methods are applied to 
create greater efficiency and specialization.  Ultimately, this paper increases knowledge 
and understanding of the successful application of lean methods to remanufacturing.   
 
INTRODUCTION TO LEAN REMANUFACTURING 
In 2002, the researcher for this paper arrived at a large naval ship remanufacturing 
facility to work as a lean manufacturing change agent.  The researcher was equipped with 
lean manufacturing tools such as takt time calculations, strategies for implementing 
andon systems on an assembly line, methods for sizing kanban systems, and methods to 
reconfigure production lines to eliminate unnecessary travel and transportation.  Yet, the 
observed processes did not match the context in which Toyota employed these tools.  In 
fact, there were many within the remanufacturing facility who were convinced lean 
production did not apply in their industry, after all, they were not Toyota!  It was quickly 
evident a tremendous gap existed between the application of lean tools and techniques to 
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the manufacture of an automobile every 56-seconds and the 18-month remanufacture of a 
$2 billion naval vessel   
 
Defining Waste in Remanufacturing: 
The Toyota Production System has been benchmarked worldwide for its overall 
efficiency and continuous drive to produce “waste free.”  Toyota identified seven forms 
of waste (overproduction, waiting, unnecessary transport, overprocessing, excess 
inventory, unnecessary movement, defects) with an eighth added later (unused employee 
creativity), that are arguably present in any manufacturing process.  (Liker, 2004)  Yet, if 
being a “lean producer” fundamentally means to produce with little or no wasted time, 
material or other resources; do the same wastes exist in remanufacturing?  In this 
discussion we question commonly held beliefs on “waste” in remanufacturing and 
highlight common examples of waste that must be considered.   
 
Value, in contrast to waste, has been defined as “anything the customer is willing to pay 
for.”  A second common definition is “any process that transforms the form, fit, or 
function of a customer-desired product.”  Yet, in remanufacturing, much of the initial 
work (component and system disassembly) effectively decreases the value of the existing 
product.  For example, a motor which can be “patched up” with little expenditure of 
resources has greater intrinsic value than that same motor which has been disassembled 
for remanufacture.  How can a process be considered value-added if it reduces overall 
value of the existing product?  Do processes of component teardown, component 
evaluation, and component test fit the definition of value add?  Consider the component 
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remanufacturing process illustrated in Figure 2.1.  These processes require significant 
expenditure of resources for a remanufacturing agency, yet component teardown does 
effectively reduce the value inherent in a damaged/worn product.  It is hard to argue these 
key processes add value to the end user.  It seems repair of worn parts, acquisition of 
replacement parts, and component re-assembly are the only true value-added function 
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Figure 2.1 – Value and Non-Value in Component Remanufacturing 
 
This is not to say component teardown, evaluation, and test can be eliminated as simply 
waste.  Despite the fact they do change the “form, fit, or function” of the component 
these steps are clearly not value added, but are still required in remanufacturing.  Toyota 
uses terminology of “non-value added work” for such items as logistics support and test; 
 27 
processes which do not add value from the customer’s perspective, but are required to 
consistently deliver a quality product.   
 
Some may debate value-add/non-value add while others may argue this discussion is 
simply semantics as the process is “required.”  Yet, it is important when considering a 
lean producer would strive to eliminate non-value added activities altogether, while 
emphasizing the streamlining of value-added processes.  Component evaluation or 
component test may be conducted with too much rigor for products that do not need to be 
evaluated or tested.  Great care may be taken in disassembling components that will 
simply be discarded.   
 
The remanufacturing context requires reconsideration of commonly held paradigms of 
value and non-value.  Consistent with the definition of non-value added work, many 
resources are expended in remanufacturing (perhaps a higher percentage than in original 
equipment manufacturing) that transform the product, but do not ultimately add value to 
the final customer.  While remanufacturing is appropriately lauded for its efficiency and 
effectiveness in creating lifecycle value, this inherent inefficiency (waste) in processing 
must be considered.   
 
When waste is considered at a more tangible production-level of remanufacturing 
processes, the concept of waste is clearer. Figure 2.2 identifies common examples for 
each of the eight wastes as observed in remanufacturing processes. 


























- Processing materials and components before the required time. 
- Processing components that ultimately can not be remanufactured.
- Remanufactured components becoming obsolete.
- Last-out first-in disassembly to re-assembly cycle leaves components idle.
- Difficulty in aligning all resources (production, logistics, engineering, lifting 
& handling, other support) at the work site.
- Geometric complexities of disassembling large and complex systems with 
components being worked in smaller machine shop environments.
- Large industrial footprint of most remanufacturing organizations
- Tendency to error on the side of conservatism is hand-processed 
remanufactured materials and components.
- Complex and interrelated customer/supplier relationships.
- A “bow wave” of materials and components is created as products are torn 
apart very quickly, only to be repaired and re-assembled more slowly.
- Supply system must support a variety of condition/processing contingencies.
- Large industrial footprint of most remanufacturing organizations.
- Difficulty in aligning all resources (production, logistics, engineering, lifting 
& handling, other support) at the work site.
- Overly-aggressive, overly-optimistic, or overly creative strategy for materials 
and components; resulting in: incorrect assessment of condition or 
incorrect processing of component.
- Many remanufacturing tasks are non-repetitive and more difficult to 
incorporate employee ideas into future processing.
Figure 2.2 – Common Examples of Waste in Remanufacturing 
 
In manufacturing, overproduction is considered the most significant form of waste 
because of the multiplying effect it has to create other wastes.  (Monden, 1998)  The 
remanufacturing context is no different.  In remanufacturing, overproduction commonly 
occurs in the disassembly of components before the (internal) customer is ready to 
receive them.  Component disassembly is a low-variability process with short cycle time 
(as compared to repair and re-assembly) that uncovers component condition (significant 
source of production variability).  Many remanufacturing organizations will disassemble 
a product as quickly as possible to determine condition, creating a glut, or “bow wave” of 
components and materials for remanufacture; making it the most significant form of 
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waste in remanufacturing.  An additional form of overproduction can occur when a 
product is remanufactured for use at a later date.  Often, an older component may be 
remanufactured, only to become obsolete while sitting on the shelf.   
 
Waiting frequently occurs as a result of production sequencing in remanufacturing.  
Similar to peeling back an onion, a large subsystem must be disassembled in layers, with 
the last component being removed often being the first component involved in re-
assembly.  This results in a last-out first-in sequencing results in waiting as significant 
material assets wait to be remanufactured.  Waiting additionally occurs in 
remanufacturing due to the overall complexities in major system remanufacturing.  Many 
components for remanufacture will cross multiple system and geographic zones of a 
major system at the same time.  This results in significant complexities associated with 
all resources (production, logistics, engineering, lifting & handling, other support) 
required to complete a task.   
 
For a major remanufacturing project, all components and materials will originate at a 
single location with disassembly of the product core.  Then the components are likely to 
be taken to more controlled industrial locations for repair and processing.  This will often 
result in unnecessary transport as components radiate out from the core and are then 
returned for re-assembly.  Additionally, due to the major infrastructure requirements for 
large-scale remanufacturing, many remanufacturing facilities have a large geographic 
footprint, which exacerbates the transportation issue.  Also, like many industrial 
organizations, many remanufacturing sites have evolved according to functional 
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departments, creating physical and informational barriers to product-flow.  In many 
observed remanufacturing processes such as paint, sandblast, engineering, and test are 
functionally located away from the flow of production.   
 
Excess inventory is often the direct result of product and process variability, as well as 
the overproduction occurring in early disassembly.  In most instances of remanufacturing, 
the condition of a product (and required repairs, materials, and components) is not known 
until the core is fully disassembled and assessed.  In some instances, a long lead time may 
be associated with certain material items, if they can be purchased at all.  As a strategic 
buffer against this product variability, many remanufacturing organizations will maintain 
significant levels of contingent repair material.  In many instances this material will 
become obsolete or damaged over time and never used.  This is not to suggest that all 
contingent repair material is excess inventory and should be disposed of, but that the 
remanufacturing agency must continually examine and refresh their inventory strategies.   
 
Unnecessary movement, is rampant if one follows the mechanics around.  They are the 
value-added workers in remanufacture.  They spend a good deal of their time leaving the 
site of the actual value-added work to go and fetch things—tools, cleaning supplies, parts, 
and so on.   
 
Defects can occur in remanufacturing as a result of incorrect condition assessment or 
improper processing.  Much of the work done in remanufacturing is completed by hand, 
providing significant opportunity for variation that leads to defects.  Whereas a 
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component is particularly badly worn or damaged and a replacement does not exist, 
remanufacturing engineers may be overly aggressive in developing a repair or 
remediation strategy for a component that simply is beyond salvage through 
remanufacturing.  This may be an extreme example, but has occurred many times for 
non-critical components.   
 
Overprocessing, doing more work than is required, is also a significant form of waste in 
remanufacturing that is directly related to the waste of defects.  Many large products for 
remanufacture, such as transportation equipment and military equipment, have extremely 
high-costs of failure while in use.  As a result, many remanufacturing organizations tend 
towards extremely high degrees of technical oversight and low degrees of risk in 
processing of critical components, resulting in overly conservative product assessments 
and high processing requirements.  Merely the prospect of process defects can ultimately 
create significant waste through redundancy of processes.   
 
Finally, unused employee creativity exists in remanufacturing just as it does in any other 
industry.  What is unique about remanufacturing is the infrequency of some operations.  
Repetitive processing provides more cycles for continuous improvement.  If a process is 
only performed a few times a year, improvement initiatives may not be developed or the 
business case for their development may not exist.  A bigger problem is that, like many 
other traditional organizations, the gap between top management and the worker is so 
large that worker ideas often simply get lost and never implemented. 
 
 32 
The majority of these examples of waste are not remanufacturing specific.  To a degree 
the objective of this discussion is recognizing the many parallels in manufacturing and 
remanufacturing processing.  Yet, each explanation highlighted some unique aspects that 
are specific to the remanufacturing context.   
 
 
A CONTINGENCY THEORY APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING LEAN IN A 
REMANUFACTURING CONTEXT 
 “Lean production won’t work in overhaul and repair, we don’t build cars!” 
This was a popular sentiment within the remanufacturing industry; many were convinced 
the Toyota Production System had no business in an overhaul and repair environment.  
Yet, to dig deeper into this question one must begin to understand the intersection of 
production theories relating lean manufacturing and remanufacturing.  The discussion 
thus far has mostly emphasized differences to be considered when applying lean 
techniques to remanufacturing, yet, many remanufacturing processes are similar to 
original equipment manufacturing.  To understand the similarities with manufacturing, it 
is necessary to first differentiate and define the unique contexts within remanufacturing.   
 
Contingency theories of organizational design suggest an organization must first 
determine its core technical production processes and then relate this to the appropriate 
(contingent) organizational design.  Contingency theory will be used to analyze the need 
for an appropriate “fit” between the process environment (e.g. remanufacturing) and the 
application of specific technical tools (e.g. lean production).   This discussion uses the 
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popular organizational design contingency model of the product-process matrix (Hayes 
and Wheelwright, 1979a) to provide a theoretical foundation for comparing traditional 
manufacturing methods, lean production, and the remanufacturing context. 
 
Historical Perspective on Organizational Design Theory: 
Many prescriptive models exist for design of organizations, organizational infrastructure, 
process layout, and technology selection in manufacturing operations.  During the early-
half of the twentieth century, many of these prescriptive models were built upon what 
was considered “universal principles of management.”  These theories promoted a one-
best-way of organizational design based upon thinking of Adam Smith (division of labor), 
Frederick Taylor (scientific management), and Henry Ford (moving assembly line).  By 
using these concepts, organizations were able to achieve never-before-seen levels of 
output and efficiency, which contributed significantly to rapid increase in the standard of 
living in industrialized nations.  These theories are summarized best in the philosophy of 
scientific management; suggesting that individual jobs as well as the supporting 
management environment can be set up in “one best way” to maximize productivity.  
Over time it became clear these principles were ideal for a large organization operating 
within a very stable market, such as the automotive market and iron mining in the early 
20th century (inspiration for philosophies of Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor, 
respectively), but may be mismatched in other industries.  These universal management 
theories eventually gave way to contingency theories of organization.   
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Contingency theory suggests the ideal structure for an organization will vary according to 
the external environment of the firm and its technical core, and that an organizations 
structural design should “fit” with key operational and environmental parameters.  
Contingency theory had its origins with a 1950s study of British manufacturing firms by 
industrial sociologist Joan Woodward.  At a time when one-best-way thinking was 
popular, Woodward (1965) identified a correlation between the “best” organizational 
design and the complexity of technology used in production within successful companies.  
This study identified three dominant organizational structures based on the utilized 
technology of unit production (small batches, customized products), mass production 
(standardized, large volume), and continuous process (continuous, automated) production.  
Each of these organizations was characterized by structural dimensions including: 
number of management levels, supervisor span of control, labor ratios, formalized 
procedures, centralization, and overall structure.  
 
Woodward’s (1965) contingency theory of organizational design was later enhanced by 
the work of Robert Hayes and Steven Wheelwright in the 1970s.  Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1979b) recognized a relationship between the maturation of a product in 
the marketplace and the maturation of the process technology to be used in manufacture, 
effectively adding the product dimension to Woodward’s theory.  This model is known as 
the product-process matrix (PPM), a leading framework in contingency theory of 




Economic/Efficiency Influence on Organizational Design Theory: 
The theoretical foundation for the theories of Taylor and Ford, as well as Woodward, 
Hayes, and Wheelwright, is the economic theory known as economies of scale.  This 
theory suggests the greatest level of cost efficiency exists with the largest level of output, 
where fixed costs of production are distributed over the largest number of production 
units.  This paradigm suggests that to remain efficient a fundamental trade-off must exist 
between operational flexibility and efficiency.  (Daft, 1978) 
 
In a post-World War II Japanese economy, Toyota did not have the luxury of operating in 
the paradigm of economies of scale.  As compared to their North American competitors, 
their markets were small and diverse.  Toyota recognized that in order to survive they 
must offer quality cars at a competitive price to their larger overseas competitors, in 
relatively low-volume and high-variety production. (Ohno, 1978)  Toyota was one of the 
first major manufacturers worldwide to achieve benefits from an economic model now 
termed economies of scope.  This theory suggests that organizational efficiency can be 
gained through increasing the breadth of product options and capability, rather than size 
of markets and volume of production.   
 
Toyota had developed a production methodology by which they were able to have both 
efficient production, and flexibility associated with small lot, customized products.  Lean 
manufacturing was first introduced to a wide audience in The Machine that Changed the 
World (Womack and Jones, 1990).  This study highlighted the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Toyota Production System and presented a new paradigm of 
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production, one in which both customization and efficiency could be achieved, without 
tradeoffs and without complex automation.  As Toyota grew to the high-volume producer 
(they are today number-one in automotive sales), they never abandoned the original 
production philosophy that made them successful when operating in a low-volume 
environment.  Toyota’s efficiency, which is based in economies of scope, is not clearly 
understood through popular contingency theories, which are based in economies of scale.   
 
CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS OF THE LEAN PARADIGM 
Contingency theorists recognize that an organizational design must “fit” within its 
operating environment.  Woodward (1965) further suggests an organization must first 
determine its core technical processes, then design the organization and social system to 
support the technical core.  Organizational design contingency models are used to link 
production technique and the appropriate organizational application.  Similarly, the 
contingency model of the product-process matrix will be used to link manufacturing and 
remanufacturing contexts for lean production.  
 
Contingency Analysis: Product-Process Matrix: 
The product-process matrix, first published in 1979, considered the appropriate fit of 
organizational design relative to the characteristics of maturity of product being 
produced, maturity of process used in production, maturity of the market, and maturity of 
core technologies used.  The PPM, shown in Figure 2.3, specifically identified that new 
products to market are generally produced in low volume and should use technologies 
characteristic of a job shop environment; slightly more mature products suggest larger 
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volume and should utilize technologies characteristic of an assembly line with connected 
line flow; and mature products will be produced as high-volume standardized products 
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I                                       
low volume/           
low standardization 
(one of a kind)
II                                       
lower volume/       
multiple products
III                                       
higher volume/      
few major products
IV                                       
high volume/           
high standardization, 
(commodity products)
Figure 2.3 – Product-Process Matrix (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979a) 
 
The model proposed that trade-offs must occur between product and process 
characteristics.  Efficient production could only occur within the diagonal axis of the 
PPM.  Hayes and Wheelwright suggested organizations operating off the diagonal are 
less efficient, and would ultimately migrate to the diagonal in order to survive.  As noted 
in the PPM model, processes can not exist in the corners of this matrix (continuous flow 
of customized parts or jumbled process flow of commodity goods) due to the 
misalignment of discrete and non-discrete manufacturing.   
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The major contribution of the PPM was to suggest a second dimension, product-life 
cycle, to Woodward’s contingency model of process technology.  The PPM is grounded 
in economies of scale thinking, and highlights the perceived trade-off between flexibility 
and efficiency.  This theory, along with Woodward’s work, was significant at a time 
when organizations in nearly every industry were searching for mass markets and a mass 
production/assembly line approach to greater performance.   
 
Remanufacturing and the Product-Process Matrix: 
The remanufacturing industry can be placed within the product-process matrix; however, 
the industry as a whole is largely considered technically immature and would not exist on 
the diagonal of efficiency.  Technical challenges associated with disassembling, 
analyzing, restoring, and re-assembling existing components have led to what is 
considered an over-reliance on hand tools, rudimentary diagnostic equipment, and 
generic machining capabilities within the remanufacturing industry.  (Lund, 1996)  Due 
in large part to these issues, the industry has been unable to fully capitalize on 
productivity improvements associated with advanced technology.  Relative to the PPM, 
this would place remanufacturing generally above the diagonal of efficiency, as shown in 
Figure 2.4, suggesting immature selections of technology for the work conducted.  This is 
consistent with observed remanufacturing organizations in which piece part production 
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Figure 2.4 – Remanufacturing, an Immature Industry on the PPM 
 
According to Hayes and Wheelwright, the placement of the remanufacturing industry 
above the diagonal would suggest an opportunity exists to improve remanufacturing 
through technology and production realignment.  However, technical process challenges 
of the remanufacturing industry, as previously discussed, must first be overcome in order 
for this to be accomplished. 
 
Lean Manufacturing and the Product-Process Matrix: 
As previously mentioned, the PPM as prescribed by Hayes and Wheelwright, with a 
requirement operate on the diagonal for efficiency, and the assumed need for trade-offs 
between flexibility and efficiency does not align with the economies of scope efficiency 
paradigm of lean manufacturing.  Furthermore, today’s environment of point-and-click 
design of laptops and customized clothing at low costs suggests other technologies such 
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as computer integrated manufacturing and flexible manufacturing are similarly 
challenging these paradigms.  In their 2004 updated commentary on the PPM, Hayes and 
Wheelwright acknowledged the model does not effectively resolve technical design 
considerations associated with lean production.  As stated by the authors, “Many 
Japanese factories appeared to surpass their American counterparts on several 
competitive dimensions – lower cost, higher quality, greater flexibility, and faster 
production introductions – all at the same time!” (Hayes and Wheelwright, 2004)  The 
resultant of lean manufacturing: with smaller batch production, emphasis on quick 
changeover, just-in-time production, and discipline to standardized work, is a production 
system which would serve to shift a production process along the dimension of process 
maturity, developing both flexibility and efficiency to create a new operations efficiency 
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Figure 2.5 – New PPM Efficiency Frontier created by Lean 
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Lean Remanufacturing and the Product-Process Matrix: 
In the manufacturing context, implementation of lean methods serves to move the process 
downwards in the PPM space.  Yet, can the same impact be anticipated in the 
remanufacturing context?  Is seems the answer should be yes.  Remanufacturing is an 
industry that is managed according to a mass production paradigm and most often exists 
above the PPM diagonal due to relative process immaturity, as already discussed.  
Theoretically, the application of lean methods in remanufacturing would have a similar 
effect as in original manufacturing, that of moving the process downward in the PPM 
space.  The result could easily be a new remanufacturing efficiency curve similar to the 
one originally proposed by Hayes and Wheelwright, shown in Figure 2.6.  Advanced 
applications of lean remanufacturing could possibly exceed the diagonal of efficiency to 
establish a remanufacturing efficiency curve similar to the one described for lean 
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Figure 2.6 – Lean Remanufacturing and the PPM 
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However, lean production does not simply exist as a switch that can be turned on, a 
consulting firm which can be hired, or a piece of equipment that can be purchased.  A 
snapshot of remanufacturing organizations today would see an immature industry 
predominately organized according to jumbled flow and a classic job shop mentality.  As 
previously discussed, much of remanufacturing operates with an engineer-to-order 
mindset.  This theoretical discussion suggests that remanufacturing should move 
downward in the PPM space so that one-of-a-kind parts are produced in an advanced job 
shop environment; low-volume, standard parts are produced with disconnected line flow; 
higher-volume non-standard parts are produced with connected line flow; and high-
volume/high-standardization parts are produced with continuous flow.  However, this 
theoretical discussion is irrelevant unless lean methods are effectively applied in the 
remanufacturing context. 
 
To transition the discussion from theory to application a better understanding of diversity 
within remanufacturing context is necessary.  In the same way it is inappropriate to 
compare the manufacture of widgets to that of a large complex system, it is similarly 
inappropriate to compare the remanufacture of such components.  It would also seem 
inappropriate to assume lean methods are not impacted by the specific component 
remanufacture to which they are applied, whether a widget or large complex system.  The 
PPM is used once again to characterize the remanufacturing environment. 
 
The product life cycle dimension (product variability) is the dominant dimension that is 
used to characterize the remanufacturing industry.  Product variability is a function of 
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product volume (demand), standardization (variety of demand), and in the 
remanufacturing context, dependability of incoming condition (product remanufacture 
scope of work).  Utilizing the PPM, this would prescribe four groupings of 
remanufacturing processes; those of high-product variability (Type I), high-moderate 
product variability (Type II), low-moderate product variability (Type III), and low-
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Figure 2.7 – Characterization of the Remanufacturing Context 
 
To prescribe the appropriate application of lean methods in remanufacturing, the four 
remanufacturing contexts of Type I to Type IV will be considered.  This is the 
methodology by which lean remanufacturing of widgets (Type IV remanufacturing) is 
differentiated from lean remanufacturing of large complex system (Type I 
remanufacturing).  A parallel structure of four unique methodologies of lean 
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remanufacturing are defined; those of high-product variability lean remanufacturing 
(Type I), high-moderate product variability lean remanufacturing (Type II), low-
moderate product variability lean remanufacturing (Type III), and low-product variability 
lean remanufacturing (Type IV), as shown in Figure 2.8.  In each instance the process 
dimension is dependent upon the application of lean tools and techniques.   The 
appropriate application of lean tools and techniques in the four remanufacturing contexts 
is developed in a contingency discussion of Type I to Type IV lean methods in 
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Figure 2.8 – Lean Methods in the Remanufacturing Context 
 
“Toyota House” as Framework for Lean Remanufacturing: 
The Toyota Production System is built upon the fundamental principles of developing 
internal process stability (standard work instructions, work cells, visual management, 
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developing process capability), just-in-time production (process and information flow, 
pull systems, production leveling, set-up reduction, work-in-process controls), and built-
in-quality (error-proofing process and paperwork, andon systems, and teamwork), with a 
lifeblood of empowered employees conducting kaizen (continuous improvement); all 
intent upon achieving the shortest lead time from customer order to product delivery.  
(Monden, 1998)  These concepts are illustrated in the “Toyota House”, shown below as 
Figure 2.9.   
 
To describe the technical application of lean methods in remanufacturing, particular 
emphasis will be placed on the three key structural elements of TPS: building internal 




















Figure 2.9 – The Toyota Production System “House” (Monden, 1998) 
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Contextual Challenges: High and Low Product Variability Remanufacturing: 
The fundamental challenge of producing in a high-product variability remanufacturing 
process is that every component may be unique; with unique technical and resource 
(material, tooling, and manpower) requirements.  The greater the product variability in 
remanufacturing, the greater the system requirements for flexibility in responding to 
production needs.  However, the challenge in applying lean methods in this context is to 
increase processing flexibility (traditionally by increasing production buffers) while 
maintaining efficient use of resources.  In this context a high-variability model of lean 
methods must be applied.   
 
In a low-product variability remanufacturing process the fundamental challenge is nearly 
reversed, as production processes are highly stable (similar to original equipment 
manufacturing), yet must be designed (buffered) to process the occasional instability.  As 
observed in many remanufacturing examples, a low-product variability process can 
ultimately migrate to the point it is designed to handle the exception in production, rather 
than the norm, and therefore every component is considered uniquely and efficiencies of 
standardization are lost.  In this context a low-variability model of lean methods must be 
applied.   
 
Internal Process Stability in High and Low Product Variability Remanufacturing: 
For the foundation of the Toyota House to build internal process stability a high-
variability lean design must create flexibility of resources and control variation where 
possible, in order to bring stability to a highly variable process.  The application of work 
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cells and standard work in this environment would help place boundaries upon sources of 
high variability.  Standard work instructions would not be overly detailed, but would 
provide process flexibility so that a highly trained, non-specialized workforce could use a 
high-degree of expertise to complete complex repairs.  To sustain throughput at a high 
level of process variability, strategically placed resource buffers (tooling, material, 
manpower) must be used to maintain stability in processing.  Visual management would 
be used to indicate irregularities in processing, but also as a key communication device 
with external support groups.   
 
In a low-product variability remanufacturing context, lean methods would be utilized to 
increase overall standardization and efficiency of production processes.  In this context a 
low-variability lean design would utilize highly-specific standard work instructions and 
tightly coupled work cells with minimal resource buffers.  Workplace layout, tool and 
material presentation would all be highly standard through utilization of point-of-use 
applications, kitting, and pull systems; with contingencies developed for the occasional 
process irregularity.  In this context, visual management would be utilized in a highly 
mature way to not only identify irregularities, but to assist in preventing them.   
 
Just-In-Time Production in High and Low Product Variability Remanufacturing: 
In a high-product variability remanufacturing context, just-in-time production is required 
to support the high degree of flexibility required in resource management and allocation.  
The concepts of pull systems and control of work-in-process would be applied to every 
type of resource, so as to better manage breadth (create flexibility) while maintaining 
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minimum required levels (create efficiency).  Production leveling would be used to better 
control peaks and valleys in resource and process utilization, while set-up reduction is 
used to reduce overall resource requirements.   
 
In a low-product variability remanufacturing context, just-in-time production is created to 
support the near continuous flow of components.  Lean methods are applied to create a 
high degree of efficiency and specialization through co-location of equipment, 
continuous production flow, as well as machining fixtures and material handling systems 
to reduce machine set-ups and set-up times.  Work-in-process is tightly controlled in this 
context, coupled with first-in first-out flow, as it can be used as a mechanism to 
pressurize the production system and drive towards a higher degree of continuous process 
production.   
 
Built-In-Quality in High and Low Product Variability Remanufacturing: 
In a high-product variability remanufacturing context, built-in-quality is used to reduce 
process variation, and in particular, reduce variation in the support-process response to 
process variability.  A tightly coupled technical support team and rapid response andon 
are keys to achieving high-output and containing variability in this context.  Simplified 
production processes and instructions, along with error-proofing devices are used to 
reduce variability in this context.   
 
In a low-product variability remanufacturing context, the tools of built-in-quality are used 
with a great deal of specificity and specialization to simplify and error-proof production 
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processes.  An andon system is important in this context to respond when irregularities 
occur, and andon calls will be used as indicators of problems to support continuous 
improvement.  (Toyota uses andon in a low variability environment and finds it critical) 
 
Lean methods applied in a high-product variability context increase process flexibility 
and efficiency, grounded in the economies of scope paradigm.  On the other hand, in the 
low-product variability context, lean methods increase process flow and efficiency 
through an emphasis on standardization, grounded in the economies of scale paradigm.   
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The objective of this study is to better understand the appropriate technical design and 
application of lean manufacturing tools and techniques in the remanufacturing context, an 
industry with promising environmental and economic growth opportunities.  This paper is 
the culmination of six years of in-depth field research within the naval ship repair 
industry.  During this time, the large shipyard organization advanced a widespread 
initiative to deploy techniques of lean production across a broad base of remanufacturing 
depots.  The researcher was hired as an employee and had the opportunity to gain 
intimate knowledge of lean remanufacturing efforts within six repair depots (totaling $5B 
annual business; products ranging from helicopters to transport jets, small turbines to 
large tanker ships), as well as a cursory knowledge of ten additional public and private 
remanufacturing depots.  The researcher was considered an internal expert with the 
organization on lean production designs within the remanufacturing context, and was able 
to advance personal and organizational understanding through participant observation.   
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This paper utilizes the organizational design contingency model of the product-process 
matrix to develop a theoretical linkage between manufacturing process design theory and 
remanufacturing application.  Utilizing this theory, four unique contexts of 
remanufacturing are identified and models for application of lean methods in the extreme 
cases of high and low product variability remanufacturing are developed.  Four 
illustrative case studies of lean remanufacturing are examined in detail, one for each 
identified context of remanufacturing.  In each case study, the Toyota Production System 
foundational elements of developing internal process stability, just-in-time production, 
and built-in-quality are examined through a detailed look at the application of 13 key lean 










Cases to be 
Studied:
Data                             
Sources:
A wide selection (applications, successes, methodologies) of lean 
remanufacturing case studies were examined; four illustrative cases were are 
highlighted for discussion.  
Research Methodology
Technical Assessment, Direct Observation, Interviews with Key Personnel, 
Review of Documentation and Reporting, Participant Observation
Study Objectives:
To better understand the appropriate technical design and application of lean 
manufacturing tools and techniques in the remanufacturing context.
Study Design:
Unit of Analysis: Industrial processing of individual products for remanufacture, ranging from 
single components to integrated systems.
Comparative case study of lean remanufacturing in four unique 
contexts of remanufacturing.  A theoretical model of lean methods in 
extreme remanufacturing cases is developed and assessed.  
Figure 2.10 – Research Methodology 
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The unit of analysis for each of the four case studies is the industrial processing of an 
individual product for remanufacture, ranging from single components to integrated 
systems.  The cases varied in applications, successes, and methodologies, but each of the 
numerous cases would fit appropriately into the theoretical design framework of Type I 
(high-product variability) to Type IV (low-product variability) remanufacturing.  The 
four illustrative case studies highlighted in this paper were selected because each fit 
within a unique context of remanufacturing and was a strong illustrative model for the 
appropriate lean methods (Type I lean remanufacturing methods to Type IV lean 
remanufacturing methods).    
 
Data sources for each case included technical assessments, direct observation by the 
researcher, internal reports on lean production, participant observation, and interviews 
with key deployment personnel.  Interviews were conducted to gain understanding of the 
technical nuances of lean deployment in each of the selected cases; interview subjects 
included shipyard site management, production management, production workers, 
production analysts, and the site lean production deployment team.   
 
LEAN REMANUFACTURING CASE STUDIES 
The Product-Process Matrix was introduced to illustrate the diversity of the 
remanufacturing processes, and four distinctive types of remanufacturing were identified, 
ranging from high product variability (low volume, low standardization, low condition 
dependability) to low product variability (high volume, high standardization, high 
condition dependability). In this section, case studies of lean remanufacturing 
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applications from the naval ship repair context are analyzed that illustrative each of the 
types of remanufacturing.  The cases to be examined ranged from the highest to lowest 
variability as follows: shipboard component remanufacturing (Type I), propulsion shaft 
remanufacturing (Type II), large valve remanufacturing (Type III), and transponder 
remanufacturing (Type IV).   
 
For each case the preexisting condition (before lean) is first described, followed by a 
general overview of the lean methods applied and their results, and then a detailed 
account of how the lean tools were used in this specific context.  Particular emphasis in 
analysis is placed on application of the three major aspects of the Toyota Production 
System; developing internal process stability (foundation), developing just-in-time 
production (pillar), and developing built-in-quality (pillar).   
 
Case Study Example: Shipboard Component Remanufacturing  
Case Study Context: Type I Lean Remanufacturing (High Product Variability): 
Remanufacturing Context: Shipboard component remanufacturing is the overhaul and 
repair of a set of components or a major physical subsystem that can not be removed 
from the ship.  This remanufacturing onboard a ship is an example of a Type I 
remanufacturing process, which is performed in low volumes (a handful of similar 
components processed in a year) with low standardization (each component can be 
different and the failure modes can be unique).  This work is done aboard the ship when it 
is located in dry dock.  All manpower, tooling, materials, and other equipment must 
converge on the specific component to be worked on.  The ship has a largely integrated 
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product architecture that creates additional challenges for work done in this environment.  
Many components cross both physical and system boundaries (e.g., hydraulics, electrical, 
etc.), yet must be repaired independently.   
 
Work is conducted by skilled trades such as electricians, pipe fitters, welders, and 
mechanics.  A single component would typically be worked on by several workers at a 
time.  They have traditionally worked in teams according to their trade specialization.  
Each specific component would be broken down into a set of tasks to be completed by 
each of the various work teams.  A “lead trade” would be identified per component.  The 
“lead trade” would conduct their work and hand the technical instruction package off to a 
“support trade,” who would similarly complete their work before handing off to another 
trade group.  The primary responsibility of supervisors is to optimize utilization of 
personnel, while a secondary responsibility is to resolve production problems when they 
are identified.    
 
Pre-existing conditions: Shipboard component remanufacturing had tremendous 
variability in all aspects of processing, resulting in a large degree of “fire fighting” every 
single day. The primary emphasis was always on the macro-level ship remanufacturing 
schedule and resources were regularly pulled from jobs in progress to support tasks that 
were on the daily “critical path” towards achieving the macro-level schedule.  Workers 
gathered at a wide variety of locations in the morning according to trade.  Supervisors 
were often at these diverse locations with no co-location of a core leadership team.  
Tooling was acquired from a variety of tool cribs around the facility, and material was 
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specifically ordered and delivered to an employee’s supervisor.  Technical instructions 
consisted of short (vague) descriptions of the task to be accomplished and blue-prints of 
the components to be worked on.   
 
Significant inefficiencies existed in production coordination between trades, as work was 
functionally organized according to area of technical competence.  Shipboard component 
remanufacturing commonly delayed the schedule for overhaul and repair of an entire ship, 
and/or the work package was de-scoped (some items that were thought to be important 
for future reliability were skipped) due to inability to deliver hull remanufacturing on 
schedule and cost.   
 
Post-lean remanufacturing conditions: The first two ship overhauls conducted after lean 
methods had been applied to shipboard component remanufacturing were two of the best 
in overall performance up to that time in achieving cost and schedule targets. Through 
empowered cross-functional teams with close engineering support, the production 
workers had a greater capability to quickly and appropriately resolve production logistics 
and technical issues as they arose.  The flow of production that was created and the focus 
on virtual “work cells” lead by cross-functional teams were transformational.  The 
greatest benefits, by far, were job site communication and coordination. Work is being 
continued to apply these concepts to the entire work package completed aboard ship in 
dry dock.  A summary of lean methods as applied to hull component remanufacturing is 
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Observed Lean Methods 
to Develop:
Case:




- Virtual work cells created.
- Cross-functional production teams were created. 
- Standard work developed for each work cell, highly general in nature.
- Consumables trailer established near dry dock for materials. 
- Tool kits created for trade and specific job tooling. 
- Visual metrics board established to track productivity to schedule.
- Work-in-process controls established for each supervisor and skilled trade.
- Pull system developed between work teams to manage WIP.
- Visual control board established to manage flow of production personnel.
- Production leveling through utilization of critical chain scheduling and WIP controls.
- Implemented job rotation and cross-functional training.
- Phones strategically placed in production zones with direct line to engineering.  
- Daily stand-up meeting of production team to discuss process abnormalities.
- Engineer assigned full-time to the production zones.
- Engineers carry pagers at all times for immediate contact.
-
Figure 2.11 – Lean Methods Applied to Shipboard Component Remanufacturing 
 
Lean methods to develop internal process stability   
- Virtual work cells were created: This is not a work cell in the usual sense of a 
flow line in which materials move one piece at a time from station to station.  We 
call this a virtual work cell because it was a physical segment of the ship to which 
teams of workers flowed to complete a defined set of work tasks. Significant 
discussion was held as to whether work cells should be created according to 
physical boundaries or functional system boundaries.  The team realized that a 
system cut across large portions of the ship and interacted with other systems so it 
would not be a defined piece of work.  Thus, it was important for work cells to 
each encompass a single work area; similar to a room in a house.   
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- Cross-functional work teams were created: Cross functional work teams were 
created of employees from multiple trades to work together within a single work 
cell.  These cross-functional work teams encompassed workers from each of the 
major trades; with a team lead from the lead trade group for that specific work 
cell.  The creation of these work teams lead to tremendous gains in terms of 
teamwork, training, and communication between trade groups.  Technical 
engineers were not assigned specifically to work teams, but would rotate amongst 
a small number of teams.   
- Standard work developed for each work cell: This was not at the level of detail 
one would see in a Toyota assembly plant in which tasks are shown in sequence 
with times per task to the second. Initially, this work encompassed simply generic 
operator instruction sheets and a checklist of steps to complete, supported by a 
technical drawing for specific questions. Over time as the process matured there 
were opportunities for further detail in the definition of tasks and a preferred 
sequence. 
- Consumables trailer established for materials: A portable trailer was established 
alongside the dry dock, which housed a wide variety of low-cost consumable 
tools and materials that were regularly needed to complete common tasks.  The 
readily available tools and materials allowed the work teams to stay closer to the 
work site, greatly reducing motion waste. 
- Tool kits created for trade and specific job: In the preexisting condition each 
worker had their own personalized set of tools in a very large, space-consuming 
tool kit.  These individualized tool kits were expensive to purchase and to 
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maintain and there were too many to locate them close to the point of use.  Each 
trade group identified a core set of tools that they were required to carry at all 
times.  These tools were acquired by the shipyard and distributed to all 
appropriate personnel.  Additionally, job-specific tool kits were created to 
augment the trade-specific tool kits for key jobs (long-duration or repetitive).   
- Visual metrics board: A visual metrics board was established in the main 
production offices.  The primary production metric on these boards was the 
percentage of overall work complete and the number of specific jobs that had 
been completed.  This board also was used for visual management to track the 
schedule versus actual times for key activities of the work cells on a daily basis. 
 
Lean methods to develop just-in-time production  
- Work-in-process controls established: Work in process controls were established 
for each supervisor.  This prevented single supervisor from becoming overloaded 
with open work items and forced them to complete tasks before moving on to new 
work.   
- Pull system developed between work teams: Pull systems were created by which 
each supervisor would place all open jobs on a visual control board.  This board 
indicated current priorities (highest priority at top of board) and number of open 
jobs per supervisor.  The board also identified when the supervisor closed a 
particular job so that another could be opened. 
- Visual control board for flow: A visual management board was created that 
highlighted the active work cells on the boat and the number of workers in each 
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area.  This allowed for improved communication and coordination of work in 
very tight work areas.   
- Production leveling: Major initiatives were taken to level production within the 
ships hull remanufacturing.  A macro-level schedule was established and critical 
chain project management software was used to develop the top priority tasks for 
both lead and support trades.  Later, the ability to create a critical chain, resource 
constrained schedule was added to the software capabilities, this was an IT 
solution that helped level production.  However, it had the effect of redefining top 
work priorities on a regular basis, frequently pulling workers from open jobs to 
shift priorities to a new task.   
 
Lean methods to develop built-in-quality 
- Implemented job rotation and cross-functional training: Cross-functional work 
teams dedicated to specific geographic zones of the boat were created.  These 
teams had a tremendous benefit for cross training of employees and effective job 
rotation.  Cross-functional training significantly improved the effectiveness of 
each work team as expertise grew within several key skilled trades.   
- Daily discussion of abnormalities: During morning job briefings each supervisor 
held a meeting with employees to discuss abnormalities from the previous day’s 
work.  Issues for immediate resolution were addressed.  Also, feedback was 
provided to technical engineers, improving their technical instructions for the next 
time that specific task was completed.   
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- Engineer in the production work area: Engineers were assigned to specific work 
cells to support production from a technical perspective.  Engineers had a pager 
on them at all times so they could be reached immediately by production 
employees within the work cell.   
 
Case Study Example: Propulsion Shaft Remanufacturing  
Case Study Context: Type II Lean Remanufacturing (High-Moderate Variability): 
Remanufacturing Context: Propulsion shaft remanufacturing is a Type II remanufacturing 
process, as it is a long-lead time process with low volumes (initially 300 days lead time, 
approximately 15 components per year), with low-moderate condition dependability 
(many failure modes and machined to extremely tight tolerances), resulting in every 
component repair being unique.  Each component must complete roughly 115 
independent work processes for completion.   
 
Work is done on a variety of large industrial equipment, including machining lathes, 
sophisticated welding machines (both manual and computer-numerical controlled (CNC)), 
and other specialized equipment.  Components are extremely large, requiring a team of 
sophisticated riggers to coordinate a complex lift anytime a piece needs to be moved.  
Therefore, efforts are made to reduce the number of moves per component; however, a 
coordinated plan of component moves has not been attempted.  Teams of approximately 
12 workers are employed on three shifts to execute this process.   
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Pre-existing conditions: Prior to lean methods being employed in the remanufacture of 
propulsions shafts.  Each component was tracked independently as it progressed through 
115 milestone processes.  Each component was subject to a significant number of starts, 
stops, and interruptions in production.  Little effort had been made to tie these processes 
together into work cells or to optimize flow through any aspects of production.  Priorities 
shifted regularly as a function of “what can be worked on today” and often a dozen or 
more components would be in some state of progress at any time.  Significant imbalances 
and bottlenecks existed in the production process, highlighted most significantly by a 
requirement for a 4-6 week technical review and sign-off by a technical expert located in 
another city.  Remanufactured products were regularly plagued with an assortment of 
quality problems and “fire drills” would often occur every 6-8 weeks when a particular 
component was badly needed to meet macro-schedule constraints on an entire ship 
overhaul and repair.   
 
Post-lean remanufacturing conditions: Once lean methods had been applied to the 
remanufacture of propulsion shafts, the greatest benefit was in production lead time, as 
this was reduced from 6-8 months per component to 6-8 weeks per shaft.  The concept of 
11 work cells and a pulsed production line brought tremendous stability and process flow 
to production, as well as a dramatic decrease in time required to obtain technical approval.  
Long-term demand rates were identified and required takt time was identified for each 
shaft.  Workers would regularly utilize kaizen (continuous improvement) methodologies 
to further reduce the cycle time for work cells not consistently performing to takt.  
Additionally, significant gains came in the reduction in moves per component.  
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Production was optimized to reduce the number of lifts, which are time consuming, 
expensive, and very risky from a quality perspective as components are machined to 
extremely tight tolerances and can be damaged in handling.  A summary of lean methods 













Type II Lean Remanufacturing (High-Moderate Product Variability)     
Observed Lean Methods 
to Develop:
Case:




- Series of work cells created (11 total).
- Standard work scoped and created for each work cell.
- Level-loaded key machines, relieving bottleneck at new lathe.
- Shadow boxes created for management of disassembled parts.
- Tool cart developed for each work cell.
- Cycle time and output metrics consistently tracked and updated visually.
- Visual metrics board created for tracking progress to takt at each cell.
- Established long-term demand and takt time.
- Redesigned process layout for flow, moving several large pieces of equipment.
- Created one-piece pulsed production line.
- Work-in-process controls established.
- Material kits created and associated with each work cell. 
- Established specialized lifting & handling equipment for speed and safety.
- Established engineer as full-time member of production team. 
- Initiated several projects to reduce set-up time.
- Worked with customer to achieve long-term production leveling.
- Implemented job rotation and production in cross-functional teams.
- Simplified technical paperwork.
- Developed a grid system for communicating condition.
- Modernized process with new lathe and automated welding process.
Figure 2.12 – Lean Methods Applied to Propulsion Shaft Remanufacturing 
 
Lean methods to develop internal process stability: 
- Series of work cells created: The shaft remanufacturing process was originally 
thought of as 115 discrete steps which need to be completed.  The processes were 
grouped into eleven “buckets” of work, which became the work content for each 
of the cells.  Many of the boundaries for work cells were selected based on the 
equipment required for processing.  The components are extremely large, and the 
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idea was to do as much work as possible without physically moving the 
component.  This had a significant impact on the production process as the 
objective then became to optimize flow through each of the 11 work cells, and not 
push each component through all 115 steps.   
- Standard work was developed at each work cell:  Once the work content was 
identified for each cell, standard work instructions were developed by the 
mechanics and machinists for each work cell.  This incorporated required tooling, 
materials, external support (engineering, lifting & handling), and a visual 
representation of each process. 
- Optimized utilization of all equipment:  A primary bottleneck in this process was 
the unavailability of a recently installed high-capability lathe, as a result of 
imbalance in utilization for the five key machines used in shaft remanufacturing 
operations.  Many functions currently performed on the new lathe could have 
been performed on less capable equipment.  All 115 process steps were evaluated 
with regards to which machines were capable of the process and balancing of 
equipment, greatly improving utilization by freeing up the key resource of the 
new lathe.  This played a significant role in defining the eleven work cells, and 
resulted in relieving workload at the constraint machine.    
- Shadow boxes were used for disassembled parts:  Similar to the concept of a 
shadow board being used for tool control, shadow boxes were used for part 
control during disassembly.  A disassembly kit was complete when all parts of the 
box were full.  A specialized cart was also created for these parts.  Movement of 
these carts did not require specialized material handling. 
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- Tool cart developed for each work cell:  Required tools were identified for each of 
the 11 work cells, tools were acquired, and tooling carts were developed.  These 
tool carts were not permanently located at each piece of equipment, but could be 
wheeled to the work depending on which tasks were being performed.  All 
personal tools were removed from the work area and new tools and gages were 
acquired and labeled to complete each of the tool carts.   
- Cycle time and output metrics consistently tracked: Cycle time metrics are now 
actively tracked and posted on the visual metrics board in the work area.  A long-
term takt time was established.  Cycle time per each component is tracked, so 
employees can have a better understanding of their performance relative to 
achieving customer demand (takt).   
- Visual metrics board:  A visual metrics board was created to highlight 
performance with regards to number of units completed and cycle time 
performance per unit production relative to takt time. 
- Set long-term demand and takt time:  Process capability, historical process 
performance, and customer demand were reviewed to identify a realistic and 
appropriate long-term demand profile.  Once this was created, takt time was 
identified for key components and a balancing of work content was attempted 
among the 11 work cells.   
 
Lean methods to develop just-in-time production: 
- Redesign process layout for flow:  Initially equipment used in remanufacture of 
propulsion shafts was in several locations in various parts of the machine shop 
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with haphazard process flow.  At significant expense, the production process was 
redesigned to lay out the equipment to support flow in the production layout.  
Two large pieces of equipment were moved and one was added so that all 
equipment could be arranged according to the flow of the product. 
- Created a sandblast satellite work cell:  A satellite work cell was created, at a 
serious investment, for shaft refurbishment in the same physical work area as 
other repairs.  Previously, components had to be shipped to another building for 
sandblast at a central facility.  This greatly improved service, quality, and 
communication between work teams and enabled one-piece flow. 
- Created one-piece pulsed production line: Eleven process cells were created. 
Process cycle time for each work cell was determined, as well as takt time for the 
entire production line.  Components could move through the system at the same 
time, similar to a pulse of a non-continuous assembly line.  This organization into 
work cells created challenges; cycle time, and particularly cycle time variability, 
had to be reduced.  This reduction became the focus of improvement initiatives.   
- Work-in-process controls established: WIP was limited to one component per 
work cell. The policy was that if that component was completed but the next 
workstation was not ready to start work on it, production would stop and workers 
would go help relieve the bottleneck. 
- Material kits created:  Material kits were created for all mandatory replacement 
parts (which were most of the parts that were not being remanufactured), and 
staged near the machining area for use.  Shadow boxes accounted for components 
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that were to be disassembled and remanufactured.  The two systems together 
provided a highly successful design for material flow.  
- Established specialized lifting & handling gear:  As previously mentioned these 
components are very large, heavy, and difficult to move.  A railroad line was set 
up going right into the work cell for movement from the outside.  Additionally, 
specialized rigging gear was established to better transport components without 
damaging them during a move.   
- Established engineer as full-time member of production team: The product is 
remanufactured to precise technical specifications.  An engineer is required for 
validating the product and checking for any deviations from the print.  
- Initiatives to reduce set-up time:  Activities reduce the time required to set-up 
components in machines at each work station.  Tooling and material kits were 
created, as well as special fixtures and lifting & handling rigs for safe and quick 
component movements. 
- Production leveling: As previously mentioned, process capability, historical 
process performance, and customer demand were reviewed to identify a realistic 
and appropriate long-term demand profile.  Once this was created, takt time was 
identified for key components and balancing of work content was attempted 
among the 11 work cells.   
 
Lean methods to develop built-in-quality 
- Implemented job rotation and cross-functional teams: In addition to the primary 
mechanics and machinists in the work area, engineers and planners were assigned 
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full-time to the propulsion shaft production support team.  All employees spent 
time learning to complete each task and operate each machine.  This led to 
tremendous knowledge sharing and cross-training as employees learned to better 
appreciate and communicate tasks to their peers, and to flexibly reallocate 
personnel when one station was ahead and another behind in production. 
- Developed a grid system for communicating condition: A tremendous technical 
advance came when a team of engineers and mechanics developed a standardized 
grid system for communicating the exact condition of the component in various 
physical locations.  This grid system was identified on the component using chalk 
and was used to communicate conditions in writing to the engineering analysis 
team, along with digital photographs.   
- Technical paperwork simplified: The grid system mentioned above served to 
greatly simplify the technical paperwork, as well as a set of standard checklists 
and critical measurement sheets which were established by the workers in the area.   
- Modernized with automated welding process: Quality increased significantly 
when a new automated welding machine was acquired and then modified to be 
placed on a rail line adjacent to a large lathe.  This allowed for automated welding 
to occur on multiple axes of the component.   
 
Case Study Example: Large Valve Remanufacturing  
Case Study Context: Type III Lean Remanufacturing (Low-Moderate Variability): 
Remanufacturing Context:  Large valve remanufacturing is a Type III remanufacturing 
process, which is processed in higher volumes (approximately 200 components annually), 
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with few major products (six families of valves, each with multiple configurations), and 
moderate condition dependability (failure can occur on several surfaces, all with 
relatively standard repairs).  Remanufacture of large valves is conducted in a large 
machine shop by a dedicated workforce of ten personnel; six personnel who disassemble, 
evaluate, reassemble, and test valves; three personnel who machine and repair worn or 
corroded valve surfaces; and one supervisor for the team.  Support services such as 
engineering, logistics support, and epoxy coating are not dedicated, but are available 
upon request.  Apprentice valve mechanics became senior valve mechanics, and the best 
mechanic was typically selected to be the supervisor.  The supervisor’s primary 
responsibilities were to elevate process problems, interpret instructions, complete 
paperwork for tracking components, and to ensure work for each mechanic.   
 
Pre-existing lean remanufacturing conditions:  Large valve remanufacturing was 
averaging 180 days turn around from receiving the valve to shipping the valve and had 
remained largely unchanged for decades.  Finding work was not a problem for large 
valve mechanics; at any time approximately 80 valves were in some stage of disassembly 
or assembly in the system, most of them stored on large pallet racks on the shop floor 
(large shelving units that held pallets of valves or components).  For many months the 
line had been operating with mandatory overtime for all employees, yet schedule dates 
were never met, despite expediting many components, and performance to planned cost 
was very poor.   
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The area consisted of eight work benches: each mechanic was assigned a work bench, 
which would be used for a variety of processes including disassembly, analysis, 
reassembly, and test & certification.  Valve components would get routed to other 
machining sections for processing: a cleaning station, a milling Section, a lathe work 
section, and an epoxy coating section, each with unique supervisors and work priorities.  
There was not a clear process flow or shop layout.  The primary management objective 
was to keep workers engaged on the highest priority component. When the next step for a 
component could not be performed, typically awaiting parts, technical instruction, or 
attention from a support process, the next highest priority valve was taken from the pallet 
rack and worked on.   
 
Four engineers supported large valve remanufacturing for technical considerations.  
However, these engineers supported the entire mechanical production shop.  They always 
had a large backlog of condition reports (from the analyze valve condition process) to 
answer.  Frequently the engineers were not located in the production shop, but instead 
were in their home engineering department (mechanical, electrical, structural, etc.).  The 
technical reporting process was cumbersome for many mechanics that were required to 
write long paragraphs identifying existing conditions, and interpret engineering responses 
also written in long paragraphs.   
 
At the machining stations, long setup times existed for each component (on the order of 
hours), leading to incentives to batch multiple valves of the same type in sequence, 
regardless of priority.  Tools were frequently horded, and hard to find.  Significant 
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quality problems occurred at each step of the process, particularly with the epoxy repair 
process completed in another building at the facility.  Valve parts and sometimes the 
valves themselves were hard to find.  Mechanics spent hours looking for them, often 
using parts scavenged from another valve that was eventually replaced when the lost 
piece would be found.   
 
Post-lean remanufacturing conditions:  At the completion of a two-year focused effort to 
apply lean methods to this process, the average cycle time, per component, was reduced 
from 180 days to 40 days, overtime was eliminated, and cost & schedule goals were 
regularly achieved.  Quality was significantly improved, particularly items related to 
paperwork and effective communication of component condition.  A summary of lean 
methods as applied to large valve remanufacturing is shown in Figure 2.13. 
Context:
Type III Lean Remanufacturing (Moderate-Low Product Variability)     
Observed Lean Methods 
to Develop:
Case:




- Four work cells were created (receiving, disassembly/assess, repair, assembly/test)
- Standard work was developed at each work cell.
- Contingent repair instructions developed for each valve.
- Machining work cell created and aligned to large valve management.
- Epoxy work cell created (new equipment in the cell)
- Tool kits created for common processes.
- Cycle time metrics consistently tracked and posted weekly.
- Visual metrics board to track and communicate production.
- Co-located equipment (test, repair, epoxy)
- Redesigned process layout for flow.
- Work-in-process controls established and continuously reduced.  
- Pull systems and buffers developed between each work cell.
- Visual control board for flow.
- Material kits created for all parts, some contingent, others mandatory.
- Lifting & handling integrated into production with small hoist.
- Production Leveling through WIP controls and additional non-ship-specific work.
- Andon system (visual andon board) located in high traffic area.
- Machining-epoxy fixtures created, significant quality improvement resulted.
- Technical paperwork simplified and key dimension sheets created.
- Implemented job rotation and cross-functional training.
- Daily stand-up meeting of production team to discuss process abnormalities.











Figure 2.13 – Lean Methods Applied to Large Valve Remanufacturing 
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Lean methods to develop internal process stability   
- Work cells were created:  Valve remanufacture was originally considered as 
approximately twenty unique steps and individual work stations performed 
everything they could, as in the old days of building a Model-T car in one place.  
By organizing a flow line and through process improvements these were 
consolidated to four production cells in a flow layout (receiving, disassembly, 
repair, and reassembly/test). 
- Standard work was developed at each work cell:  Mechanics and machinists 
worked together to develop standard work instructions, checklists, and set-up 
sheets for each work cell.   
- Visual management implemented:  Extensive visual management was instituted in 
the work area as work areas were cleaned and work cells and work stations were 
marked.  A central production control board illustrated the status 
(red/yellow/green) and location (work cell or buffer) of every component, as well 
as associated process problems.  This lead to tremendous improvements in 
communication, organization, and general workplace cleanliness, including 
disposing of large quantities of excess and retired parts. 
- Contingent repair instructions developed for each large valve:  The technical 
instructions were expanded to included appendices for common failure modes and 
repair instructions.  They acted like recipes for standard meals.  This empowered 
a mechanic to initiate repairs without engineering signature, effectively removing 
a bottleneck from the process.  This improved quality, particularly quality of 
paperwork, and assisted in training new employees. 
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- Satellite epoxy work cell was created in the process flow:  Repair work cells were 
created and co-located for mill machining, lathe machining, and epoxy repair 
processing.  In the instance of epoxy repair, where it had previously been located 
several buildings away, a satellite work cell was created in the valve repair area. 
Machinists that operated these machines were incorporated into the valve repair 
team and reported to the valve repair supervisor, with dotted-line responsibilities 
to their functional supervisor.  This created tremendous teamwork, synergy, and 
joint learning between the mechanics and machinists; leading to significant 
improvements in quality and communication. 
- Tool kits created: Tool kits were developed for a variety of applications.  In some 
instances, a core tool set was identified, acquired, and maintained at a particular 
work site.  In other instances, specialized tool kits, specific to a complex repair 
and/or component were identified, stored in a central location, and brought to the 
job as needed.  Improvements in tooling made a significant impact on quality and 
scrap rates as all mechanics were now able to consistently use correct tooling for a 
job. 
- Cycle-time metrics consistently tracked: Cycle-time metrics had never been 
utilized before. Key performance metrics included the number of units completed, 
percentage of on-time delivery, and average cycle time per component. This 
created a sense of camaraderie and a great deal of motivation to set challenging 
objectives and meet them.  Previously all metrics had been cost-related, largely 
preventing mechanics and machinists from relating to their impact on the metric.    
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- Visual metrics board: A visual metrics board was established in the work area to 
track daily performance on the cycle-time metrics.  
 
Lean methods to develop just-in-time production   
- Co-located equipment: In addition to the epoxy machine mentioned above, 
several other pieces of equipment were co-located in the production area.  
- Redesigned process layout for flow: Once all work processes were co-located in 
the primary work area, work benches and two lathes were moved to better support 
flow between work cells.  The result was a logical u-shaped flow between the four 
work cells of receiving, disassembly, repair/machining, and assembly/test. 
- Work-in-process controls established:  Each work cell and each intermediate 
buffer was capped with a maximum number of components permitted.  This 
buffer improved level-loading of production and prevented a large build-up prior 
to valve machining (the process bottleneck). 
- Pull systems developed between work cells:  The WIP controls acted as a pull 
system.  Once the maximum for each buffer was reached, work on the preceding 
process would stop, and then proceed when a component was moved or 
completed.  As the buffers filled up, workers were expected to find other useful 
activities, including continuous improvement.  Components waiting processing in 
buffers were not required to adhere to strict FIFO restrictions; each buffer allowed 
for a re-shuffling of component priorities.   
- Material kits created:  Material kits of “mandatory replacement parts” were 
created for each component.  A system was developed for contingent material 
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items to be acquired from a secured “supermarket” in the valve repair work area, 
or were standard stock items that could be provided in a timely manner by the 
supply system.  Much effort was placed on applying lean methods to the supply 
chain, resulting in a significant increase in flow as parts became more readily 
available.  Having a limited number of valves in process allowed for clearer 
prioritization to expedite needed parts. 
- Lifting & handling integrated into production:  Specialized large valve pallets 
were created for safely wheeling components around the factory, while keeping 
materials, instructions, and tooling, together.  Additionally, low-capacity jib 
cranes were acquired and strategically placed within the production area.  High-
capacity overhead cranes (and supporting lift team) were not required for 
handling heavy components. 
- Production leveling:  Large valve remanufacturing had traditionally had 
significant variation in production demands over time.  A set of non-urgent valves 
for remanufacture were identified (to be placed in finished good inventory).  
These components support production during low demand periods.  Buffer 
management and WIP controls enabled the production system to function more 
efficiently during times of peak production and emergency component repairs. 
 
Lean methods to develop built-in-quality   
- Andon system created:  A crude, but effective communication system was 
developed by attaching red tags to components that were waiting for external 
assistance to continue processing.  Similarly, on the visual control board, a small 
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red magnet (with the required support identified) was placed next to the 
component and located where senior management would see the andon signal 
regularly.   
- Machining fixtures created:   Fixtures were created for machining set-up and 
machining of components in lathes, mills, and epoxy ovens.  Machinists in the 
work area established a visually managed set-up instruction guide for every 
component.  Many of the fixtures incorporated turntables, flexible fixture plates, 
and rotating capabilities in each axis.  Machinists in the area ingeniously designed 
and manufactured these fixtures, which created less scrap and less machining 
downtime for part changeover and setup.   
- Technical paperwork simplified:  Efforts to develop pre-engineered repair 
instructions reduced writing and simplified technical instructions.  The 
development of pre-engineered repair instructions additionally reduced variability 
between engineers in repair recommendations.  Mechanics in the work area 
developed an assortment of set-up guides, assembly/disassembly “cheat sheets” 
and checklists.   
- Implemented job rotation and cross-functional training:  All valve repair 
employees were required to spend several days cross-training with fellow workers, 
even if this involved crossing production trades.  This resulted in improved 
teamwork and learning throughout the entire production team.   
- Daily discussion of abnormalities:  The valve remanufacture work team 
assembled each morning for five to fifteen minutes to address abnormalities, 
quality defects, and lessons learned from the previous day. 
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- Engineer on the shop floor:  A technical engineer was assigned full-time to the 
production shop, his desk permanently located in the middle of production.  This 
location allowed for quick resolution of minor technical issues as well as 
teamwork and joint learning between the engineer and production workers.   
 
Case Study Example: Transponder Remanufacturing  
Case Study Context: Type IV Lean Remanufacturing (Low Product Variability): 
Remanufacturing Context:  Transponder repair is considered a Type IV remanufacturing 
process for its combination of high-volume (1500 components per year), high 
standardization of components (2 similar components processed), and high condition 
dependability (most components go through the same set of mandatory replacement 
processes).  This remanufacturing application is the most similar to a Toyota assembly 
line.  Two types of transponders are remanufactured on one production line of 12 
employees.  Each transponder weighs approximately 30 pounds.  The repair process 
requires disassembly, cleaning, component replacement, component repair as needed, 
reassembly of electronic and mechanical systems, and test.   
 
Pre-existing lean remanufacturing conditions: For years the transponder remanufacturing 
process had struggled to meet demand, a demand expected to increase significantly in the 
coming years.  The work was generally performed by apprentice-level mechanics paid at 
a lower rate than experienced mechanics.  Work on components occurred in batches of 
approximately 20 transponders - the quantity received from the supplier.  Quality 
problems were not significant, but did exist due mainly to incorrect processing and a 
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particularly cumbersome plastic repair process.  The bottleneck production process was 
the test phase, which was performed in a test facility at the opposite end of the shipyard.   
 
Post-lean remanufacturing conditions: 
As a result of the lean methods applied, the transponder remanufacturing line was able to 
nearly triple production throughput.  This line became one of the most impressive 
examples of lean transformation as an inefficient batch production shop became a high-
performing mass production-like assembly line within less than a year.  The start-and-
stop batch production was replaced with two parallel flow lines of production; one 
specialized for each of the two types of components.  A summary of lean methods as 













Type IV Lean Remanufacturing (Low-Product Variability)     
Observed Lean Methods 
to Develop:
Case:




- Two parallel production lines created, one for each major component.
- Highly specific standard work developed at each work station.
- Workstation-specific tooling identified.
- Cycle time and output metrics consistently tracked.
- Visual metrics board tracked daily, weekly, and monthly production.
- Pre-screening of components to identify those not worth remanufacturing.
- Acquired specialized lifting & handling devices for each production line.
- Redesigned process layout for flow.
- Work-in-process controls established with little buffer between work stations.  
- Created one-piece flow production line.
- Acquired satellite test tank and co-located.
- Initiated many efforts to reduce (and ultimately eliminate) set-up time.
- Developed specialized material handling cart.
- Worked with customers to develop long-range production leveling.
- Acquired component & process specific gages.
- Developed specialized mold for plastic repair process.
- Implemented job rotation and cross-functional training of employees.
- Simplified technical paperwork, eliminating all together in standard production.
Figure 2.14 – Lean Methods Applied to Transponder Remanufacturing 
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Lean methods to develop internal process stability   
- Two parallel production lines created:  Pre-existing conditions had work 
processes begin work cells spread around a machine shop.  Processes were lined 
up in two parallel production lines, one for each of the two transponders being 
remanufactured.  The production lines shared resources for the clean and test 
stage.  Each production line had eight work stations (disassembly, clean, repair 
(x2), reassemble (x3), test) 
- Standard work was developed at each work station:  Visual standard work 
instructions were developed by mechanics at each of the eight work stations.  
These instructions included pictures of the layout, pictures of acceptable and 
unacceptable components, and pictures for assembly.  The pictures showed the 
steps to be followed, in sequence, and with standard times for each step.  These 
work instructions were regularly reviewed and updated by the production team.   
- Workstation-specific tooling identified:  Mechanics identified their exact needs for 
each production step and tool requirements for each workstation were 
standardized.  Tools were acquired to meet needs, color-coded for each work 
station, and ergonomically placed at each work station.  All personal tools were 
removed from the work area, and mechanics identified their exact needs for each 
production step.     
- Cycle time and output metrics consistently tracked:  Weekly output and cycle 
time metrics were tracked and posted in the work area.  Key performance metrics 
were the number of units completed, percentage of on-time delivery, and average 
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cycle time per components delivered.  Previously, performance metrics had not 
been communicated to employees. These metrics now became a weekly challenge 
to improve upon the previous best.   
- Visual metrics board:  A visual metrics board was established and placed in the 
production area to display the metrics. 
- Pre-screening of components for remanufacture:  These components are generally 
considered an easily replaceable commodity.  A cost benefit analysis determined 
that discarding excessively damaged components for parts was more cost 
effective than to attempt remanufacture.  An initial visual inspection is now 
conducted on all components and a very small percentage of components are set 
aside for later disassembly and utilization as spare parts.   
- Acquired specialized lifting & handling device:  A specialized scissor lift was 
acquired and placed along the conveyor.  The lifting device could be used to 
ergonomically lift components into a key machining process.  This also 
significantly reduced the lifting requirements associated with each component. 
The device was set on a track roller system such that it could service both 
production lines.   
 
Lean methods to develop just-in-time production   
- Co-located equipment:  A new test tank was acquired and co-located with the rest 
of the production processes.  Previously, testing processes occurred in another 
building, far from the primary production operations.   
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- Redesigned process layout for flow:  An extremely significant improvement in the 
remanufacture of transponders came when two parallel flow lines were 
established to achieve continuous production.  Nearly every machine was moved 
to support this production and batches were broken from their original size of 20, 
down to a single-piece flow. 
- Work-in-process controls established:  Inventory controls throughout the 
production lines were tightly controlled and buffers were very small.  Workers 
were easily able to shift from one production process to the next as needed to 
maintain production.   
- Created one-piece flow production line:  The new production lines were set up to 
support one-piece flow and FIFO by utilizing a single long roller-conveyor for 
movement of each component.  This flow allowed processes to be tightly coupled 
visually, and allowed workers to shift workstations as necessary to support the 
workload.   
- Acquired satellite test tank:  A smaller testing apparatus was acquired that could 
be co-located with the production process and was always available to support the 
transponder remanufacturing line.     
- Initiatives to reduce set-up time:  The new smaller testing apparatus did not have 
the capacity (20 components) of the previous facility.  With the use of a smaller 
test facility it became critical to load and unload parts for testing very quickly.  
Standard work was developed for test set-up.  Specialized material handling 
devices were created.  The output of testing increased the number tested, while at 
any one time decreased.   
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- Developed specialized material-handling cart:  A small cart with rollers to rotate 
the piece was developed for each component.  Specially-sized carts were 
established for each of the two sizes of components.  These carts were designed 
and produced by mechanics in the work area and were very simple constructed 
out of wood, ball bearings, and small casters.   This simple design significantly 
reduced the amount of handling required per component.   
- Production leveling:  The production team worked with customers and suppliers 
to develop a long-term demand profile, and to establishing a level production 
schedule to meet demand.  This level schedule enabled a steady flow of 
components through the parallel lines and a daily understanding of cycle time as 
compared with takt time.   
 
Lean methods to develop built-in-quality   
- Acquired component & process-specific gages:  Required measurement and test 
gages were identified for two of the work stations.  Only one set of gages had 
existed, and they were not ideally sized for the components.  An appropriately 
sized set of component and process gages were acquired, with the existing set 
serving as a backup when gages were being calibrated.   
- Developed mold for plastic repair process:  One process repaired plastic molding 
and removal of excess plastic.  A new mold was designed that significantly 
reduced excess plastic and injected plastic through a non-critical surface such that 
the time required for removal of excess material was reduced.    
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- Implemented job rotation and cross-functional training:  All production 
employees became proficient at each work station.  They were able to surge as 
needed depending on demand for each of the two components.  Additionally, 
engineers, quality control and logistics personnel took turns on the production line.  
This experience improved communication, cross-training, and ultimately quality 
for the overall production.    
- Technical paperwork simplified:  The technical paperwork for transponder repair 
was practically eliminated.  Paperwork was only required if an exception to 
standard work was identified – a rare occurrence.   
 
LEAN REMANUFACTURING CASE STUDY DISCUSSION 
Do lean production tools and techniques apply within the remanufacturing context?  The 
four case studies illustrate effective application of lean methods in the remanufacturing 
context.  Detailed cost-benefit analyses were not presented, but the benefits 
overwhelmingly paid for any costs of implementation.  This paper has highlighted there 
is not simply one best lean solution that applies in this context, but many.  Just as 
manufacturing a small industrial pump differs from manufacturing a large airplane, the 
remanufacturing of these such products is equally diverse.  This discussion will highlight 
ways in which lean solutions were modified to address different remanufacturing 
contexts.  The discussion also addresses whether lean is a new paradigm of 
remanufacturing or simply maturation to the appropriate methods that would be 
suggested by scholars like Woodward, Wheelwright and Hayes.   
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Breaking the Tradeoff Between Flexibility and Efficiency with Lean Methods: 
In The Machine that Changed the World (Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990), the term lean 
production was introduced to describe a new “paradigm” of manufacturing that broke 
many of the rules of traditional mass production.  It was more than“maturation” - actually 
a new way of looking at old problems.  The original frameworks reviewed here, including 
the product-process matrix, suggest a clear tradeoff occurs between flexibility and 
efficiency, and that the efficient frontier is fixed and rigid.   
 
Remanufacturing needs flexibility.  Variability is inherent in the technical process 
performed.  The original component must be inspected and different tasks performed 
depending on findings of the mechanic.  Craft-like methods such as the job shop would 
seem as far as one could get for the more highly variable products and processes 
 
The lean remanufacturing case studies addressed in this paper suggest that lean thinking 
can move remanufacturing beyond their current placement within the PPM space.  As 
seen in Figure 2.15, the four cases illustrate four unique remanufacturing contexts.  Prior 
to application of lean methods to each of these cases, they would have been considered 
well “above the diagonal”, an inefficient process even in the normative model determined 
by authors of the product-process model.  The cases of ships hull, propulsion shaft, and 
large valve remanufacturing would have been considered as job shop production; the case 
of transponder remanufacturing would have been considered as batch processing.   
Yet, in all cases the shipyard was able to move beyond the limits of a jumbled job shop.  
Lean efforts focused on getting as close as possible to one-piece flow.  The ability to 
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approach one-piece flow was limited in three of the four examples.  The case of 
transponder remanufacturing, with low-product variability was able to approach one-
piece flow, similar to an assembly line process - or in this case disassembly, inspection, 
and reassembly.  The other three cases all moved closer towards the diagonal of 
efficiency suggested by the product-process matrix. 
 
Figure 2.15 illustrates how each process moved closer to achieving the PPM models 
diagonal of manufacturing efficiency, even though in the precondition they were thought 
to represent a less mature job-shop production.  What appeared to be a Type I process 
moved toward a Type II solution and so on.  In a sense the paradigm of the product-
process matrix was challenged by viewing the product and process in a different way.  
While this chapter talked about the before-and-after conditions as snapshots, in reality the 
post-lean solution was the result of an evolution.  This evolution was a progression 
moving toward continuous flow.  Significant opportunity for improvement remained in 
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Figure 2.15 – PPM Impact of Lean Remanufacturing Implementation 
 
Adaptation of Lean Methods to the Lean Remanufacturing Context: 
The application of lean methods to the four case studies discussed here are as unique as 
the four case applications themselves.  The highly flexible and robust lean methods 
developed in the Type I context of high variability production contrast with the highly 
structured and specific lean methods applied in the Type IV context of low variability.  
On the whole, the appropriate application of lean methods paralleled to the production 
process.  Importantly, all four cases used the same process and the same principles to 
move in the direction of continuous flow.  This discussion will focus on the application of 
lean methods in each of the four contexts, focusing on key dimensions of developing 
internal process stability, developing just-in-time production, and developing built-in-




Lean Methods to Develop Internal Process Stability in the Remanufacturing Context: 
In considering the application of lean methods to develop internal process stability, the 
lean concepts of standard work instructions, creation of work cells, use of visual 
management, and consistent presentation of tools and materials were considered in all 
cases.  Figure 2.16 summarizes application of lean methods to develop internal process 
stability in the four cases examined. 
 
Standard Work Instructions:  The most identifiable characteristic of standard work 
instructions to the four applications of lean remanufacturing was the detail associated 
with the instruction.  In the case of high-variability (Type I), work instructions were 
developed as generic operator instruction sheets and a checklist of steps to be completed, 
at the same time placing significant reliance on the technical drawings accompanying the 
mechanic.  Standard work instructions were seen to develop greater detail and precision 
with Type II and Type III applications, to the Type IV application, which had detail down 
to the point of standard process times for each step.   
 
Work Cells:  In the Type I lean remanufacturing case; the work cell was defined virtually, 
as a geographic zone where a cross-functional team of workers would converge for 
production.  In the Type II instance it was one of 11 distinct phases of production, with 
boundaries of production largely based on the desire to reduce the number of complex 
moves for the large components.  Type III work cells were defined by the more natural 
phases of component remanufacturing: receiving, disassembly, machining/repair, and re-
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assembly/test.  In the Type IV application, a single flow line was created, like an 
assembly line.   
 
Visual Management:  Visual management differed in the level of detail it portrayed.  In 
the Type I case, visual management identified the physical zones in which production 
was taking place, and a few very macro-level metrics.  In the Type II and Type III cases, 
metrics became more detailed.  In the Type IV case, metrics also became more detailed 
as performance to takt time was maintained throughout the day.  In the Type IV case, the 
status of production was visual at all times as a result of the highly standardized linear 
flow of production.   
 
Tool & Material Presentation:  In a Type I remanufacturing context the tool and material 
presentation is generic to the trade of the worker and has little to do with the actual work 
being conducted.  All necessary tools and materials can be acquired, as necessary.  In the 
Type II context, tools are specific to the work station, in Type III, both tools and 
materials are kitted, per specific component.  In a Type IV application, point-of-use 
tooling and material is utilized, while tools are fixed at each workstation and materials 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lean Methods to Develop Just-in-Time Production in the Remanufacturing Context: 
In considering the application of lean methods to developing just-in-time production, the 
lean concepts of redesign of process for flow, pull systems, production leveling, set-up 
reduction, and work-in-process controls are examined.  Figure 2.16 summarizes 
application of lean methods to develop just-in-time production in each of the four cases. 
 
Redesign of process for flow & co-location of equipment:  Redesigning the process for 
flow was an equally important aspect of lean remanufacturing in the case studies of Type 
II-IV.  In each instance, co-located external processes, establishing satellite work cells 
and overall reorganization for flow was a significantly enabling step for all other lean 
methods.  In Type I remanufacturing, where work was completed aboard the ship in a 
seemingly virtual work environment, significant efforts were being made to redesign the 
technical process for work flow.  This, however, has proved to be far more difficult as it 
must be done on a job-to-job basis.  In the longer-term the ideal solution would be to 
consider work flow for remanufacturing in the original design of the equipment, for 
example, considering modular designs of component systems. 
 
Pull systems:  Pull systems were important in establishing control of the production 
process in the context of Type I-IV remanufacturing.  The Type I case pulled materials 
and tools as they were needed to the work cell. In the Type II case, pull systems were 
used to establish a pulsed production line, and in Type III case, pull systems at each 
buffer were used to manage the variability in different component sizes, conditions, and 
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type of repairs.  In the Type IV case pull systems were used to initiate the flow line with a 
regular demand schedule.   
 
Production leveling:  In the remanufacturing context, production leveling was a totally 
new concept for each of the four cases examined.  Production leveling and pull systems 
were of particular importance in each case due to the tendency within remanufacturing to 
disassemble each component as soon as it is received.  Production leveling, in each 
instance, served to decrease the urgency of component induction to the process reducing 
WIP. 
 
Set-up reduction:  Set-up reduction played a significant role in Type I-III 
remanufacturing.  In the Type I case, set-up was the time required for an employee to get 
to the job site with all tooling, materials, and instructions to complete a task.  In the Type 
II and Type III cases, set-up reduction was applied in traditional contexts to reduce the 
amount of time required to set-up a component for processing.  Results were significant 
for each case.  In the Type IV case, setups were able to be eliminated completely 
 
Work-in-process controls:  As previously mentioned, pull systems and work-in-process 
controls were critical to gain process control in each case examined.  Within 
remanufacturing, the tendency is to disassemble components as soon as they become 
available, creating a glut of WIP through all lead and support processing.  WIP controls 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lean Methods to Develop Built-in-Quality in the Remanufacturing Context: 
In considering the application of lean methods to developing built-in-quality, the lean 
concepts of simplified technical instruction, error-proofing, integration of technical 
support, and andon were examined.  Figure 2.18 summarizes application of lean methods 
to develop built-in-quality in each of the four cases. 
 
Simplification of technical work instructions and processes:  In Type IV remanufacturing, 
lean methods effectively eliminated technical instructions, except in rare instances of 
irregularities from standard work.  In Type III remanufacturing, the most impressive 
simplification of technical instructions, contingent repair instructions were created, 
authorizing immediate technical resolution to common failure modes.  In the Type II case, 
the zone coordinate system what was established was transformational to the condition 
assessment process with its ease of communicating existing condition.   
 
Error-proofing; fixtures to achieve improved quality in processing:  Fixtures were created 
for both machining and material handling purposes.  In Type II-IV applications, fixtures 
were created that significantly improved the overall quality of machining and reduced the 
likelihood of accidental damage during transport.  In Type I applications, variability of 
product and process was so high that error-proofing efforts did not make a significant 
impact beyond methods to better handle components in shipment.  
 
Integration of engineer to production process:  Integration of the engineer into the 
production process is seen as the counterpart to simplification of the technical 
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instructions.  In Type III and Type IV applications, paperwork was simplified to the point 
the engineer does not play an integral part of production.  However, in Type I and II 
applications, the engineer was considered of vital support to production.  In the Type I 
case, the engineer carried a pager at all times and was to be able to provide near 
immediate support to any production team.   
 
Andon system:  Andon support systems played a major role in Type I and Type III case 
studies, yet each was very different from what would be seen on a Toyota assembly line. 
In the Type I case, andon existed as phones strategically placed throughout the work site 
with a direct line to an engineering support desk.  In the Type III case, andon took the 
form of a simple flag in a highly visible part of the shop, identifying the requested 
support.  In the Type IV case, the production process was so visual and engineering and 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   










































































































CIM REMANUFACTURING CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
The discussion thus far has focused on the application of lean production tools and 
techniques in the remanufacturing context.  Yet, for the tremendous benefits lean has 
produced in a number of industries, it is not the only modern production methodology 
recommended for its dramatic improvement over traditional mass production.  Computer 
integrated manufacturing (CIM) and flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), are 
additional techniques which have been popularized in recent decades.  (Daft, 2004) 
 
This section chronicles one example of application of lean production and CIM to the 
same product and process - large valve remanufacturing.  The large valve (Type III) lean 
remanufacturing case study occurred between 2002 and 2005.  In 1995 a high-technology 
government research facility approached the shipyard about deployment of CIM to the 
same process of large valve remanufacturing.  The research facility had experts in CIM 
and had successfully deployed these techniques with other clients.  A detailed 
implementation proposal was written, however, the CIM implementation (projected at 
$2M in cost) was never funded. 
 
Interestingly, the 1995 proposal discussed the [then] current conditions of excessively 
long cycle times, inability to meet schedules, and challenges associate with poor quality.  
The researchers highlighted bottlenecks of technical instructions in response to condition 
assessment and machining due to non-dedicated resources.  From this report, as well as 
interviews with employees in the work area, the process experienced little change in the 
seven years between the CIM proposal and lean remanufacturing implementation. 
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In studying the CIM implementation proposal, the primary objectives were to: 1) improve 
processing speed and quality of information at the condition assessment process, and 2) 
utilize information technology systems to improve decision making and data storage 
throughout the entire valve repair process.  Elements of the proposed implementation 
included: 
- Computerized technical work documents: Laptop computers were to replace paper 
technical work documents.  Computerized technical instruction would hold all 
checklists, procedures, and additional required information such as technical 
drawings and blueprints associated with large valve remanufacturing.  Data would 
be input by mechanics and uploaded daily to a central database.   
- Coordinate Measuring Machine:  A coordinate measurement machine (CMM) 
would be acquired and utilized to improve the accuracy of the measurement 
process (part of the condition assessment procedure), which was currently done 
by hand.   
- Parts tracking via bar code system: A bar code scanning system was to be 
established for tracking all parts used in large valve repair. 
- Automated parts storage system: A large storage system was to be built in the 
large valve production area to store all valves and associated parts, e.g., replacing 
the manual pallet rack system. 
- Automated machining:  Valve data from the CMM was to be input and large 
pallet fixtures were to be created such that setup in the CMM and for machining 
could be improved. 
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- Pre-engineered repair instructions: Historical failure modes and common repairs 
were to be evaluated and analyzed so that standard repairs could be prescribed 
and mechanics could be empowered to execute. 
- Rapid manufacturing part production cell: Utilizing a CNC Lathe, unique parts 
could be rapidly manufactured to support assembly. 
 
The overall objectives of the study were identified as cutting cost and cycle time, while 
improving quality and overall efficiency.  These initiatives would likely have improved 
performance in large valve remanufacturing.  Interestingly, the CIM improvement 
methodology differed significantly from that of lean remanufacturing, which also 
dramatically improved upon current performance at far less cost. 
 
Ultimately, the lean application was implemented effectively, and became very 
successful.  This is not to say that lean better than CIM, and in fact CIM could be part of 
a lean solution.  It does suggest that when a particular technical solution is forced onto a 
process it can actually do more harm than good. 
 
CIM REMANUFACTURING CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS DISCUSSION 
The conceptual analysis of proposed CIM and actual lean production in the large valve 
remanufacturing context provides an interesting opportunity to compare two popular 
production methodologies.  This discussion will review differences in lean, CIM, and 
traditional mass production along several operations management dimensions, and earlier 
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research conducted with regards to CIM and the previously discussed product-process 
matrix.   
 
Comparison of Large Valve Remanufacturing: Mass, CIM, Lean Perspectives  
The proposed methodology of CIM and actual implementation of lean production in large 
valve remanufacturing are compared with conditions before introduction of lean methods 
in Figure 2.19.  The rows in this figure are dimensions of operations management, 
including: production strategy, inventory strategy, process flow, utilization of technology, 
employee engagement, and inter-departmental communication.  Many dimensions of 
operations management could have been used in the comparative study; however, it was 
believed these dimensions would best illustrate key differences in production philosophy 























Figure 2.19 – Mass, CIM, and Lean Large Valve Remanufacturing 
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The traditional mass production perspective has the strategic objective of optimizing the 
utilization of resources, particularly the valuable time of production mechanics and 
expensive equipment and an emphasis was placed on management to keep production 
going at all times.  Inventory strategies were secondary to the need to maintain full-
utilization of resources.  Process flow was highly stove-piped, particularly in recognition 
to the evolution of the physical plant over time.  New machines had largely been placed 
where there was available space, with little thought for sequential process flow, as long as 
each machined could maintain high utilization.  High technology was used sparingly in 
the process; rather, technology was inherent in the craftsman skills of the experienced 
mechanics.  Production workers in the large valve remanufacturing process were not 
engaged in improvements, nor had they ever been engaged.  Historically, process 
engineers, process planners, shop process managers, had worked as technical subject 
matter experts in all improvement initiatives.  Inter-departmental communications, 
primarily communications between the production shop, technical engineering, and 
support production shops (quality, lifting & handling, etc.), were functionally stove-piped 
and at times confrontational.  Each group was measured independently using a unique set 
of measurement criteria.  In some instances these measurement criteria were not in full 
alignment with resource needs of the large valve remanufacturing operation.   
 
The CIM proposal was centered upon the production strategy of optimizing processing 
speeds with advanced robotics and leveraging information technology systems for better 
and faster decisions in the component analysis process.  The inventory strategy for CIM 
implementation was based on the utilization of the automated retrieval system.  The 
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automated retrieval system had an extremely large storage capacity, such that large 
quantities of valves and valve parts could be stored for possible utilization in the future.  
The proposed automated retrieval system was state of the art in its capacity and ability to 
rapidly store large quantities of inventory. The new system was designed by the experts 
from the external government agency and internal manufacturing engineers, with little 
input from production employees.  It was anticipated that inter-departmental 
communications would have been improved as a result of information technology tools, 
specifically in that less face-to-face interactions between engineering and production 
would need to occur as the data exchanges were done electronically. 
 
The implementation of lean methods within large valve remanufacturing focused on the 
production strategies of reducing work-in-process and creating continuous flow of 
components.  During this deployment, inventory levels were seen as a mechanism for 
pressurizing the production process and driving process improvement.  Production cells 
(receiving, disassembly, machining/repair, and re-assembly/test) were developed around 
the process flow.  High-technology was not used in implementation; however, new 
technology was used in the form of an upgraded wash machine and epoxy repair process.  
Improvements and redesigns of the process were conducted by cross-functional teams of 
production employees, technical engineers, external lean experts, and other support 
personnel.  Inter-departmental communications improved dramatically through a 
simplification of information to be communicated, the use of standard work instructions 




Lean and CIM in the Product-Process Matrix:  
In earlier discussions the Product-Process Matrix was used to link production 
methodologies, on various degrees of technical complexity and context.  It was suggested 
PPM trade-offs between flexibility and efficiency have become somewhat outdated in 
today’s environment of point-and-click design of laptops and customized clothing at low 
costs.  A 1988 study by Paul Adler identified that CIM, developed long after the PPM 
model was first published, broke away from the assumptions of the PPM required trade-
offs.  According to Adler, CIM offered new production possibilities capable of marrying 
efficiency and flexibility at the same time.  This occurred through the use of highly 
flexible robotics, advanced information systems, and automation of equipment.  In his 
study, Adler proposed a new efficiency frontier of the PPM for firms utilizing CIM; one 
“flattened or bowed out to the left”.  This failed adherence to trade-offs was similar to the 
discussion earlier in this paper regarding lean production.  As shown below in Figure 
2.20, lean manufacturing and CIM offer a similar new operational efficiency frontier to 
the PPM.  The implications of this discussion for an organization utilizing production 
principles of lean manufacturing or CIM is to suggest that low-volume, standard parts can 
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Figure 2.20 – New PPM Efficiency Frontier created by Lean and CIM (Adler, 1988) 
 
Comparison of Organizational Design Characteristics:  
Taking a broader look at characteristics of organizational design between mass 
production, CIM, and the Toyota Production System (lean), a summary of organizational 
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Source: Mass Production, Nemetz & Fry, 1988; CIM, Adler, 1988.
Figure 2.21 – Organizational Design Characterization of Mass, CIM, and Lean 
 
As previously discussed, CIM and lean each enable the production of low-volume 
components with efficiencies approaching assembly line flow.  However, their 
organizational design methodologies are very different.  TPS and CIM encourage a 
narrow span of control by each level of management, while mass production proposes a 
wide span for extensive control.  CIM promotes few hierarchical levels of organization; 
TPS and mass production propose many.  However, as documented by Adler and others, 
TPS has successfully achieved an enabling infrastructure of hierarchical bureaucracy, as 
opposed to a traditionally coercive organization.  Within TPS and mass production, tasks 
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are generally routine and repetitive, while CIM recommends adaptive and craft-like tasks 
to promote learning and teamwork.   
 
Specialization of production is low in CIM, moderate-high in TPS, and high in mass 
production.  In parallel, decision making is decentralized with CIM, centralized with 
traditional mass production, and decentralized with an emphasis on clear boundaries 
within TPS.  CIM encourages a self-regulating and organic organization structure; mass 
production recommends a mechanistic bureaucracy, and TPS successfully creates an 
organic bureaucracy.  Both CIM and TPS encourage teamwork, though in TPS the 
objective of teamwork is for processes to continually improve, in CIM teamwork is 
intended to effectively operate machines.   
 
Training within CIM is broad and frequent, while mass production generally deems 
training as unnecessary, recommending it be narrow and one time only.  In a TPS 
environment, training should be frequently given, and both broad in terms of general 
technique and specialized for particular application.  TPS values cognitive, social, 
technical, and problem solving expertise.  Mass production values manual and technical 
expertise.  CIM values cognitive, social, and problem solving expertise.  CIM promotes 
investment in technology, while TPS and mass production do not place specific emphasis 
on this.  TPS in particular encourages technologies that promote simplicity and flexibility 
in production.  The ideal batch size for efficient operation is high in both CIM and mass 
production; lean is built upon the concept that small batch size is ideal to promote 
flexibility.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter began by asking whether lean production tools and techniques apply in the 
remanufacturing context. The answer, “yes.”  However, this discussion and the case 
studies from four unique lean remanufacturing contexts reveal complexities underlying 
the original question and in answering it.  The remanufacturing industry is complex and 
diverse, defying simple generalizations of one problem or one best solution.  In some 
instances, such as that of the Type IV case study, remanufacturing has many close 
parallels to a traditional high-volume manufacturing process.  In some instances, such as 
the Type I case study, remanufacturing is as complex and variable as any process found 
in original manufacturing.  However, a key to effective application of lean methods in 
remanufacturing is to understand the operational context under consideration.  
 
This chapter examined assumptions underlying the product-process matrix, and 
implications of new production methodologies such as lean manufacturing and computer 
integrated manufacturing.  Comparing applications of CIM and lean to large valve 
remanufacture provided a unique comparison of two popular “transformational” methods 
of production.  The following conclusions can be drawn from the four case studies of lean 
remanufacturing, conceptual analysis of lean and CIM, and their discussion: 
 
• The remanufacturing context is very broad and diverse:  when discussing advanced 
manufacturing concepts with leaders in the remanufacturing industry, leaders may say 
these concepts do not apply in their industry due to inherent variability of every 
component as a result of incoming conditions.  This response over simplifies the 
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remanufacturing context as a whole.  Remanufacturing exhibited extreme diversity 
across the four specific case studies.  In the same ways contingency theorists adapted 
economies of scale and mass production thinking to applications varying from job 
shop production to continuous flow production, we must offer the remanufacturing 
industry the same considerations.  
 
• Lean methods do apply in all instances of remanufacturing, but specific solutions 
must be tailored to specific context regarding characteristics of product variability: 
In the case of high-variability lean remanufacturing: the buffers will be bigger, parts 
supermarkets will get broader, engineers will be more integrally involved, fixtures 
will be less specialized, and cross functional teams will support each other to address 
variability in production processes.  In the case of low-variability lean 
remanufacturing, the process may closely resemble applications of lean tools found in 
a traditional manufacturing organization: technical instructions will be simplified, 
one-piece flow will occur, materials and tools will be kitted to precision, andon 
signals will be responded to immediately, specialized fixtures will improve quality 
and reduce setups, and multi-skilled workers will continuously improve processes to 
achieve takt time.   
 
• Lean actually moves a production process within the PPM space; mainly along the 
process axis, allowing flexibility and efficiency simultaneously: the product-process 
matrix has been a highly valuable tool for examining the alignment of an 
organizations production methodology to the application context.  However, this 
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model has generally been used as a static descriptor of an organizations alignment 
with technology and product, with little explanation of how to move towards a more 
appropriate “fit” between product and process characteristics.  These case studies 
show that implementation of lean methods can move a production process within the 
PPM space, in the direction of continuous flow. 
 
• Lean manufacturing mitigates the production trade-off between quality and cost; 
volume and variety; efficiency and customization: The PPM is grounded in 
economies of scale production paradigm, suggesting a required tradeoff exists 
between quality/customization and output/efficiency.  However, in examining the 
PPM, lean methods offer a new set of efficient production options, such that a 
tradeoff is not required between the key variables.   
 
• Lean manufacturing techniques work effectively to create improved performance in 
the remanufacturing context: The four case studies represent a much larger number of 
remanufacturing processes to which lean tools were applied.  In each of the four cases 
the application of lean methods produced significant performance improvements, 
particularly in developing internal process stability, just-in-time production, and built-
in-quality.  It is further believed that despite the tremendous improvements that were 
recognized in each of these cases, still far greater opportunity for increased efficiency 
and productivity exists. 
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• Lean, CIM, and advanced mass production are different “production paradigms:”  
Today’s operations management theory teaches the tremendous benefits from modern 
production techniques such as advanced mass production, CIM, and lean 
manufacturing.  In some instances, particularly that of CIM and lean, the resultant 
flexibility and quality of production may lead to improved results.  Yet, these 
methodologies diverge in application, so much so that they must be considered as 
different production paradigms, and possibly even divergent production paradigms.  
In considering the case study of lean and CIM in large valve remanufacturing, it is not 
believed the thinking behind these paradigms, while each effective in their own right, 
and could have complemented each other successfully.  Figure 2.22 illustrates the 
divergent paths of lean, CIM, and advanced mass production.  While each is 
considered an improvement upon traditional production paradigms, the slope of 
improvement differs. It should be noted that this is an observation based on a few 
case studies and not a rigorous large scale study.  Moreover, there are many examples 
of companies like Toyota that deploy lean methods and use advanced manufacturing 
technologies as one would see in CIM implementations.   The difference is the way 
Toyota focuses process improvement on first simplifying the process and eliminating 
waste with minimal new technology, then applying the technology very selectively 
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Figure 2.22 – Traditional and Modern Methods of Production 
 
• Mass production and CIM take a mechanistic view, while lean takes an organic view: 
as previously discussed the modern production methodologies of lean, CIM, and 
advanced mass production offer improvements and efficiencies over traditional 
production.  However, a closer examination of the structural characteristics used to 
achieve these improvements suggest a mechanistic application (and perhaps over-
reliance) on technology in CIM and advanced mass production, while lean is more 
organically driven by production employees. 
 
• A tremendous opportunity exists to apply lean production methods to the generally 
immature remanufacturing industry: The introduction noted that remanufacturing has 
been considered as “the next great opportunity for boosting U.S. productivity” and 
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“the ultimate form of recycling.”  This paper has shown the potential for lean 




This chapter has sought to answer the specific question of lean production design in the 
remanufacturing context.  As a result of this study, several key contributions have been 
made to the academic literature in the areas of lean manufacturing, organizational design, 
and organizational change. The following contributions to academic literature in these 
areas have been made: 
• Improved understanding of the mechanics by which organizations are able to use 
processes and technology to move within the PPM space and achieve greater 
efficiency. 
• Modified the PPM to create a framework for characterization of remanufacturing 
processes, this enables a theoretical linkage between OEM and remanufacturing. 
• Utilized the PPM to develop an advanced understanding of the ways in which new 
production paradigms of CIM and lean manufacturing relate with regards to both 
process and outcome.   
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter analyzes the application of lean production tools and techniques within the 
remanufacturing context.  The perspective has been a largely static perspective, simply 
considering ways in which lean methods apply to the specific remanufacturing context.  
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Lean remanufacturing has been shown to exhibit tremendous flexibility and potential.  
Following socio-technical contingency theorists who suggest an organization must first 
define its technical core and subsequently develop the organizational structure to support 
technology; this paper has initiated a study of lean production techniques in the 
remanufacturing context by examining the application of lean production tools and 
techniques.  However, the mechanisms by which an organization can effectively deploy 
these techniques have not been studied.   
 
Future research must examine techniques by which an organization can effectively 
deploy these concepts with equal appreciation for social and technical considerations.  
Additionally, future research should explore the mechanisms by which a large multi-site 
bureaucracy (similar to most large U.S. enterprises) can develop and sustain an 
organizational transformation aligned to the tenets of lean production.  Finally, 
remanufacturing is an interesting and unique context to apply lean production tools and 
techniques.  Other similar context exist, such as the health care industry, research and 






COMPARATIVE CASES OF LEAN MANUFACTURING DEPLOYMENT:  




Many organizations worldwide are pursuing deployment of continuous improvement 
strategies aligned to the principles and practices of lean manufacturing, based on the 
Toyota Production System.  Many have had some success in attempts to emulate 
practices of waste elimination, empowerment of employees, and continuous improvement, 
however, far more have struggled in their attempts to deploy lean manufacturing.  Many 
organizations have experienced early successes at deployment, but little long-term 
growth and sustainment.  This chapter seeks to understand this specific phenomenon by 
analyzing organizational deployment of lean manufacturing at two large industrial 
organizations over a six-year period.  The two organizations started out with very 
different approaches to lean deployment, one which is characterized as “mechanistic” and 
the other “organic.”  Each organization experienced a mix of successes and failures, ups 
and downs, crises and regrouped successes.  Ultimately, the approaches began to 
converge as the two learned from each other.  For this paper, the level of analysis is an 
individual industrial facility; specifically two naval ship remanufacturing depots are 
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compared and contrasted. This level of analysis would be similar to comparing two 
automotive production plants, the field activity offices of a larger organization, or 
independent divisions of a large corporation.  Chapter four of this dissertation looks at the 
transformation of the larger, connected enterprise of which these two cases are a part. 
 
One common reason organizations struggle in their efforts to implement lean 
manufacturing is a failure to understand and appreciate both the social and technical 
aspects of successful deployment.  Lean manufacturing is identified for its socio-
technical nature; effective implementation is shown to require a change of both 
organizational processes (technical) and organizational culture (social).  The culmination 
of this socio-technical deployment is the learning paradigm of lean manufacturing, which 
has led it to be defined by some as the “thinking production system.” (Liker, 2004)   
 
This chapter builds on distinctions in organizational design between organic and 
mechanistic structures.  These terms were first used by Burns and Stalker (1961) in their 
studies of formal structure and control within organizations.  Organic is flexible and free-
flowing in nature, while mechanistic is rigid and controlling.  Their study identified 
environmental characteristics favoring different mixes of internal organic and 
mechanistic characteristics.  Burns and Stalker addressed the static state of an 
organization, not the dynamic deployment process for a change in management methods.  
This paper extends the conceptual distinction between mechanistic and organic 




An organic and mechanistic approach to organizational design exists at the very heart of 
how an organization makes decisions, and how it reacts to internal and external changes.  
Mechanistic management thinks of the organization as a technical entity with simple 
cause and effect relationships; find the right levels of inputs and the desired outputs will 
follow. Management structure, strategy, and organization could be considered as gears of 
a machine to be measured, adjusted, altered, and realigned within an organization.  A 
mechanistic approach to lean deployment would be characterized by rules, procedures, 
and a clear hierarchy of authority.  This would involve formalized organizational rules 
and structures to implement lean based on centralized, top-down decision making.  Lean 
would be perceived as a set of tools to be deployed, and would create a bureaucratic 
process for deployment driven by training, close measurement of results, and formal 
process controls. Implementation would likely involve a rigid implementation strategy, 
comprehensive roles and responsibilities, certifications of training capability, and metrics 
associated with speed of deployment.  Outcomes would be measured to assess return on 
investment for specific lean tool deployment.  Since specific lean tools are taught to a 
small number of “experts” and deployed broadly across the organization, a mechanistic 
deployment could quickly disseminate the tools to a wider audience (Liker and Meier, 
2006). 
 
An organic organization seeks to learn, evolve and adapt to internal challenges and the 
external environment. This type of organization considers internal “workings” as living, 
breathing cells that constantly grow and adapt inside of the larger body, as opposed to the 
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rigidity of gears and optimization.  Organic organizations do not assume that any one 
formula for management is optimal.  Rather, they continuously search for growth and 
balance at all levels of the organization.  An organic deployment of lean manufacturing 
would be loose, free-flowing, and adaptive in nature.  In this type of organization, rules 
and regulations are often not written down, and when written they are selectively 
interpreted and adopted.  In this type of deployment individuals are given more freedom 
to experiment and learn what works and does not work. Organizational hierarchy is less 
structured, and decision-making authority is decentralized.  These characteristics may 
manifest themselves in a lean deployment based in equifinality (more than one path to 
success, an element of Open Systems analysis) and evolutionary learning.  (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1997)  As opposed to the rank or certification of the individual as a “lean 
expert,” individual expertise and skill sets are likely to be more valued as the organism 
takes advantage of unique talents of personnel.  Lean deployment would focus on deep 
learning team by team, rather than on rapid deployment of tools based on a preset 
formula.  Compared to mechanistic deployment, organic deployment would be slower 
and more methodical, quickening in pace as the organism strengthens its internal 
“muscles” of change. 
 
Both the mechanistic and organic approaches to lean manufacturing deployment have 
advantages.  A mechanistic approach includes an internal strength of infrastructure and 
rapid deployment of top-down goals; whereas an organic approach results in an ability to 
adapt and learn in a changing environment.  Is one approach to deployment better than 
the other?  In their study of formal structure within an organization, Burns and Stalker 
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argue the answer to this question is contingent upon environmental uncertainty.  
Organizations become more organic as environmental uncertainty increases and more 
mechanistic as it decreases.  This paper seeks to understand lean manufacturing policy 
deployment in order to distinguish between an organic and mechanistic deployment 
strategy, to understand the benefits and challenges of each, and to identify the most 




This paper is a comparative case study, the culmination of six years of research and 
observation of lean remanufacturing deployment within the naval ship overhaul and 
repair industry.  Over the six years, a total of four large industrial organizations were 
observed in this industry.  This paper will focus on two of these organizations.  The cases 
were selected for their contrasting methodologies of lean manufacturing deployment, as 
well as accessibility of data.  (Yin, 2002)  These two organizations, referred to here as 
“Small Ship” and “Big Ship,” are loosely aligned as industrial entities in a large naval 
ship repair organization, REMAN.  Their association relative to each other is as both 
partners and competitors within the same extended organization.  They are partners in 
that they are aligned to the same organizational management hierarchy and serve the 
same mission, including teaming, sharing of resources and lessons learned.  They are 
competitors in that they are judged as individual entities and each desires to be regarded 
as the leading ship repair depot.  Thus, when they developed different strategies and 
ideologies of lean, they each struggled to win in pushing their approach to become the 
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standard for the extended organization.  Figure 3.1 summarizes the research 











Figure 3.1 Research Methodology 
 
Data presented in these case studies are collected from multiple site visits over a six year 
period.  Data sources include direct observation, extensive interviews, and review of 
documentation and archival records.  A total of more than 50 site visits to Small Ship and 
Big Ship contributed to the development of this paper. Participant observation was 
facilitated by the author being an employee with responsibility for lean deployment.  In 
addition, about 40 hours of formal interviews were conducted with personnel from 
“REMAN” (corporate management), site management, shop management, line 
management, production workers, production analysts, and the lean manufacturing 
deployment team at both Small Ship and Big Ship.  The support of the REMAN in this 
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study is acknowledged, however, for the sake of confidentiality, no specific organizations 
or individuals are identified. 
 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
Lean manufacturing, the principles and practices of the Toyota Production System, is a 
production system identified worldwide for its ability to efficiently deliver customer 
value by the reduction of process lead time and elimination of waste.  The Toyota 
Production System was first brought to the forefront of manufacturing strategy in the 
landmark study of global automotive manufacturing by the International Motor Vehicle 
Program at MIT, documented in The Machine that Changed the World. (Womack, Jones, 
and Roos, 1990)   In this study, lean Producers were noted for their ability to produce 
with roughly half the human effort in the factory, half the manufacturing space, half the 
tool investment, half the engineering hours, and half the time to develop new products as 
compared with non-lean competitors.  Today, lean manufacturing is being deployed in 
industries as diverse as health care, defense, home construction, restaurants, and rental 
cars as a methodology for achieving greater efficiencies, cost reductions, quality 
improvements, and flexibility of workforce.  (Womack and Jones, 1996) 
 
Lean manufacturing has been interpreted in light of the socio-technical systems approach 
to manufacturing (Liker, 2004).  It integrates technical tools (waste elimination, just-in-
time production, standardized work, workplace organization, pull systems) with social 
organization tools (problem solving, built-in-quality, teamwork, voice of the customer, 
continuous improvement).  With research beginning in the mid-1980s, the Toyota 
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Production System has been studied extensively as a manufacturing system.  Through 
follow-on research lean manufacturing has been shown to apply successfully in a wide 
variety of non-traditional manufacturing, service, and “white collar” applications.  
Despite an extensive understanding of the principles and practices of lean manufacturing, 
a majority of companies have failed to successfully deploy the methodologies.  
Deployment strategies for lean manufacturing have not been examined in great detail, in 
large part due to the difficulty of obtaining data over an extended deployment.  In light of 
many failed organization-wide attempts at deployment of lean manufacturing, 
deployment is a critical element that must be examined further.  
 
Organic and Mechanistic Deployment Methodology 
One dimension that can be used to characterize the methodology for deployment of lean 
manufacturing is that of organic and mechanistic, borrowed from theories of 
organizational design.  This theory identifies organizations by their degree of formal 
structure, characterizing them as either “mechanistic” (rigid, high formalization, 
machine-like) or “organic” (flexible, low formalization, living-evolving organisms).  
(Burns and Stalker, 1961)  A similar construct can be used for classifying deployment of 
lean manufacturing.  Organic and mechanistic deployment approaches to lean 
manufacturing are summarized in Figure 3.2 with a set of six variables describing the 





Scope and Objective of Lean Deployment: 
The scope and objectives of lean deployment are described by a set of variables 
addressing how the organization defines success and how this definition translates into 
the initial deployment approach.  Mechanistic or organic tendencies lead to divergent 
perspectives on how an organization should be structured.  These perspectives underlie 
different reasons for implementing lean manufacturing.  Mechanistic and organic 
deployment strategies to lean manufacturing are summarized below according to the 
dimensions:  key to successful deployment, scope and objectives for both initial and long-











Figure 3.2 Scope and Objective of Lean Deployment 
 
Mechanistic deployment seeks to achieve success through the overall efficiency of 
deployment.  In other words, a strategy and structure for deployment are created and a 
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successful deployment is one that deploys resources to the strategy and structure 
efficiently.  Due to the highly-structured nature of deployment and focus on overall 
efficiency of deployment, a mechanistic approach is able to touch a broad cross-section 
of the organization.  However, it tends to be shallow in depth as resources are so 
widespread.  A mechanistic approach to deployment seeks consistency across the 
organization.  For an organization with an existing mechanistic infrastructure, a 
mechanistic deployment of lean manufacturing would seek to “grease the gears” of its 
internal workings not to change the internal workings, but to make them operate more 
smoothly and efficiently.  In a mechanistic deployment bottom-line results are the initial 
objective for lean deployment, with sustainable efficiency and cost reduction as the long-
term objective.  In considering a mechanistic deployment, key performance indicators of 
cost reduction are tracked closely.  As previously mentioned, efficiency among the gears 
of a mechanistic organization is the primary objective for deployment and therefore the 
primary measure of success.   
 
Organic deployment of lean manufacturing seeks to create a living, learning-organization.  
An organization with this perspective would consider a successful deployment to be 
achieved through the effectiveness of each interaction, the success or failure of each 
unique project.  An organic deployment would start off far narrower in focus than a 
mechanistic deployment.  Therefore, it is critical that each focused project be a success, 
since success cannot be gained through average results of a large number of projects.  An 
organic deployment would initially seek a deep, focused penetration of Lean tools and 
techniques, initially narrow in focus, as a pilot or model of lean manufacturing, followed 
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by a growing deployment to the larger organization in the long-term.  An organic 
deployment of lean production would seek the short-term goals of organizational learning, 
developing a greater sense of internal operations and structures within.  Whereas the 
short-term objective for organic deployment is organizational learning, the long-term 
deployment objective would be a “learning organization”, as defined by Peter Senge 
(1990).  The juxtaposition of “organizational learning” and a “learning organization” is 
compared with the focus on cost reduction and sustainment of those benefits in a rigid 
deployment.   
 
A mechanistic deployment of lean manufacturing seeks rapid, widespread engagement of 
a broad organization, focusing on efficient delivery of the change implementation.  An 
organic deployment on the other hand, seeks deeper understanding through focused pilot 
projects and models, with eventual diffusion of learning to the broader organization, with 
a focus on effectiveness of each unique project.  One element of this deployment, 
reflecting back to the socio-technical nature of lean manufacturing, would be the depth of 
understanding of the social and technical principles of lean manufacturing.  The depth of 
an organization’s experience with lean over time is illustrated in Figure 3.3, considering 
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Figure 3.3 Depth of Deployment with Socio-Technical Tools & Techniques 
 
The above figure considers depth of experience to technical and social tools and 
techniques of lean manufacturing for both an organic and mechanistic approach to 
deployment.  The technical dimension of tools and techniques ranges from: 
- Tools Deployment: a concerted effort to widely deploy 5S, standard work, 
production cells, or other singular concepts of lean manufacturing. 
- Disconnected Process Improvement: an emphasis on kaizen events or rapid 
improvement workshops, improvement projects that are wholistic in their 
utilization of technical tools and techniques of lean, but disjointed in their overall 
focus to the organizational deployment or higher-order value streams.   
- Value Stream Thinking: application of technical tools and techniques of lean 
manufacturing to re-orient processes and align all process improvements to 









- Pursuit of Perfection : the most mature application of lean tools and techniques; 
occurs as organizations are aligned to value creation along value streams and all 
individuals are working to improve strategic and non-strategic initiatives, all tied 
to a higher order policy deployment or hoshin planning. 
 
The social dimension of tools and techniques ranges from: 
- Employee Engagement: the first dimension of social transformation is the process 
of introducing employees to lean manufacturing and getting them involved, 
whether directly or indirectly, in the change process. 
- Employee Empowerment: as the social constructs of the organization evolve, 
leadership becomes more trusting of employee ideas and feedback; employees 
take ownership of improvements and feel empowered to make continuous 
improvements.  
- Advanced Team Building: the social evolution to where groups of employees are 
working productively as a unit for continuous improvement and synergistic 
production capabilities.  A team lead would evolve, to build the truly embedded 
social organization for improvement and sustainment of lean deployment. 
- Learning Organization: the evolution of an organization to the social evolution of 
employees at all levels working individually and in teams to learn and evolve 




As illustrated in Figure 3.3, mechanistic deployment, with an emphasis on rapid and 
widespread engagement, would ultimately lead to a shallow profile of depth of 
experience to both social and technical tools and techniques.  Organic deployment, with a 
narrow and deep engagement, would have a steeper profile of experience to tools and 
techniques.  However, they would be limited in scope in the early stages eventually 
broadening out across the organization.   
 
The dimensions of social and technical experiences are not believed to be inter-connected.  
Rather, they follow the same deployment profile and would therefore be parallel in nature.  
As time progresses, an organic deployment would level off in experience, while a 
mechanistic deployment would deepen as select projects became more advanced and 
mature in their development.  Shifting from a focus on the depth of organizational 
experience, we now consider the effects of organic and mechanistic deployment on the 
breadth and scope of organizational deployment.  Figure 3.4 illustrates the breadth and 
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Figure 3.4 Breadth of Lean Deployment 
 
Scope of deployment is characterized over time, moving from initial model areas of 
deployment, to multiple pilot areas, to production shops in entirety, and ultimately the 
entire organization.  A mechanistic deployment rapidly impacts a broad scope of the 
organization with its rigid, consistent, and ideally efficient deployment strategy.  An 
organic deployment on the other hand, is slower to impact a broad scope of the 
organization, yet over time will achieve a large segment.  In some instances it may 
achieve the same breadth of a mechanistic deployment.  Interestingly, the two figures of 
depth (figure 3.3) and breadth (figure 3.4) of deployment are inverted models of each 
other: mechanistic deployment achieving a shallow curve in depth, a steep curve in 











Bureaucratization of the Lean Deployment: 
A second set of key variables to lean manufacturing deployment is associated with the 
bureaucratization and formal infrastructure of lean deployment.  Tied closely to the 
mechanistic and organic discussions of Burns and Stalker, the bureaucratization of lean 
deployment addresses the extent of written rules, policies, and guidance of the 
deployment, the ability of a deployment strategy to be tailored for specific environmental 
conditions, the location of lean expertise within an organization, strategies for 
deployment of lessons learned, and ultimately the organizational sustainment strategy in 
response to organizational entropy.  Figure 3.5 summarizes both mechanistic and organic 
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Figure 3.5 Bureaucratization of Lean Deployment 
 
In mechanistic deployment, formalization of infrastructure is high, often in terms of 
written rules, regulations, procedures, roles and responsibilities, metrics, and deployment 
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strategies.  This would create a very rigid infrastructure and model of implementation.  
Autonomy of the customized process is low because success in a mechanistic deployment 
is considered to be achieved through efficiency of deployment.  Therefore deployment is 
tightly controlled and monitored, with little autonomy granted for specific external 
conditions.  The source of lean expertise is often centralized in a small change 
management group that oversees the deployment.  This group of “experts” controls the 
training and deployment mechanisms for lean deployment; a challenge can be created in 
a mature deployment when the depth of understanding of the organization begins to 
eclipse that of the “experts.”  Strategies for deployment of lessons learned are rapidly 
deployed through written compliance letters with follow-on audits.  The response to 
organizational entropy is the organization seeks to counter organizational entropy (an 
element of Open Systems Theory) through rules and regulations to maintain the new 
level of performance.  (Nadler and Tushman, 1997) 
 
An organic deployment is low in formalization of infrastructure - much flexibility exists 
in deployment to fit the specific environmental conditions and unique skill sets of the 
deployment team.  Written rules and regulations are not common.  If they exist, they are 
often ignored.  A high degree of autonomy is vested with the change agent to tailor 
implementation needs to the specific environmental circumstances.  Lean expertise 
within an organic deployment is dispersed amongst the broader workforce and learning of 
the organization and change agents involved in the model deployments.  Lessons learned 
are not recognized so much as benefits to be replicated, as they are of lessons to be shared.  
Ultimately, an organic deployment seeks to consistently evolve to achieve continuing 
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growth and learning.  As such, organizational entropy is overcome through establishment 
of continuous improvement initiatives to continually drive performance, processes, and 
people forward.   
 
Organic and Mechanistic Deployment: Visual Metaphors for Deployment: 
The organic and mechanistic deployment approaches can be illustrated visually using 
concentric circles (mechanistic) and spirals (organic).  Consider an organization where 
key organizational processes, work areas, or departments, are identified by the nodes 
shown below in Figure 3.6.  Each node represents an opportunity for process 
improvement; the entire square represents the entire organization.  The overall success of 
each initiative is illustrated by the area encompassed by a concentric circle or spiral.   
 
Figure 3.6 Key Organizational Processes 
 
Mechanistic deployment as concentric circles: In Figure 3.7, mechanistic deployment is 
illustrated by concentric circles, each radiating outwards from a key organizational 
process or target area for improvement.  As initiatives are successful, the size of the circle 
radiates out from the initial node.  Concentric circles were selected for this illustration 
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because a mechanistic approach would deploy a standardized set of specific tools with 
each initiative.  It is simply a matter of success for each initiative.  As can be seen in 
Figure 3.7, a mechanistic approach, with its broad scope, colloquially termed “inch-deep, 
mile-wide”, will impact many key processes at a time.  As initiatives are successful, the 
size of the concentric circle will increase or decrease as a representation of the impact 
from deployment.   
 
 
Figure 3.7 Mechanistic Deployment as Concentric Circles 
 
Organic deployment as spirals: Organic deployment is illustrated in Figure 3.8 by spirals 
growing outwards from key organizational processes (as opposed to the concentric circles 
of mechanistic deployment).  As the spiral grows outward it will impact more entities 
within the organization, resulting in knowledge sharing.   Each turn of the spiral leads to 
an advanced level of implementation and learning.  The organic deployment initiates with 
a small number of nodes, which are established as “models” of lean for the entire 
organization.  This approach is colloquially termed “inch-wide, mile-deep”.  As the 
success of the penetration of each model initiative goes deeper and deeper, the impact 
and benefit from those initiatives, and organizational learning gained from them, will 
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have a direct and indirect impact on surrounding key organizational processes.  At some 
point a broader cross-section of the organization begins to learn value stream thinking in 










Figure 3.8 Organic Deployment as Spirals 
 
Organizational Entropy: A final element of these illustrative models is the concept of 
organizational entropy, a core concept of open systems theory.  Entropy suggests an 
organization, in the absence of a positive force, will seek its level of lowest energy.  In 
many instances, this is identified by the pre-existing process conditions.  Entropy is a 
force against which all change management and continuous improvement programs must 
battle in sustaining improvements.  The specific parallel to the models of lean 
manufacturing deployment as spiral implementation (organic) or concentric circles 
(mechanistic) is that they are capable of collapsing to the original node.  Even in a 
successful deployment of lean manufacturing, the laws of Entropy will apply.  Without 
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energy, commitment, and resources, the deployment can regress to a lower-energy state.  
In many instances, the regression can lead to original conditions, unless a new baseline 
level of organizational homeostasis can be developed by the socio-technical 
implementation.  Achieving this new level of homeostatic requires continual energy from 
leaders who are deeply committed to developing a lean culture. 
 
 
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS – A TALE OF TWO SHIPYARDS 
Organizational Profile: 
The two organizations compared in this chapter are large naval ship remanufacturing 
depots, identified here as Small Ship and Big Ship.  The mission of these organizations is 
to maintain operational condition of a large fleet of super-sized naval vessels.  Each of 
these organizations has a long and proud history, has an experienced and unionized 
workforce, a technically-expert management team, and an overall risk-averse culture.  As 
previously mentioned, these two organizations are loosely aligned as both partners and 
competitors within the same operational arm of REMAN, their parent organization.  They 
are partners in that they are aligned to the same organizational management hierarchy, 
serve the same organizational mission, and share resources and lessons learned.  They are 
competitors in that they are judged as individual entities and each desires to be regarded 
as the leading shipyard.  With regards to lean implementation, each organization had the 
same introduction, and their paths have fully paralleled each other chronologically.  
However, it has not always been a relationship of teamwork in deployment.  Each 
organization has a different strategy and ideology with regards to lean.  To some degree 
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they are each a manifestation of the overall shipyard culture, but each organization has 
struggled to win out in pushing its approach to become the standard for the extended 
organization. 
 
The first organization to be profiled in detail is the smaller of the two shipyards, referred 
to in this case study as Small Ship.  Small Ship was an organization of roughly 4500 
employees, and dedicated and to one major product line.  The company is known for its 
independent thinking and entrepreneurial perspective to work.  Small Ship had 
established itself as the expert within the naval ship repair environment in one focused 
product line.  The shipyard has been shaped and hardened by multiple threats of closure 
due to a perceived excess capacity within REMAN.  The shipyard has survived multiple 
close calls for closure, and this possibility constantly looms for the workforce, especially 
because REMAN leadership has shown a tendency to consider site closings roughly 
every ten years.  The shipyard has survived largely based on its past performance and 
specialization, but powerful political powers exist both for sustaining the shipyard and 
closing the shipyard.  Lean manufacturing was viewed as one strategy to better ensure 
their longevity.  However, the organization is ultimately not trusting of outsiders and 
external initiatives. 
 
The second organization profiled is the larger of the two shipyards, Big Ship.  At the 
beginning of this case study Big Ship was an organization of approximately 7500 
employees, and was dedicated to two major product lines.  Big Ship is known for its 
progressive management strategies.  Prior to lean, it had invested significantly in training 
 133 
of managers along tactics of Stephen Covey (leadership), Mark Graham Brown (metrics), 
and Malcolm Baldridge (quality).  The organization, which is large and influential, has 
not experienced threats of closure such as Small Ship, or the distrust of external 
influences.  Big Ship is closely aligned to REMAN’s corporate initiatives and has 
regularly sought to exert influence over cross-shipyard directives and guidance.  At the 
time of kick-off to lean deployment, the most significant management influence at Big 
Ship is that of the Baldridge Criteria and its use for management by corporate 
measurement and assessment as part of their “organizational effectiveness cycle”. 
 
Case Study Phases of Implementation:   
Deployment of lean manufacturing at Small Ship and Big Ship differs greatly, and is 
captured in this comparative case study, which encompasses six years of deployment.  
The timeline for these two case studies is identical, beginning in 2001 and concluding in 
2007.  And while their paths are mostly unique and parallel, they do intersect at several 
points through communication, resource sharing, occurrences of joint-learning, and 
engagement of corporate management.  These points are highlighted in the case study.  In 
each instance, what began as a grassroots effort to become more efficient through 
deployment of lean manufacturing was transitioned to a corporate mandate to do so.  The 
deployment methodologies of the two organizations differed greatly, as did their response 
to corporate guidance on deployment.   
 
The deployment methodologies of Small Ship and Big Ship match the overall culture of 
the shipyards.  Small Ship is “entrepreneurial and rebellious,” tending towards an organic 
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approach, while Big Ship is “button down corporate,” leaning towards a mechanistic 
approach. In writing the comparative case study, six distinct phases of lean 
manufacturing deployment were identified: 
- “Phase One - Early Awareness”: In phase one, the shipyards are first introduced 
to the concepts of lean manufacturing through training and one-week exposure 
from external consultants. 
- “Phase Two – Grassroots Deployment”: In phase two, the first major steps 
towards implementation of lean manufacturing are undertaken at both Small Ship 
and Big Ship. 
- “Phase Three – Growing the Deployment - Spreading Lessons Learned”: In 
phase three, the shipyards have moved beyond initial deployment, and seek to 
spread lean manufacturing to broader elements of the organization. 
- ‘Phase Four – Corporate Engagement and the Next Level of Deployment”: As 
Small Ship and Big Ship mature in their deployments, corporate leadership 
becomes engaged in the improvement initiatives.  As part of this, external 
influences and guidance are now applied to the organization. 
- “Phase Five - Crisis in Lean Manufacturing Deployment”: In phase five of 
deployment, both Small Ship and Big Ship face crises in deployment and must 
respond to challenges that could undermine continuing deployment.   
- “Phase Six - Regrouping & Redefinition”: In the sixth phase of deployment, the 
final phase studied for Small Ship and Big Ship, the organizations must regroup 
from crisis and successfully move forward in deployment.   
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This case study will analyze both Small Ship and Big Ship as they evolve through the six 
phases of implementation.  At the conclusion of phases two and four a detailed analysis 
of implementation will be conducted to better illustrate the cases.  Finally, a summary of 
mechanistic and organic characteristics will be provided.   
 
Case Study Phase One – Early Awareness: 
Both organizations, Small Ship and Big Ship, were introduced to lean manufacturing in 
July of 2001.  At this time a small contingent of REMAN VIPs, including senior leaders 
from both Small Ship and Big Ship, toured the site of a successful lean manufacturing 
implementation in western Michigan, an automotive parts supplier to Toyota.  On this 
tour, managers received an introduction to the concepts of lean manufacturing, attended a 
five-day seminar on the subject, and discussed the prospects for lean manufacturing 
deployment in the naval ship repair industry.   
 
Within six months of the initial offsite, both Small Ship and Big Ship were kicking off 
their lean manufacturing deployment.  Kick-off for lean at each organization occurred 
when a lean consulting firm, hired by the headquarters management group for the 
REMAN, arrived at each shipyard to conduct a one-week kaizen event (also know as a 
rapid improvement event).  A kaizen event is a change management tool used by many 
organizations as a primary driver of lean manufacturing deployment.  It is a one-week 
“blitz” of an area, specifically intended to bring all perspectives to the table, identify 
desired changes, and implement changes immediately, in accordance with lean 
manufacturing principles and practices.  This is a valuable tool for continuous 
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improvement, specifically designed to overcome organizational and bureaucratic inertia 
associated with “paralysis by analysis,” general inactivity from over-analysis.  The five-
day, expert-led event was intended to provide training and an illustration for each 
organization on the potential for lean manufacturing.  The targeted projects for Small 
Ship and Big Ship were large valve repair and project management of shipboard valve 
repair, respectively.  These projects were selected for their importance as constraints in 
the overall execution of ship overhaul and repair. 
 
At Small Ship, the kaizen event selected for an initial target area was the machine shop 
process of large valve repair.  In one week the team of approximately ten workers was 
able to clean up the workspace, organize tools, and establish basic visual management in 
the workplace.  Equipment was moved to improve work flow and a capital investment 
was initiated to procure a parts-cleaning machine, which was identified as a bottleneck 
process.  Despite initial skepticism, the improvement effort was well received within the 
work area and positive energy was created.  However, Small Ship did not maintain 
energy beyond the one-week kaizen event and lean manufacturing deployment failed to 
take hold.  In time, the work area regressed to previous process and performance levels, 
as well as a growing skepticism among employees in the area associating lean with a 
“flavor of the month” and un-kept promises by management. 
 
At Big Ship, the kaizen event focused on the project management processes associated 
with onboard valve replacement, specifically work sequencing, readiness of support 
services, and overall resource allocation.  This was a particularly challenging project to 
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undertake as the work is done in a crowded non-dedicated area onboard the ship.  To 
complete the process, specialized mechanics bring their materials, tools, and instructions 
to the worksite.  This was later termed as “bringing the worker to the work” as opposed to 
“bringing the work to the worker” (classic assembly-line thinking).  An additional 
challenge to this effort was that the consultant was not able to visit the actual worksite, 
due to security restrictions.  In the five-day kaizen event, the team developed a process 
plan to change the methodology for repairing the component.  Ultimately, only pieces of 
the new process were implemented, elements that had been previously identified prior to 
the kaizen event.  This project was particularly challenging as a kick-off for lean 
manufacturing.  It was identified years later that significant forces existed within Big 
Ship at the time to repress lean manufacturing deployment since it did not fully align with 
their existing paradigm for improvement based on the Baldridge approach.  
 
Case Study Phase Two – Grassroots Deployment - First Major Steps: 
The Early Awareness Stage of lean deployment at Small Ship and Big Ship was an 
illustrative example, but largely a failure at each organization due to a lack of follow-up 
and organizational commitment.  Deployment could have ended at this initial stage, if not 
for interest of corporate management, REMAN, and a general belief lean could be a tool 
to alleviate growing budget pressures.  Small Ship began to commit well-respected, if 
limited, resources to the deployment, while Big Ship overcame strategic alignment issues 
and folded lean into the continuous improvement strategy along with the Baldridge 
approach of measurement and control.  In this phase, which lasted approximately twelve 
months, Small Ship revisited the site of the initial kaizen event in attempts to develop a 
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model of lean manufacturing.  Meanwhile, Big Ship developed a lean six sigma 
continuous improvement program and a lean six sigma academy for training “black belt” 
experts.   
 
The first major step at Small Ship was to place a highly-respected senior leader, a 
production-oriented ex-project manager, as the director of lean manufacturing 
implementation.  A lean manufacturing expert was then hired to guide implementation on 
the Shop Floor.  With a lean manufacturing staff of only two, Small Ship attempted to 
rejuvenate implementation by revisiting the original kaizen event in large valve repair.  
Shipyard management acknowledged their failing to support outcomes of the initiative, 
and the lean manufacturing staff was dedicated and fully focused on this specific area to 
determine whether or not the tenets of lean manufacturing could be successful at Small 
Ship.  A follow-on kaizen event was held to rejuvenate ideas and initiatives from the 
Early Awareness Stage that had not been implemented.  This second kaizen event was 
followed-up with daily activity from the lean manufacturing staff.  Small Ship made a 
significant commitment of resources, both financial and managerial, to a small group of 
employees and their process of large valve repair over an extended period of time.  At the 
time, large valve repair was performing significantly above cost, beyond cycle time, and 
with significant quality problems.  This became identified as the organization’s “model 
line” for lean manufacturing, and it was decided that Lean success or failure at Small 
Ship would be dependent upon the success and lessons learned at the large valve repair 
model line.  The organization received criticism, both internally and from leadership at 
Big Ship, as to why they were not working faster and applying lean manufacturing in 
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more areas at once.  Senior leadership at Small Ship, convinced they were on the right 
path, weathered the criticism and stayed the course. Small Ship brought in consultants to 
assist, and hired two industrial engineers to support the lean manufacturing deployment, 
doubling the team to four personnel.  In the course of twelve months, Small Ship made 
many iterative improvement passes at the model line in large valve repair.  It took time, 
but within twelve months the process was transformed greatly, both in terms of people 
and process.  Average cycle time for large valve repair was reduced by 83%, schedules 
were being maintained, costs were reduced (e.g. overtime eliminated), quality was 
improved, employees were fully engaged, and the team was achieving continuous 
improvement through daily initiatives, both large and small.   
 
At the same time as model line implementation was occurring at Small Ship, Big Ship 
was aggressively training black belt experts and senior managers through a newly 
established lean six sigma academy.  Similar to lean manufacturing, six sigma is a 
process improvement strategy intent upon continuous improvement of performance, 
though principles, tools, and techniques are divergent.  The strategy for deployment at 
Big Ship was to implement lean manufacturing and six sigma jointly via four to six 
month projects, led by the internal experts.  Big Ship hired a six sigma black belt from an 
automotive OEM as their internal expert.  This individual played a vital role in 
developing a lean six sigma academy, a training program for green belt and black belt 
change agents and facilitators.  Big Ship hired many talented industrial engineers fresh 
from large universities to serve as these internal experts.  These facilitators were trained 
to follow a highly regimented five-step process and were assessed by supervisors based 
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on their adherence to the process and overall cost reductions from their projects.  Big 
Ship, successful in building a large infrastructure to support lean manufacturing and six 
sigma deployment, was lauded by REMAN for development of their lean six sigma 
academy. 
 
Case Study Deep Dive Profile - Large Valve Repair at Small Ship and Big Ship: 
Through the first eighteen months of lean manufacturing deployment at Small Ship and 
Big Ship, no process illustrated the differences in implementation strategy more than that 
of large valve repair.  At Small Ship, large valve repair was identified as the model line 
for implementation, and was therefore the narrow focus of implementation.  At Big Ship, 
large valve repair was selected as one of several processes to be worked in the first set of 
six-month projects for implementation, in part to share best practices and lessons learned 
with Small Ship.   
 
At Small Ship, the large valve model line was developed over eighteen months.  During 
this time a fully-dedicated lean expert worked in the area, all necessary resources were 
committed to the initiative, and senior management was fully engaged to understand and 
learn from the implementation.  The initiative was a success, though not over night or 
without setbacks.  From a technical perspective, many of the lean tools were used such as 
standard work instructions, 5S (workplace organization), kanban, andon, takt time, work-
in-process reduction, rapid changeover fixtures, visual management, and point-of-use 
materials and supply.  Paperwork was streamlined or eliminated, tool kits were developed, 
teamwork became enhanced, and work cells were created to support work previously 
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done off-site.  Average cycle time was reduced from 270 days per component to 45 days 
per component.  The team on the shop floor, which had initially been very skeptical and 
resistant to change was now embracing the process, taking ownership, and making small, 
but daily continuous improvements.  The level of commitment and understanding grew 
with each continuing success.  Much like how a sports team will gain momentum in a 
competition, the team was building momentum in lean manufacturing deployment.  As a 
result of the improvements, overtime in the area was completely eliminated, productivity 
tripled per employee, and many managers at Small Ship would regularly tour the large 
valve repair section.  Later, many outside visitors including high level leaders of 
REMAN toured the large valve area.  Ultimately, this represented a small and seemingly 
insignificant element of the total business at Small Ship, yet it was invaluable in 
demonstrating the concepts of lean manufacturing to management and the workforce. 
 
At Big Ship, the large valve repair area was worked as an accreditation project for a 
recent graduate of the lean six sigma academy.  For six months the individual worked in 
the large valve repair area, deploying lessons learned in the training.  The initial task in 
deployment of large valve repair at Big Ship was to benchmark processes at Small Ship.  
There was much resentment at Big Ship over the notoriety Small Ship was receiving from 
their efforts in large valve repair.  Big Ship felt they had never had performance problems 
in that specific work area, and were therefore as efficient as Small Ship (ultimately, this 
was identified as incorrect when considerations were made for type of work, volume of 
work, and employee productivity).   
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At Big Ship, the six-month benefits were generally shallow in nature.  Implementation 
was directed by the black belt as part of that individual’s accreditation project, most 
benefits were identified through visual management and implementation of 5S.  The 
work area was cleaned, color coding systems were established and overall organization 
and appearances were improved significantly.  No changes were made to the process flow, 
but paperwork improvements were attempted (but ultimately not supported by the 
engineering team).  Only minor equipment expenditures were allowed.  At the conclusion 
of six months, the black belt change agent presented results of the initiative, as well as 
planned follow-up tasks.  The black belt expressed frustration from the lack of overall 
management engagement, particularly from groups outside of the production 
responsibility.  Overall, the initiative was deemed a success.  Unfortunately, after a few 
months of inattention the initiative had regressed to pre-existing conditions.  Setbacks in 
the area were not due to a lack of knowledge on behalf of the change agent, or lack of 
enthusiasm from the workers.  Rather, employees became busy and could not support the 
initiative and closure of follow-up tasks.  Managers did not understand the significance of 
what the change agent was attempting to achieve, and many simply viewed the individual 
as an annoyance that would go away; they were largely correct.  Though, to be fair in 
comparing the large valve repair case studies, it is important to recap that Big Ship had 
ongoing projects in many work areas, while implementation at Small Ship had been 




Case Study Pause for Analysis - Mechanistic vs. Organic in “Early Awareness” and 
“Grassroots Deployment”: 
In the initial stages of deployment, we identify Big Ship for its tendencies towards 
mechanistic deployment.  Big Ship has placed tremendous emphasis on widespread 
deployment (though shallow in nature), training, and emphasis on cost reductions.  The 
emphasis at Big Ship has been to build an infrastructure to support a long-term sustained 
deployment and they have been very successful at this.  They are placing all expertise in 
the central office, with little opportunity for those outside of the “lean team” to shape the 
lean deployment process.   
 
At Small Ship, the organic deployment tendencies are clear.  They are focusing on only 
one area for the purposes of organizational learning.  Management attention is focused on 
this area and they have an extremely concentrated deployment.  They are emphasizing the 
organic evolution of learning amongst the employees as they seek to understand how 
classic lean tools and concepts apply in their environment.  Expertise of the lean process 
is taught at a basic level and is delegated to shop floor employees to lead the process.  
Little infrastructure was developed in the lean deployment team, though.  Perhaps this 
simply illustrates an overall lack of management support.  Figure 3.9 summarizes both 
Big Ship and Small Ship in phases one and two for characteristics of mechanistic/organic 






Figure 3.9 Analysis of Big Ship & Small Ship in Phases One and Two 
 
Case Study Phase Three - Growing the Deployment and Spreading Lessons Learned: 
Phase three of deployment represents the growth and maturation of lean manufacturing 
deployment, growing the deployment and spreading lessons learned.  At this point, each 
organization has established a firm foundation for their moving forward.  In phase three 
of lean manufacturing deployment, each organization sought to expand and elevate lean 
manufacturing to a more significant deployment strategy.   
 
At Small Ship, multiple model lines began to develop across the organization and 
“spontaneous lean” initiatives began to develop as work leaders embraced the tools they 
saw demonstrated in the model line area.  Small Ship spread the model line concept to 
multiple production shops within the organization.  Transponder repair, motor generator 
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repair, ball honing, and hatch repair were selected.  Each of these had similar experiences 
to the large valve model line implementation; however, they were able to move much 
faster as senior leadership began to further understand the implementation process and 
overall vision for lean manufacturing.  Additionally, the application of tools such as value 
stream mapping, workplace organization, standard work instructions, andon, and setup 
reduction began to “pop up” spontaneously throughout the organization as management 
began to understand the vision for lean manufacturing.  These spontaneous attempts at 
deployment were now considered in the screening process to select future areas to focus 
lean deployment resources.  That is, focus areas for deployment models were being 
developed in areas that had shown significant commitment and personal investment in the 
lean manufacturing deployment.  
 
At Big Ship, black belt and green belt experts were deployed to each major department of 
the organization.  A growing number of black belt change agents were trained; all senior 
managers were trained on lean six sigma principles; and lean six sigma objectives were 
placed in managerial performance appraisals.  At Big Ship, lean manufacturing was 
becoming ingrained in the vocabulary and organization structure of senior management.  
As additional employees were selected for the lean program, they were trained as black 
belt and green belt facilitators and were embedded in the line organization.  Green belts 
reported directly to the line organization, black belts reported to either the line 
organization or the director of the lean program.  All senior managers were trained on 
lean six sigma principles and lean six sigma objectives were placed in managerial 
performance appraisals.  Lean six sigma briefings became commonplace at senior 
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management meetings.  In terms of execution, many experiences were similar to that of 
the Big Ship large valve repair effort from Phase Two.  Improvements were being made, 
but they were often limited in scope to the particular shop/function being engaged.  
Consequently they did not pull in extended partners (customers and suppliers) from other 
work functions.   
 
Deep-rooted experience and understanding of lean manufacturing was beginning to take 
hold in Big Ship’s machine shop.  This area was the home of large valve repair, and 
several other projects that had been in the first round of black belt accreditation projects.  
Additionally, at this point many managers were visiting other organizations to see 
examples of lean manufacturing deployment, including the one at Small Ship, to gain a 
greater understanding.  Several of the most experienced black belts were working in the 
machine shop and were learning from their prior experiences at deployment.  An external 
consultant was hired and assisted in developing a value stream map of key processes in 
the machine shop, which highlighted twelve areas to focus energy.  A building-wide 5S 
was conducted (reportedly removing more than 35 tons of waste and excess material) and 
the organization proceeded to conduct kaizen events in each of the twelve work areas 
identified in the value stream map.   
 
At this time a rift began to exist between experiences of the seasoned change agents in 
the machine shop and the training occurring in the lean six sigma academy.  As the most 
senior black belt change agent said, “employees go to the six-week training program and 
when they get back, the first thing I have to do is retrain them.”  This rift began to exist as 
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a divergence between textbook knowledge of the instructors and “deck plate” experience 
of seasoned change agents occurred.  This rift was only to grow as the two organizations 
moved into Phase Four of Lean Manufacturing Deployment and Corporate 
Headquarters became engaged. 
 
Case Study Phase Four - Corporate Engagement and Next-Level of Deployment: 
Phase Four of lean manufacturing deployment within the two organizations was a 
significant turning point in deployment, highlighted by two external influences: (1) a 
planned closure of Small Ship and (2) the engagement of REMAN with a rigid 
implementation strategy similar to that at Big Ship.  This phase of deployment was 
characterized by each organization making an effort to apply lean to the central core 
business function of ship overhauls.  During the first two years of lean manufacturing 
deployment at Small Ship and Big Ship, the efforts had been bottom-up, grassroots 
efforts.  Each organization had a similar objective, but the roadmap was unclear and no 
guidance was being given from a corporate headquarters.   
 
REMAN saw the positive impact lean manufacturing was having at Small Ship, Big Ship, 
and other facilities that had undertaken grassroots efforts.  REMAN established a special 
task force to oversee lean implementation at all sites.  This task force hired a lean 
consultant who had been supporting Big Ship with guidance and assistance.  Desiring a 
common approach to lean across the entire enterprise, a rigid implementation plan was 
developed, with a formula for implementation, roles and responsibilities, methods, and 
metrics for capturing the savings.   
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At Small Ship, the organization was marked by site closure process.  The specter of this 
event, along with the nearing departure of their charismatic shipyard leader, created 
significant energy for process improvement.  The thought was they needed to “take it to 
another level” in order to “show what we are capable of.”  The corporate task force had 
little impact on lean at Small Ship during this period as they simply ignored corporate 
guidance.  With the impending base closure, REMAN was not about to step in and 
mandate compliance.   
 
Senior leadership at Small Ship held a two-day offsite to strategize about the next level of 
lean manufacturing deployment.  The particular challenge faced by leadership was the 
lack of standard and repetitive work during a ship overhaul.  They had learned how to 
apply lean in higher-volume and lower-variety work processes, but a ship overhaul, with 
its low-volume and high-variety presented a unique challenge.  Approximately 10,000 
tasks were executed on a ship overhaul, with nearly every one of those tasks being unique.  
How could techniques such as process flow, pull systems, work-in-process reductions, 
andon, and visual controls work in this environment?   
 
An important revelation for the organization came when it was revealed that, while each 
of the 10,000 tasks is unique in work content and complexity, a common method and 
approach existed in the planning and follow-up of work.  Utilizing the same tools used in 
the original model line, the organization developed a value stream map and a strategy for 
managing the 10,000 tasks in a systematic approach.  This involved a wide array of lean 
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production tools and techniques.  With a focus on continuous flow and cycle time per unit, 
the organization was able to make tremendous strides in a short time.  They established a 
supermarket for incoming work, visual communication boards, standard work 
instructions, and significantly improved workplace organization, work-in-process 
inventory controls, andon systems, and pull systems.  The deployment included all 
production shops, and required significant communication across multiple trades and 
functions.  In many instances, as the strategy was both being developed and implemented, 
comments were made such as “well, we had a similar situation in the large valve model 
line, this is what we did and this was the outcome… let’s try that here.”   
 
The entire shipyard management team rallied around the single mission, vision, and 
objective.  Ultimately, the strategy was recognized to have flaws in implementation, yet 
the new strategy had allowed for the organization to complete one of their most complex 
ship overhauls at a twelve percent cost reduction over a previous best.  The way ahead for 
lean manufacturing was clear.  Largely due to their innovation and process improvement 
initiatives, Small Ship was successful in being removed from the base closure list, the 
charismatic leader was promoted to Admiral and all energy was riding high at Small Ship.   
 
At Big Ship, energy was also riding high as the corporate task force offered an 
opportunity for it to broaden its influence with lean deployment, and consolidate its 
efforts locally under the guidance of a corporate directive.  At Big Ship a feeling existed 
that the organization could now “take lean deployment to the next level.”  Big Ship now 
placed one of their brightest and most respected managers to oversee the lean 
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manufacturing deployment.  This individual, who brought tremendous credibility to the 
position, proceeded to implement and oversee the rigid implementation strategy laid out 
by REMAN.  Quotas were established for each manager and department in terms of the 
number of improvement events, participants, and initiatives to be achieved.  All 
departments at Big Ship were deploying lean in order to meet their management quotas 
and each was building internal examples and expertise.  However, the departments at Big 
Ship were working independently and not always willing to share resources; top-notch 
personnel rarely participated in lean events outside of their particular department.  An 
additional change came at Big Ship when the lean six sigma academy broke from the 
shipyard and aligned directly with the REMAN task force.  This resulted in Big Ship 
losing control of the overall curriculum and vision of the academy.   
 
Similar to Small Ship, Big Ship also worked to tackle the tremendous challenge of 
successfully applying lean to the entire ship overhaul.  The approach taken at Big Ship 
included aligning lean deployment on the overall ship overhaul with existing accounting 
mechanisms and focusing efforts on reducing the overall cost and variability of cost to 
major line items, with responsibility falling to the individual departments who executed 
the work.  This strategy produced positive results, but they were largely constrained by 
the existing accounting measures, producing sub-optimized results to the overall initiative 
of improving performance. 
 
Case Study Deep Dive Profile - Ship Overhaul Maintenance & Modernization: 
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At both Small Ship and Big Ship, the greatest opportunity and challenge for improvement 
existed in applying lean to the core business capability of ship overhaul and repair, 
known as a ship overhaul.  As previously discussed, this could be comprised of upwards 
of 10,000 individual tasks, each unique and subdivided further by requirements for 
material, engineering services, direct labor and indirect labor services.  This was 
complicated by the extreme low-volume and high-variety of each task, as well as the size 
(potentially upwards of one-thousand personnel each day), duration (potentially longer 
than two-years in execution), lack of consistent work environment (each task was 
completed at a unique location aboard ship) and overall technical complexity of each 
overhaul.   
 
During the first two years of lean implementation, both Big Ship and Small Ship took 
“baby steps” to understand how lean concepts could apply in this non-repetitive 
remanufacturing environment.  In a previous chapter we addressed the technical 
challenges and analysis of applying lean in the remanufacturing context.  These baby 
steps taken at the two organizations shaped their full-blown application of lean to the 
overall ship overhaul.  However, it was the unique experiences and lessons learned in the 
large valve model line that ultimately allowed Small Ship to change their frame of 
reference and truly revolutionize their way of doing business.   
 
With pressures to impress decision makers in the shipyard closure process, the best 
analogy for the Small Ship experience with lean is they jumped into a swimming pool 
rather than cautiously dipping a toe in the water.  As previously mentioned, the leadership 
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at Small Ship held a two-day off-site meeting to develop a strategic plan for applying 
lean to the complete ship overhaul.  During this off-site meeting a complex value stream 
map of the complete two-year overhaul was created.  The leadership team developed a 
high-level plan, emphasizing continuous flow of work, work-in-process controls, and 
improvement of team structures and worker communication.  Kaizen events were 
scheduled for teams to develop details of the plan.  As a result of taking a step back to 
study the work and by applying lessons learned during model line implementation, Small 
Ship was able to shift the paradigms of production management to account for seeming 
paradoxes of lean such as work-in-process controls and emphasis on individual cycle 
time reduction.  The team developed new sets of metrics to measure daily and weekly 
performance, production schedules and work hours were shifted, and “rules of thumb” 
were challenged.  The team even went as far as to request variance from corporate policy 
as they felt it promoted non-lean behaviors.  The entire ship overhaul was nearly treated 
as a science experiment.  The entire management team met once a week to look at, 
discuss, and debate the meaning of their new set of metrics.  “Lean advocates” were 
assigned to the production team to police adherence to new processes and provide 
immediate and direct feedback on process changes.  As part of the shift in production 
paradigms, the management team began to rethink rules on meeting performance 
milestones and even the importance of metrics in one production area as opposed to 
another.  As one senior production manager at Small Ship said: 
“It used to be that we would think of ourselves as one team, but 
we were a baseball team.  We [the Shipyard] would achieve 
success if we [each production shop] were all .400 hitters and hit 
a lot of homeruns.  Now, we still think of ourselves as a team, but 
now we’re a football team.  We have blockers [support shops], 
running backs and receivers [primary production shops].  We 
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don’t care if our blockers are performing great individually, just 
that our running backs and receivers are moving the large 
downfield for the entire team to be successful”. 
 
Significant changes were occurring at Small Ship, including the formation of a single 
team, but little emphasis had been placed on improving performance in the value-added 
functions of production.  Rather, most energy was spent removing roadblocks to value-
added production and improving or eliminating the non-value-added functions.  In order 
to quantify improvements, the organization decided to simply target the overheard 
management costs for the ship overhaul.  Aggressive targets of 20% cost reduction were 
not achieved, but schedule was improved by more than a month and a solid 12% cost 
reduction was achieved.  Ultimately, many lessons were learned as to how future 
overhauls could be managed and improved. 
 
At Big Ship, the application of lean manufacturing to the entire ship overhaul was much 
less pronounced, than at Small Ship.  In maintaining their “corporate and button-down” 
demeanor, management at Big Ship considered the task at hand to be a natural 
progression of their deployment strategy for training the workforce and conducting 
kaizen events throughout the entire organization.  REMAN, the corporate management 
group, pressured Big Ship to deliver significant improvement results on their next ship 
overhaul.  Because of this, Big Ship leadership felt pressure to increase their pace of 
training and kaizen events.  At Big Ship, the ship overhaul was dissected according to 
cost and cost variance.  Additionally, each manager was asked to target high-cost jobs 
and use lean manufacturing to cut the costs.   
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These factors created three significant challenges for leadership at Big Ship: 1) Each 
department was challenged to work independently to improve cost, thus attacking the 
value-added functions one at a time.  It is believed the most significant opportunities 
existed in improving the non-value-added functions, specifically the coordination 
between departments.  2) Other than the machine shop, few of the departments within Big 
Ship had any deep-rooted experiences and learning to draw upon in applying lean to the 
challenging applications of shipboard production.  3) An extreme emphasis was placed 
on cost reductions, which made it particularly challenging for managers to achieve short-
term cost objectives while enabling the needed investment in kaizen events.   
 
Using the analogy offered by Small Ship, Big Ship was a team of individuals 
[departments] each working to improve their batting average and home run hitting 
prowess.  As a result of these efforts, many improvements were made at Big Ship, 
however, the improvements were largely disconnected and potentially sub-optimizing.  
Reporting of improvement results was conducted one job order at a time, and while some 
were reduced others were increased (with justifications addressed).  Minimal reductions 
were made in the overall schedule or cost of the next ship overhaul.  Ultimately, 
performance was improved, but no significant lessons were learned or paradigms 
challenged.  Any organizational learning that occurred was on the individual level.   
 
Case Study Pause for Analysis - Mechanistic vs. Organic in “Growing the 
Deployment” and “Corporate Engagement and Next Level of Deployment”: 
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Phases three and four highlight the growing divergence between the largely organic 
deployment at Small Ship, and the largely mechanistic deployment at Big Ship.  Small 
Ship’s actions and decision for deployment strategy were based almost entirely on their 
own learning and do-or-die perspective to performance.  Big Ship’s actions were based 
largely on a desire to build favor with the REMAN task force and maintain consistent 
progress along their internally developed lean deployment journey. 
 
At Big Ship, they are becoming more mechanistic in response to the challenges of a 
growing deployment and the alignment with the REMAN task force implementation 
strategy.  Ultimately, the metrics and implementation strategy of Big Ship align perfectly 
to the mechanistic strategy and values of the corporate implementation.  Big Ship is 
successfully training and engaging large numbers of employees and the effort is receiving 
great visibility within the organization. 
 
At Small Ship, a clash was occurring between the mechanistic rigidity of directives, 
forms, training, and accounting as prescribed by the REMAN task force and the flexible 
organic deployment that had been successful.  As a result, Small Ship is ignoring 
corporate direction regarding deployment strategy, yet they are delivering results held by 
the REMAN task force as a model for deployment opportunities.  The organic learning 
occurring at all levels of Small Ship was very dynamic and exciting to observe.  Figure 
3.10 summarizes both Big Ship and Small Ship in phases three and four for 















Figure 3.10 Analysis of Big Ship & Small Ship in Phases Three and Four 
 
 
Case Study Phase Five - Crisis in Lean Manufacturing Deployment: 
Lean manufacturing deployment within the naval ship repair community had been 
growing rapidly, bolstered by an urgency to survive and desires to use the corporate 
directive as a mandate at Small Ship and Big Ship, respectively.  However, in phase five 
each organization began to recognize growing pains in deployment.  Both organizations 
faced tremendous, though unique, crises to the long-term success of lean deployment. 
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At Small Ship the lean deployment was met with five significant changes at one time, 
each highlighting a single failure point in their deployment; Small Ship was removed 
from the base closure list, removing the perceived urgency for improvements.  The 
charismatic leaders, both the shipyard leader and the head of the lean deployment team, 
were promoted to more prestigious positions as a result of their successes.  Four of the 
most experienced lean change agent facilitators, some of the key players in development 
of the new strategy, left within a six month period for personal reasons.  Problems were 
surfacing in the implementation plan established for the ship overhaul model line, some 
senior leaders felt this was proof the concept of lean manufacturing in this environment 
was flawed.  Finally, conflicts continued to grow between Small Ship and the 
increasingly influential corporate Task Force.   
 
Each of these changes pointed to the failure points that Small Ship (1) had become overly 
dependent upon charismatic leadership and (2) could not sustain the unusually high 
energy level for lean deployment.  The progress of lean deployment slowed tremendously 
and regressed in certain areas. The characteristics that allowed Small Ship to be flexible 
and learning-oriented at the start became the same characteristics that challenged them as 
they sought to continue growth of their deployment.  The extraordinary energy and focus 
that was driving lean Manufacturing deployment at Small Ship was removed and the 
organization had not built an infrastructure of systems, processes, and people capable of 
maintaining the deployment.   
 
 158 
At Big Ship, the crisis was nearly opposite that of Small Ship.  The organization became 
overextended in their drive to achieve the REMAN quota of kaizen events and number of 
employees trained.  This was a form of event overload.  Managers were pushing hard to 
achieve their numbers.  As a result, many initiatives were unprepared and poorly selected, 
leading to a failure to deliver the expected results and value.  This was not a problem 
during times of extra manpower, but resources were becoming extremely constrained and 
work was not being completed on schedule.  Drawing resources away from direct labor to 
use in process improvement grew increasingly difficult.  As part of this, many managers 
were growing increasingly skeptical of the benefits being realized through the shallow, 
yet widespread deployment of lean at Big Ship.  Managers were struggling to believe the 
return-on-investment (ROI) claimed by the corporate task force, believing this was 
simply “paper money.”  Unfortunately, the “good stories” of waste elimination were not 
yet quantifiable at this point.  Additional pushback to the lean manufacturing deployment 
occurred when REMAN mandated that Big Ship deploy the same strategy and lessons 
learned as Small Ship on their next ship overhaul.  This led to resentment of Small Ship 
and a strong reluctance to adopt ideas that were perhaps not their own. 
 
 
Case Study Phase Six - Regrouping and Redefinition: 
A return to basics is now the goal at both Big Ship and Small Ship for lean 
implementation.  Both organizations have pushed themselves to the point of internal 
crisis and now they are both forced to rebalance themselves and their lean efforts for 
long-term sustainment.   
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At Small Ship, they have recognized the challenges of pushing implementation far 
beyond the infrastructure they had developed to support it, only to realize they do not 
have the internal strength to sustain the pace.  Relying upon what has made them 
successful; Small Ship is refocusing its improvement priorities.  At the same time they 
are now requiring all senior managers to attend training and go on regular “waste walks” 
with the lean management team.  The original charismatic leader of the lean deployment 
team has returned to lead the office.  New industrial engineers have been hired and they 
are being trained in the corporate lean six sigma academy, as well spending time in each 
of the model line initiatives at the shipyard.  Ultimately, Small Ship has pockets of deep 
models and illustrations of lean manufacturing.  They have a management team, which 
has experienced the evolution and adaptation of their improvement initiatives, and now 
they must build the infrastructure of their lean organization and continue to build support 
among managers for long-term continuing success. 
 
At Big Ship, a return to basics suggests a more significant re-baseline to the fundamentals 
of lean manufacturing.  The lessons learned thus far have largely been associated with 
infrastructure development and deployment, not deep Lean learning.  The organization is 
pulling back in the number of ongoing initiatives and becoming more focused as they 
attempt to develop deep examples of learning.  One focus of this effort is in the machine 
shop, which had been moving ahead with models of lean implementation and organic 
learning.  They are acting largely as an independent sub-culture within the larger 
organization.  Several similar production areas are now using concepts from the machine 
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shop to build lean manufacturing models throughout the organization.  The organization 
is beginning to push back on the REMAN task force by resisting pressures to continually 
do more and more initiatives and becoming more strategic in selection of initiatives and 
deployment of resources.  Their ultimate challenge is to develop an internal culture of 
understanding that effective lean manufacturing provides the opportunity to develop a 
learning organization – it is not simply an issue of resources and internal efficiency. 
 
Case Study Pause for Analysis - Mechanistic vs. Organic in “Crisis in Lean 
Deployment” and “Regrouping and Redefinition”: 
In phases four and five, Big Ship showed weaknesses of a predominately mechanistic 
deployment (lack of deep learning).  In phase five, Big Ship focused on the “activity 
metrics” of number of kaizen events conducted and employees trained, and their overall 
efficiency in running those events.  Ultimately they overestimated their own 
infrastructure and outran their internal capability to support Lean initiatives.  They 
attempted to conduct too many initiatives (with a leadership team that lacked a deep 
understanding of lean) and the preparations and follow-up were not completed 
successfully.  Consequently, initiatives began to fail at higher rates.  In Phase Six, Big 
Ship became more focused on deeper deployments and models within the organization, 
ultimately becoming more organic in nature. 
 
Small Ship showed weaknesses of a predominately organic deployment and ultimately 
became more mechanistic in nature (lack of deployment infrastructure).  During the crisis 
stage, Small Ship lost the energy and momentum created by the potential base closure 
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and found itself lacking in the necessary infrastructure to be successful over the long run.  
They had been overly dependent upon dynamic personalities and enthusiasm created by 
an organizational crisis.  As it regrouped, Small Ship ultimately became more 
mechanistic as it built a more robust infrastructure to support continuing deployment.  
Figure eleven summarizes both Big Ship and Small Ship in phases five and six for 



















CASE STUDY DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter has defined two distinct strategies for lean manufacturing deployment: 
organic and mechanistic.  Which methodology of deployment is preferred, organic or 
mechanistic?  In order to address this question, the case studies have been characterized 
according to 1) the degree to which they illustrate organic and/or mechanistic 
characteristics of deployment, and 2) the degree of success for each methodology 
throughout the deployment.   
 
Organic and Mechanistic – Understanding the Case Studies: 
Figure 3.12 summarizes the case studies of Big Ship and Small Ship through the six 
phases of deployment according to their degree of organic and mechanistic approach to 
implementation.  Ratings on the scale of organic and mechanistic were assessed 
according to the organization’s actions and emphasis in deployment and the extent to 


















Figure 3.12 Big Ship & Small Ship as Mechanistic/Organic in Six Phases of 
Deployment 
 
In the Early Awareness phase of implementation, each organization was introduced to 
lean manufacturing by REMAN and initial kaizen events were conducted.  Yet, while the 
two organizations responded differently in acceptance of the new concepts, it is difficult 
to characterize either as having an organic or mechanistic approach.  Each deployment, 
therefore, is characterized as uncertain.   
 
In the second phase of deployment (Grassroots Deployment) the tendencies of each 
deployment first emerge as they seek out the first steps in implementation.  Small Ship, 
with its committed focus to a lean manufacturing model line in large valve repair and 
relatively unstructured implementation strategy is characterized as extremely organic.  
Big Ship, with its focus on widespread training, curriculum development, and structured 
implementation, is characterized as mechanistic. 
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The third phase of implementation (Growing the Deployment) brings both organizations 
closer to the center.  Small Ship attempts to replicate successes of the initial model line in 
multiple areas, creating a small portfolio of model lines that vary in their implementation.  
Their deployment is characterized as organic.  At Big Ship, they continue to use a 
mechanistic implementation strategy, but become more moderate as their advanced 
deployment area, the machine shop, takes root.  A relatively organic implementation 
emerges in that environment, and overall the deployment is characterized as moderately 
mechanistic.   
 
The fourth phase of implementation (Corporate Engagement and Next Level) is 
highlighted by the aggressive engagement of corporate deployment and the full-speed 
push at Small Ship to produce results in order to avoid closure.  At Small Ship, the 
aggressive attempts at transforming operations on an entire ship overhaul using lean 
would qualify as extremely organic.  Despite the use of extensive rules, regulations, and 
roles & responsibilities of deployment in order to rapidly deploy, the deployment is 
characterized as organic.  At Big Ship, the mechanistic tendencies of the organization are 
greatly enhanced by the extreme mechanistic approach being deployed by the REMAN 
task force, which uses an extremely rigid implementation plan, metrics, and expectations 




In the fifth phase of implementation (Crisis in Lean Deployment) each organization 
struggles to achieve the aggressive pace and expectations of REMAN, particularly after 
the fears of base closure at Small Ship subside.  Big Ship, with the continuing push for 
further and faster deployment within the existing infrastructure, is characterized as an 
extremely mechanistic deployment.  At Small Ship, charismatic leadership and expertise 
has been removed and it has become more dependent upon the infrastructure for 
improvement.  The deployment is characterized as moderately organic. 
 
In the final phase of implementation (Regrouping and Redefinition) both Big Ship and 
Small Ship sought to regroup from the crisis in implementation.  Big Ship recognized the 
crisis was partially caused by shortcomings of their rigid implementation structure and 
lack of a deep understanding throughout the organization.  Despite the continuing 
pressure from REMAN for a rigid and highly mechanistic approach, they are becoming 
more moderate in their approach and are characterized as mechanistic.  While Big Ship’s 
crisis involved too much infrastructure, Small Ship experiences a crisis due to too little 
infrastructure.  Small Ship, while largely resistant to this point, is becoming more aligned 
with the rigid implementation strategy of REMAN and is continuing to introduce 
infrastructure in order to bolster the long-term feasibility of their implementation.  The 
deployment is characterized as moderately mechanistic. 
 
Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Success – Understanding the Case Studies: 
Many quantitative indicators were examined to define the deployments at Big Ship and 
Small Ship as successes or failures.  Unfortunately, the size and scope of projects was 
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different enough so that it was not possible to compare the two organizations on precise 
quantitative measures.  Instead the data are qualitatively summarized in Figure 3.13.  It 
was previously discussed that success in a mechanistic view of deployment involves a 
highly structured process for deployment and then efficiency in delivering resources to 
execute that strategy and structure.  An organic deployment is focused more on the 
overall effectiveness in developing buy-in and understanding within the entire workforce 
to grow a new culture, as opposed to efficiency of deployment.  Figure 3.13 characterizes 
the success of each organization through the six phases of deployment for efficiency of 
deployment, effectiveness of deployment, and overall success of deployment.  In 
conducting this subjective analysis, the following definitions are used: 
- Efficiency of Deployment – the degree to which large segments of the organization 
are introduced to lean manufacturing with the least number of resources. 
- Effectiveness of Deployment – the degree to which an organization is able to 
successfully transform specific work processes and get buy-in and understanding 
for a deep and lasting implementation of lean manufacturing. 
- Success of Deployment – the degree to which the entire organization is on a path 


















Figure 3.13: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Success at Big Ship and Small Ship 
 
Ratings of high, medium, and low for each element of figure thirteen were developed 
from qualitative analysis of actions, outcomes, and intent for each organization during the 
first five stages of deployment.  Stage six has not been assessed because it is too early to 
tell the results of their response to crisis.  Efficiency and effectiveness are considered 
independently.  However, overall success is considered a combination of the two 
categories.  In considering success, more emphasis is placed on effectiveness than 
efficiency.  While it is true both efficiency and effectiveness must exist for success, 
effectiveness is considered a closer indicator. 
 
The results in Figure 3.13 are complex when we compare all the indicators for both yards 
during the five phases.  Some patterns of note are: 
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1. The two organizations took very different paths.  However, each began with low 
overall effectiveness, and both concluded with medium overall effectiveness.   
2. As expected, Big Ship was more efficient across all phases compared to Small 
Ship.  Small Ship was more effective than Big Ship in the early stages of lean 
deployment, but both exhibited moderate effectiveness in the long run. 
3. At Small Ship, efficiency generally increased, but effectiveness slightly decreased 
(with the exception of the crisis stage) as efforts became more widespread. 
4. The highest performing period was in phase four at Small Ship, largely due to the 
medium-high efficiency of deployment while maintaining medium-high 
effectiveness.  This success is largely a result of charismatic leadership and the 
overall organizational drive towards being removed from the base closure list.  
Big Ship was also most successful at this point.  They were ramping up their 
deployment while exerting internal controls (or simply, organizational inertia to 
change) in order to proceed at an internally desired pace. 
 
Organic and Mechanistic Deployment – Benefits and Shortcomings: 
To suggest that either mechanistic or organic deployment is always superior would not be 



















Figure 3.14 Benefits & Shortcomings of Mechanistic and Organic Deployment 
 
Mechanistic deployment provides clear expectations for deployment, builds widespread 
awareness throughout the organization, builds an infrastructure to support long-term 
sustainment, and is quick to engage all managers in deployment.  The shortcomings of 
Mechanistic are that it can be shallow and potentially superficial, creates a potential 
discontinuity between training and deployment, and may hinder true organizational 
learning through adherence to a rigid strategy. 
 
Organic deployment on the other hand, provides clear examples of deployment, builds a 
deeper understanding of lean manufacturing throughout the organization, creates a better 
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opportunity for long-term sustainment through deep learning, and better enables 
organizational learning through a flexible and evolutionary deployment strategy.  The 
shortcomings of organic include a slower and more methodical approach, a slowness to 
engage all managers, and requirement for change agents with more advanced skills due to 
the flexibility of implementation strategy. 
 
One might conclude that it is better to choose one deployment approach based on what 
strengths are more important to the organization and live with the shortcomings.  
However, the result may not be satisfying to anyone.  For example, in the case of a truly 
mechanistic deployment, the lean program may be superficial, and the actual 
implementation will be weak compared to what the training suggests lean should be.  
Because of this, the organization will not learn or progress.  Instead, they will efficiently 
deploy tools superficially that have little staying power and limited effectiveness. That 
certainly is not satisfactory.  A truly organic deployment will provide a deep 
understanding and allow the organization to learn and grow.  That certainly sounds better.  
Unfortunately, the organic approach is sometimes hard, slow going at times, and in need 
of real expertise to guide an organization through the learning process.  It seems that the 
organic approach  may be more effective overall if the organization is willing to put in 
the effort and both obtain and develop the expertise. 
 
So why did Big Ship end up just as successful overall as Small Ship if Big Ship was 
implementing superficial tools with little understanding?  Had Big Ship continued upon 
their initial course of textbook training and little external influence, the lean deployment 
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likely would have ultimately stalled due to being superficial, spread too thin, and lacking 
significant learning and results.  The deployment could have been extremely efficient, but 
a superficial tool delivered efficiently would still be considered ineffective.  The reason 
for Big Ship’s success is that Big Ship slowly developed internal expertise, particularly in 
the machine shop, developing individuals who understood lean organically.  These 
individual deployment champions began to focus on model line projects, as Small Ship 
had done, and achieved the same great successes as Small Ship had earlier.  These 
deployment champions began to develop a deeper understanding of lean to the point, as 
previously mentioned, they found themselves at odds with the mechanistic strategy of the 
REMAN task force, the textbook learning of the lean six sigma academy, and their 
organization’s traditional mechanistic management structure on the whole.  The 
combination of Big Ship’s mechanistic infrastructure and Small Ship’s organic learning 
led to something stronger than either the mechanistic or organic approach by itself.   
 
The rest of this chapter will elaborate on these two approaches and explore how they can 
be blended to a hybrid that exploits that best of mechanistic and organic approaches to 
deployment. 
 
Organic and Mechanistic Deployment – Stages of Technology Acceptance: 
The deployment of lean manufacturing within an organization can be likened to 
adaptation and acceptance of a new technology.  In his study, Rogers (2003) identified 
five groups of individuals associated with acceptance of a new technology.  They are as 
follows: 
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1. Innovators - venturesome, educated, multiple information sources, greater 
propensity to take risk  
2. Early adopters - social leaders, popular, educated  
3. Early majority - deliberate, many informal social contacts  
4. Late majority - skeptical, traditional, lower socio-economic status  
5. Laggards - neighbors and friends are main info sources, fear of debt  
 
If we are to consider lean manufacturing as a new technology that must be accepted by 
individuals, particularly managers, it is reasonable to assume the profile of management 
acceptance would look similar to Rogers’ profile of these five groups.  One of the 
strategies of the organic approach is to develop the initial model in an area where there is 
a leader prone to be an innovator or early adopter.  Getting early “wins” is important.  
This individual is often developed to then sell and teach others.  This type of targeting 
and then developing depth of knowledge in the innovators and early adopters is more 
difficult in a mechanistic implementation that blankets the organization with more 
superficial training. Overall the mechanistic approach does not recognize the human 
dynamics of change and does not align well with Rogers’ model of the adoption process.  
 
Technical and Cultural Change – Understanding the Interconnected-ness: 
These case studies reveal the interconnectedness of social and technical change in 
building a lean-learning organization and developing the lean technical systems.  The 
balance between social and technical aspects of deployment is something missing from 
the mechanistic approach, which is overly focused on technical change.  In both cases 
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technical change was easier than social change.  Process changes, such as a redesign of 
process flow, reduction of work-in-process, or implementation of pull systems can be 
driven by management to create immediate change.  On the other hand, those same 
technical changes, if implemented using team problem solving and employee engagement 
may create a resultant social change within the team, diminish skepticism, improve 
morale, empower employees, and encourage more fundamental problem solving.   
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.15, with the initial impetus of a technical process change, the 
resultant social change may enable (but not create) a greater technical change as the 
employees gain greater understanding of the goals and overall attitudes towards change 
are improved.  As an iterative process, if change continues to be implemented in a 
positive, empowering way, greater technical/process changes will lead to further 






Figure 3.15 Positive Relationship Between Technical and Cultural Change 
 
Based on observing Big Ship and Small Ship over six years, with each iterative cycle of 
improvement (technical change -> creating social change -> enabling technical change) 
the benefits increase exponentially.  With each implementation of process improvements 
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the organization becomes more emboldened and enlightened to the true capabilities of a 
lean producer.  The first few kaizen events in an area may be focused on removing 
“monuments” to the old way of doing things, whether by moving equipment, establishing 
customer/supplier relations, or simply changing the existing attitudes towards change.  
Follow-on kaizen events would likely become more focused on improving daily process-
related issues.   
 
However, it is also noted that impacts of not sustaining a technical/process change will 
have social/cultural implications.  In the event a team develops a positive change, but it is 
not sustained, the team may become disenfranchised with lean, skeptical of the benefits 
and unkept promises, or outwardly hostile towards management or the lean deployment 






Figure 3.16 Negative Relationship Between Technical and Cultural Change 
 
Recognizing the interconnectedness of technical/process change and social/cultural 
change suggests a further enhancement to the illustrative models introduced earlier in the 
chapter for organic and mechanistic deployment.  These models used illustrative 
metaphors of spirals and concentric circles, respectively.  Figure 3.17 illustrates a 
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technical change enhancing subsequent social change and so forth.  As previously 
discussed, if energy for continuous improvement is not sustained, it is feasible for a spiral 










Figure 3.17 Understanding Technical and Cultural Change Metaphors 
 
A Broader Perspective - Small Ship as “Model Line” for Corporate Deployment: 
For the purposes of this comparative case study, analysis has focused on Big Ship and 
Small Ship as mostly separate entities.  However, a broader frame of reference could 
more closely link the two organizations within the extended naval ship repair enterprise.  
It could be concluded that Big Ship could not have achieved its success, or the potential 
for longer-term improvements, if Small Ship were not the “model-line shipyard.”  Small 
Ship had a more flexible and aggressive organization, while Big Ship was much larger 
and command-control focus.  It can be argued that Big Ship, and the extended enterprise 
as a whole, had too much to risk by Big Ship being as innovative and exploratory as 
Small Ship was in phase four of implementation.  This broader frame of reference does 
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not change the short-term or long-term outlook for Big Ship or Small Ship.  However, 
shifting to a broader frame of reference may lead to a revision in characterizing 
individual sites as successes and failures when viewed in the context of contributions to a 
larger corporate structure.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The comparative case studies of Small Ship and Big Ship present a complex picture of 
successful lean deployment.  One over simplified conclusion is that a mechanistic 
approach is preferred, especially when one examines the success of Big Ship in building 
widespread awareness and large infrastructure to support lean deployment in the long-
term.  Another over simplified conclusion is that an organic approach is preferred if one 
looks at Small Ship’s ability to quickly gain a deep understanding and learning of lean 
through a model line implementation.  While reasonable, each of these conclusions fails 
to grasp the deeper understanding of the case studies.  The following conclusions can be 
drawn from this case study:    
 
• Need for Balance: The case study set out to determine the “one best way” of 
deployment between organic and mechanistic.  However, the cases suggest a 
long-term successful deployment requires a blending of both organic and 
mechanistic approaches.  An organic approach is required for deep understanding 
and organizational learning, but it fails if it is not supported by appropriate 
infrastructure (as seen in the case of Small Ship).  A mechanistic approach will 
enable widespread awareness and implementation, yet, it must be augmented with 
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deeper change at the technical and cultural level and organizational learning. It is 
worth noting that Big Ship and Small Ship have attempted to become more 
balanced in their deployment between organic and mechanistic in their response 
to deployment crises. 
 
• Existence of Equifinality: A construct of Open Systems Theory, equifinality is the 
belief in multiple paths to achieving the same outcome.  It is illustrated in the case 
studies of Big Ship and Small Ship.  Both organizations observed in this case 
study have an opportunity for a successful long-term deployment of lean 
manufacturing.  Big Ship has achieved this through a highly mechanistic approach, 
subsequently is balanced with an organic approach through inter-organizational 
knowledge sharing and response to crisis in deployment.  At Small Ship, crisis in 
deployment brought them to a similar position of a more balanced approach of 
mechanistic and organic deployment, as they increased their infrastructure for 
deployment over time, and the over-reliance on charismatic personalities required 
them to institute a more structured approach to deployment.  Ultimately, there is 
no “one best way” to deploy lean manufacturing, but a long-term balance between 
organic and mechanistic strategies is required for continued successes to occur.   
 
• Begin with Organic deployment: while it was just stated there is no “one best 
way” to deploy lean, these case studies do seem to suggest advantages to leading 
with an organic deployment in order to achieve deep, immediate, and illustrative 
examples.  This conclusion is also partly aligned to the original distinction of 
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organic and mechanistic by Burns and Stalker.  An organic approach seems more 
appropriate when uncertainty exists regarding the deployment, specifically 
questions about the objective, longevity, benefits, scope, timeline, etc.  As the 
deployment begins to take hold within an organization, and the idea of “lean 
deployment” is better understood and embraced, uncertainty regarding the 
deployment is reduced and the infrastructure of a more mechanistic approach can 
begin to take hold.  This conclusion proves true both at the model line (large valve 
repair) scope of analysis, as well as the model organization (Small Ship) scope of 
analysis.   
 
• Technical and cultural change go hand-in-hand: As was discussed early in this 
chapter, many organizations will develop strategies for implementing specific 
technical and/or social change.  Yet, in many of the case studies, particularly 
those with deeper implementations and multiple iterations of improvement, 
technical changes created social changes.  Social changes in turn enabled greater 
technical changes.  Therefore, deployment strategies that limit engagement to 
only a social or a technical change is shortsighted and do not appreciate the 
interconnectedness of the two.  Long-term success is defined by achieving a lean 
learning organization, which is knowledgeable of the appropriate technical tools 
and the social infrastructure for implementation. 
 
• Exponential benefits with depth of deployment:  In case studies at both Big Ship 
and Small Ship deeper deployment, with multiple passes on a specific project, 
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yielded greater benefits.  As the organization deployed advanced social and 
technical tools of lean (e.g. flow of value, flexible/interconnected processes, WIP 
reduction, and a team construct) the benefits were more significant than in initial 
tool implementation (e.g. 5S and brainstorming).  This is represented by the 
expanding surface area of the spirals and concentric circles in the illustrations of 
organic and mechanistic deployment, respectively. 
   
• No wasted failures, only failures to learn: This adage, attributed to a senior leader 
with Toyota, is relevant when one looks at the evolution in both the organic and 
mechanistic approaches of the two shipyards.  Small Ship, with the organic 
approach, was certainly more dynamic and evolutionary with their learning of 
lean manufacturing, but both organizations learned over time and adapted their 
strategies.   
 
• There is no crystal large: The case studies of Small Ship and Big Ship produced 
one definite outcome.  In large, complex organizations it is hard to predict the 
long-term future for lean implementation, adoption, and learning.  Successful lean 
implementation requires that organizations challenge their present norms and 
procedures.  Talking about an organization’s evolution is simple compared to 
talking about each organization as a large number of individuals who must 
similarly challenge their own personal norms, procedures, and successes.  One 
particular element of this is that in a large complex organization, positive energy 
may be effectively created for lean manufacturing deployment, yet, if the message 
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is not closely preserved the energy and enthusiasm behind that message may be 
distorted by a manager looking to advance his/her own ideals.  An examination of 
the Small Ship and Big Ship case studies after phase three or four of 
implementation would have suggested a very different set of analyses and 
conclusions than at the completion of six years.  Successful lean deployment 
requires significant focus and energy for an extended period of time.  Success and 
failure cannot be easily predicted.   
 
ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
This chapter has sought to answer the specific question of how to begin a lean 
deployment, and to better understand the methodology and mechanisms by which lean 
deployment occurs.  As a result of this study, several key contributions have been made 
to the academic literature in the areas of lean manufacturing, organizational design, and 
organizational change. The following contributions to academic literature in these areas 
have been made: 
• Adapted organizational design concepts of an organic and mechanistic structure to 
develop a detailed dynamic model of organizational change; one of organic and 
mechanistic methodology of transformation.  Strengths, weaknesses, and 
appropriate application of each concept are identified.     
• Developed a socio-technical organization change model to describe the ways in 





This chapter addresses lean manufacturing deployment on the scope of a specific 
organizational entity.  In the comparative case study of Big Ship and Small Ship, it is 
acknowledged they are both partners and rivals in a larger enterprise.  Yet, this study 
does not examine lean deployment at the enterprise level.  Further study is planned 
regarding how enterprise deployment of lean manufacturing occurs over an extended 
lifecycle and how the organizations of enabling bureaucracy and coercive bureaucracy 
respond to efforts at creating the proper environment for successful lean manufacturing 
deployment.  Additionally, it is recommended the model of organic and mechanistic 
deployment be studied over a larger set of organizations to understand the long-term 
strengths and weaknesses of each methodology.  Finally, it is recommended that these 
concepts be applied in a retrospective look at large organizations that have successfully 
deployed lean production techniques, to determine the ways in which their experiences 






DEVELOPING A LEAN BUREAUCRACY: ENABLING VERSUS COERCIVE 





Lean (adj.) – containing little excess, fat, or waste; efficient; see-
also: lean muscle, Toyota production System. 
 
Lean manufacturing, lean thinking, lean culture, lean product development, lean supply 
chain - these are descriptive characteristics sought by many of today’s largest and most 
successful companies around the world to connote industry-leading efficiency.  The term 
“lean” was coined by MIT scholars to mean “fragile with strength” in an attempt to 
describe what they observed in studying the Toyota Production System (TPS). (Vasilash, 
2005)  It is meant to describe an organization that does “more with less” by empowering 
employees towards continuous improvement and learning, and building upon a technical 
foundation of concepts such as stable production processes, workplace safety and 
organization, just-in-time production, and built-in quality.  (Liker, 2004)  Many 
companies have sought expertise from a lean sensei (Japanese term for “teacher”) to 
internally learn, teach, and deploy lean thinking throughout their organization.   
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Bureaucracy (n.) – management or administration marked by 
hierarchical authority among numerous offices and by fixed 
procedures; the administrative structure of a large or complex 
organization. 
 
Bureaucracy, described by Max Weber (b.1864 - d.1920) as an idealized form of 
organizational governance for its rational control, clearly defined hierarchy, span of 
control, roles & responsibilities, and division of labor, is the predominant management 
structure for large complex organizations worldwide.  Weber studied the largest 
organizations of his time (the government, military, and church) to appreciate the relative 
effectiveness of the bureaucratic governance form across broad and diverse organizations.  
(Weber, 1990)  However, while in Weber’s day a “bureaucrat” may have been praised for 
service to the organization, today the term has largely given way to negative perceptions 
of ineffectiveness, self-preservation, “red tape,” and mindless adherence to procedures.  
 
Lean bureaucracy (n.) – 1. an efficient, large and complex 
organization, operating with minimal waste and excess in the 
system; see-also: lean manufacturing.  2. an internal agency 
within a large or complex organization, created as a deployment 
unit of lean management throughout an organization, highlighted 
by rules, procedures, and reporting metrics; see-also: red tape, 
institutional theory. 
 
A play on words, lean bureaucracy is meant to represent the ideal of transforming a large, 
complex, inefficient bureaucracy into an efficient and well-run organization as Weber 
had envisioned.  It was first coined by Paul Adler (1996) in an article that described what 
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he observed at New United Motor Manufacturing Incorporated (NUMMI), Toyota’s joint 
venture with General Motors in Freemont, California.  He observed many structural 
characteristics of a bureaucracy, but found they enabled employee performance, instead 
of stifled employee-driven innovation and improvement, which was expected.    
 
Unfortunately, for many organizations and senior leaders, this ideal of transforming their 
organization is replaced with another type of lean bureaucracy, a politically powerful, yet 
inefficient internal bureaucracy to deploy tenets of lean production.  As seen in many 
organizations, the lean deployment team can quickly become a negative function of an 
inefficient bureaucracy, and not a mechanism to positively change an inefficient 
bureaucracy.  In some instances, the rules and procedures used to efficiently deploy lean 
can ultimately become counter, even oppressive, to the overall message of learning and 
empowerment that are characteristic of a successful lean organization.  This chapter seeks 
to better understand this specific phenomenon, the unintended double-meaning of lean 
bureaucracy.  It will examine (1) why this phenomenon occurs, (2) why many attempts to 
transform an organization can become overwhelmed by self-inflicted red tape, and (3) 
will further consider how a bureaucracy can be formed through lean deployment, that is, 
has the best of both worlds - highly efficient and empowering within a bureaucratic 
framework, as envisioned by Adler. 
 
The term lean bureaucracy has been used thus far to highlight the potential double-
meaning of this terminology.  To clarify discussions, for the remainder of this paper the 
term “lean bureaucracy” is used to represent a large, complex bureaucracy that has been 
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transformed through tenets of lean production.  The internal bureaucratic organization 
with the mission to deploy lean production is hereby termed a “lean deployment unit.”   
To use these terms in context: if the lean deployment unit is successful in its mission an 
organization may transform to a lean bureaucracy. 
 
In a previous chapter, “Comparative Case Analysis of Lean Manufacturing Deployment: 
Organic vs. Mechanistic Approaches,” a distinction was made between an “organic” and 
“mechanistic” lean deployment within an organization.  Two contrasting methodologies 
for deployment were identified (organic and mechanistic) and the benefits and 
shortcomings of each were identified.  Organic lean deployment was noted for its deep 
learning and application of tools as systems, as well as its relatively slow pace of 
implementation.  Mechanistic lean deployment was noted for its rapid and broad 
deployment, yet relative shallowness of implementation.   
 
This chapter considers a broader scope of analysis - that of lean deployment across a 
large, complex, and geographically diverse organization, a multi-site bureaucracy.  Many 
organizations attempting lean deployment today would be characterized as large, 
complex, and mature bureaucracies.  Perhaps it is because these organizations are 
advanced bureaucracies that enterprise-wide transformation is attempted.  This chapter 




This discussion of organizational transformation will build upon two significant theories 
of bureaucracy: that of the organizational life cycle (Greiner, 1972) and the distinction 
between enabling and coercive bureaucracy (Adler, 1996).  The most prominent theory 
on the organizational life cycle proposes four stages of organizational growth and 
maturation evolving to a “very bureaucratic” organization and ultimately to an 
elaboration stage, a form of post-bureaucracy, that breaks down the stranglehold of a 
rigid management structure.  
 
Theory on enabling and coercive bureaucracy distinguishes between two types of 
bureaucracy, both of which may exist within a single organization.   Coercive 
bureaucracy is a negative form of bureaucratic governance, or a system of rules and 
procedures intent upon measuring and controlling the individual.  It is typically 
associated with inefficiency, mindless adherence to rules, and oppressive management 
control.  By contrast, enabling bureaucracy, first observed in a Toyota-run plant, also has 
extensive rules and procedures, but they exist to support and empower the individual to 
higher levels of creativity and performance.  (Adler, 1996) 
 
Discussion of developing a lean bureaucracy integrates these two theories of 
organizational life cycle and enabling/coercive bureaucracy, to suggest a life-cycle 
development by which an organization may take alternative paths to an end state of 
enabling (positive) or coercive (negative) bureaucracy.  In considering lean 
implementation across a large, multi-site organization, a model for life cycle stages of 
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lean deployment is developed to define a sequence by which a positive lean bureaucracy 
is created.   
 
To illustrate these theoretical constructs, this paper examines the life cycle of lean 
deployment within a large, complex, and mature bureaucracy, REMAN.  Like many 
organizations, lean deployment at REMAN was initiated in good faith, to transform the 
organization through the principles and practices of lean production.  Yet, over time it 
became clear the lean deployment unit within REMAN was far more a function of the 
bureaucracy than a transformation.  The case study of REMAN and its analysis produce 
recommendations for effective enterprise-wide lean transformation.  These 
recommendations can be used to develop efficient lean bureaucracies. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
“REMAN” would be considered as “very bureaucratic” by any definition.  It has facilities 
across the United States, and is heavily influenced by national and international events.  
REMAN is an organization of more than 50,000 employees at 30 sites across the United 
States. (The specific agency or industry is not important to case study considerations)   
 
Prior to lean deployment REMAN was a large, complex, mature, geographically 
dispersed organization with a long and proud history of industry-leading performance. 
REMAN had a long history of adopting “best practices” as introduced by outside 
contractors: from total quality management (TQM) to quality circles and quality 
functional deployment; from Malcolm Baldridge to Stephen Covey, to Mark Graham 
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Brown; from MRP systems, to ERP, to ERP2, and portfolio management.  One could say 
lean manufacturing deployment is no different from these other initiatives.  However, it 
currently has six years of run-time at REMAN, outlasting all other initiatives and has no 
sign of slowing.  Furthermore, it has been developed and embraced internally.  As one 
senior official stated, “lean has made more impact than any single initiative I have 
observed in 30 years with the REMAN.”  This case study examines the first six years of 
lean deployment at REMAN. 
 
A number of advantages led to selecting REMAN as the case study for this analysis.  
First, if implementation of lean production could transform a large bureaucracy from 
coercive to more enabling, it would be a strong demonstration of the impact of lean 
deployment, considering the layers and maturity of the REMAN bureaucracy.  Second, 
access was good as senior leadership at REMAN was very supportive of this research.  
The researcher was a participant observer for part of this study as an entry-level 
professional helping lead the lean transformation of REMAN.  Consequently, there was 
access to many archival documents, reports, directives, and planning meetings for lean 
deployment.  Numerous interviews were conducted, both formal and informal, with 
personnel at all levels of the organization.  An extended rotation at corporate 
headquarters, and multiple site visits to nearly half of REMAN’s thirty field-activities 
offered a well-rounded perspective on enterprise-wide deployment.  (Eisenardt, 1989; 
Yin, 2002)  
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In order to deepen the learning to be gained from this case study, two specific divisions 
of REMAN, the two largest divisions, are highlighted for analysis: EarlyAdopter 
Division and LateToTheParty Division.  These two divisions of REMAN are similar in 
size, geography, workforce demographics, culture, and overall organization structure.  
They perform diverse missions, yet serve a similar customer.  Additionally, each division 
is subject to the same guidance and policies as outlined by the parent organization, 
REMAN.  The two case studies had different starting points for lean deployment and 
took somewhat different paths that led to unique outcomes and understanding.  Figure 4.1 














Case to be 
Studied:
Data                             
Sources:
REMAN, a large ship remanufacturing agency, through six years 
of lean deployment
Research Methodology
Interview                    
Sources:
Direct observation of lean deployment, extensive 
interviews with key personnel, review of 
documentation and deporting, archival records of 
implementation, participant observation
Corporate management, site management, shop 
management, line management, production workers, 
production analysts, lean manufacturing deployment 
team
Study Objectives:
To better understand the phenomenon by which efficient lean 
bureaucracy is created
Study Design:
Case study analysis of a single large organization during six 
year lean deployment; deep-dive examination of two large 
departments within this organization for case study comparison
Unit of Analysis: Extended enterprise - large, mature, and complex bureaucratic 
organization
Figure 4.1 Summary of Research Methods 
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THEORETICAL DISCUSSION – DEVELOPING A LEAN BUREAUCRACY IN 
THE EXTENDED ENTERPRISE 
To be “lean”, to do “more with less” while continuously improving and maintaining 
focus on customer value is a characterization sought by competitive organizations in 
nearly every market in the world today.  The global marketplace continues to place ever 
greater emphasis on operating efficiency as organizations search the world over for better 
and cheaper materials, facilities, labor and intellectual capital.  The term “lean” 
originated in automotive manufacturing, but has since been associated with a variety of 
industries, including: manufacturing, service organizations, office operations, home 
construction, management philosophy, organizational culture, product development 
practices, and supply chain characterization.  (Womack, Jones, 1996) 
 
Deployment of lean thinking in any organization at any level is a deliberate effort to 
promote better performance, with the best known model being Toyota.  In some ways the 
deployment of lean production is no different than any other corporate initiative in that it 
is intent upon tangible change within the organization.  Organizations may deploy lean 
for a variety of reasons: to impress stockholders; to transform a culture; to improve 
operational safety, efficiency, throughput, cycle time, quality, customer satisfaction, or a 
myriad of other measurable objectives.  From the perspective of others in the field (e.g., 
Liker, 2004) deployment of lean is far different from other corporate initiatives.  It is not 




Many of the organizations working to “deploy lean” are large, multi-site, and even global 
organizations.  These organizations would all be characterized by a high degree of 
bureaucracy. Bureaucracy has been noted throughout history, as early as the Book of 
Exodus in the Bible, for highly efficient oversight and control of large organizations 
through rational control, clearly defined hierarchy, span of control, roles & 
responsibilities, and division of labor.  In a bureaucracy, legitimate control is associated 
with a position, not an individual, allowing organizations to endure far beyond the tenure 
of key personnel.  (Weber, 1990)  However, in a mature bureaucracy, elements of 
complacency, organizational entropy, and stagnation are commonly found and can erode 
efficiency within the overall organization.  (Greiner, 1972)  These sources of decline lead 
many organizations to attempt to continuously improve their organization through lean 
deployment.   
 
Lean Bureaucracy and Organizational Life Cycle Development: 
In this paper we take a dynamic perspective on lean deployment, considering the natural 
evolution, growth, and decline of bureaucratic organizations through the organizational 
life cycle.  Greiner (1972) studied numerous organizations over time and began to 
recognize patterns in organizational development, similar to life cycle development 
observed in organisms, including humans.  Greiner’s organizational life cycle theory 
suggests the growth, evolution, and maturation of an organization occurs through four 
distinct and predictable stages of development: (1) entrepreneurial stage, (2) collectivity 
stage, (3) formalization stage, and (4) elaboration stage.  In this theory of organizational 
life cycle development, a key dimension in distinguishing the stages is the degree of 
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bureaucracy present at each stage.  The entrepreneurial stage is characterized as “non-
bureaucratic.”  The organization reaches the peak of bureaucracy in the formalization 
stage.  Then the organization reverses itself to undo some of the strangling bureaucracy in 
the elaboration stage, which may be considered “post-bureaucratic.”  The elaboration 
stage is particularly interesting, both for the fact it is the most ideal bureaucracy, and for 
the fact it receives the least consideration in Greiner’s work (perhaps because strong 
examples of this type of organization were difficult to find at the time).  Today, Toyota 
may be an example of an organization that successfully grew to the elaboration stage and 
filled a gap in this literature. (Liker, 2004) 
 
While Greiner provided the initial architecture for organizational life cycle development, 
understanding of this construct has been further enhanced through follow-on research 
(Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Lippitt and Schmidt, 1967), characterizing each stage 
according to a large collection of variables.  Figure 4.2 summarizes each of the four 
stages of life cycle development along the dimensions of: 
o Keys to Achieving Stage: the characteristic of organizational development which 
marked the transition from one stage of evolution to the next.  Initially, an 
organization originates from a creative idea in the Entrepreneurial Stage, will 
develop a clear purpose and direction as it transitions to the Collectivity Stage, 
develops extensive internal systems of management in the Formalization Stage, 
and develops effective utilization of teamwork in the Elaboration Stage.   
o Goal of Organization: the overarching objective for an organization in this stage 
of maturity.  Organizational goals transition from survival to growth, internal 
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stability, and market expansion, to development of a “complete” organization 
with efficient and effectives rules and regulations throughout, as it transitions 
through the stages of development. 
o Structure: the overall formal infrastructure common to an organization at this 
level of maturity.  Overall structure transitions from an informal one-person show, 
to a mostly informal structure with some procedures, to a formal structure with 
division of labor, to extensive teamwork and small-company thinking as an 
organization matures. 
o Top Management Style: characteristics of organizational leaders commonly found 
in an organization in this stage of development.  As the organization matures, so 
do the requirements of leadership, from individualistic, entrepreneurial, and 
controlling; to charismatic and team building; to the ability to delegate and 
manage; to a self-managing team approach to attack bureaucracy.   
o Reward and Control Systems: the formal and informal methods and systems used 
to award and discipline employees.  Reward and control systems evolve from 
personal rewards which are paternalistic to recognition of contributions to 
success; to impersonal rewards as elements of the formalized system; and 
ultimately to rewards which are tailored to the department. 
o Crisis to Overcome: the specific challenge that develops within the organization 
at this stage of development and must be overcome for the organization to mature 
to the next stage of evolution.  An organization may suffer from a lack of 
leadership in the Entrepreneurial stage, a need for delegation with control in the 
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Collectivity, a need to deal with too much red tape in Formalization, and a need 
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Source: Greiner (1972), Lippitt and Schmidt (1967), Quinn and Cameron (1983) 
Figure 4.2 Summary of Organizational Life Cycle Characteristics 
 
As seen through the organizational life cycle, an organization becomes more dependent 
upon rules, regulations, and formal procedures to exert influence and control as it 
becomes larger and more mature.  As layers of bureaucracy are added to achieve this 
influence and control, the organization becomes less responsive to internal and external 
pressures to change.  This trend is reversed as organizations achieve the Elaboration 
Stage (Stage IV) of development, achieving a post-bureaucratic organization.  The 
Elaboration Stage is unique for the high degree of bureaucracy, but relatively low degree 
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of red tape.  Greiner (1972) identifies it as rare for this stage to be achieved or sustained 
by any organization due to a unique balance of the conflicting values of big-organization 
control and small-organization flexibility.  It is largely for this reason most large and 
mature organizations today would be considered stuck in the Formalization Stage (Stage 
III), unable to make the transition to Stage IV thinking.   
 
Transition through the first three phases of the organizational life cycle is a largely 
natural transition for a growing, maturing, and successful organization; transition to an 
Elaboration-Stage organization is not a natural evolution.  As previously mentioned, it is 
believed that Toyota is a rare organization that has achieved successful elaboration and 
the positive characteristics of bureaucracy described by an Elaboration-Stage 
organization.  The specific mechanics of this achievement within Toyota are not clearly 
understood.  However, for most organizations the transition to an Elaboration stage 
organization must occur through a purposeful organizational design.  The fear of 
remaining in a stagnant, Formalization Stage may motivate many to deploy lean 
production with promises of organizational learning, employee empowerment, reduction 
in bureaucracy, improved efficiencies, and culture change.   
 
This study of the development of a lean bureaucracy examines the transition from a Stage 
III organization to a Stage IV organization.  Figure 4.3 highlights this specific 
transformation.  Evolution to Stage III allows an organization to operate at a high level in 
a complex environment, while evolution to a Stage IV organization can be considered as 














Figure 4.3 Purposeful Transition to an Elaboration Stage Organization 
 
Relating the Organizational and Individual Life Cycle – Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs: 
The study of growth, evolution, and purposeful transition in pursuit of perfection at the 
organizational level has a striking similarity to Abraham Maslow’s theory of motivation 
at the individual level. Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs” identifies stages of personal 
development and growth as our goals and desires in life transition through the following 
stages: survival, external growth, internal growth, and self actualization, the highest level 
of achievable performance.  Figure 4.4 illustrates the parallels between Maslow’s 














 Source: Greiner (1972) and Maslow (1990)
Figure 4.4 Organizational Life Cycles and Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
 
According to Maslow (1990), many people will naturally transition through Stages I - III 
of development.  Similarly, many organizations will naturally transition through Stages I-
III of development.  However, few individuals and organizations are able to achieve the 
highest levels of performance associated with self-actualization and elaboration.  Self-
Actualization and elaboration exist as goals sought after by most mature individuals and 
organizations, but are seldom achieved. 
 
Enabling/Coercive Bureaucracy and the Lean Transformation: 
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As previously mentioned, Formalization Stage organizations are characterized by 
extensive internal systems of oversight and control, impersonal formalized systems, and 
formal procedures, rules, and regulations.  Elaboration Stage organizations on the other 
hand, are characterized by teamwork and their overall attack on wasteful bureaucratic 
structures and organizations.  This stark contrast in organizational characteristics is 
similar to that of Coercive and Enabling bureaucracies, as identified by Paul Adler (1996).  
It must be noted that in his recognition of coercive and enabling tendencies, Adler 
suggests organizations are not homogenous.  Rather, Adler argues intention and outcome 
may blur as systems and governance exist in some areas to control (coerce) an employee, 
as well as support (enable) him/her.   
 
Adler identifies bureaucracies, not by their maturity as Greiner, but by their internal 
characteristics of the relationship between the individual and the formal systems.  Adler 
identified coercive bureaucracy by the ways in which they focus on assessing poor 
performance, measuring costs, keeping employees out of the decision making loop, and 
controlling actions of the individual through rigid adherence to rules, regulations, and 
procedures.  By contrast, enabling bureaucracy emphasizes: process characteristics, 
sharing of best practice methodologies, empowerment and customization of procedures 
as necessary, and emphasis on continuous evolution and improvement.  Enabling and 














Coercive Bureaucracy Enabling Bureaucracy
• Systems should be designed as to keep 
employees out of the control loop.
• Systems are instructions to be followed, 
not challenged.
• Systems focus on performance standards 
so as to highlight poor performance.
• Standardize the systems to minimize 
gameplaying and monitoring costs.
• Systems should allow customization to 
different levels of skill/expertise and should 
guide flexible improvisation.
• Focus on best practice methods: 
information on performance standards is not 
much use without information on best 
practices for achieving them.
• Systems should help people control their 
own work: help them form mental models of 
the system by glass box design.
• Systems are best practice templates to be 
improved.
Source: Adler (1996)
Figure 4.5 Summary of Enabling and Coercive Bureaucracy 
 
A unique aspect of Adler’s study (1996) is highlighting the potential of bureaucratic 
organizations to enable the employee.  Prior to this research, most work on bureaucratic 
theory suggested that a high degree of bureaucratization was synonymous with “red tape” 
and inefficiency caused by excessive controls.  Adler’s description of enabling 
bureaucracy aligns closely to Greiner’s (1972) characterization of an Elaboration Stage 
organization and post-bureaucratic organizational development.   
 
Similar to Adler, Steven Spear and Kent Bowen (1999) have closely examined culture 
and bureaucracy at Toyota.  Their findings were similar, specifically their perceived 
paradox of bureaucracy that “rigid specification (bureaucracy) is the very thing that 
makes the flexibility and creativity possible” (Spear and Bowen, 1999).  How is this 
possible?  Spear and Bowen point to the continuous improvement practices of Toyota.  
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Any improvement made to an unstable process becomes simply one more way of 
performing the process.  True organizational learning requires stabilizing the process.  
They use the analogy of scientific inquiry to describe Toyota’s approach as running many 
experiments. For each experiment a certain number of variables must be held constant 
and standardized, while selective changes are made and the results observed.  If the 
results are favorable, then the new method is standardized until a better way is found.  
Through alternatively stabilizing and improving through experimentation, a “very 
bureaucratic” organization becomes efficient and capable of adapting to environmental 
stressors. (Spear and Bowen, 1999; Adler, 1993, 1996)  
 
Defining a Lean Bureaucracy: 
Adler, Greiner, Spear, and Bowen all offer descriptions of very bureaucratic 
organizations that reveal a picture of what a positive lean bureaucracy may look like.  Yet, 
the descriptions offered by these authors are each intended for a unique purpose and 
audience.  In order to describe a lean bureaucracy more systematically, an adaptation of 
Open Systems analysis is used to refine descriptive characteristics and parameters 
(Nadler and Tushman, 1997).  Three key areas in organizational analysis are: the formal 
organization, informal organization, and the organization’s orientation to change. 
 
These dimensions are summarized in Figure 4.6.  The formal organization has an 
organizational hierarchy and structure, rules, regulations, and procedures, roles and 
responsibilities, written communication mechanisms, and decision making processes.   
The informal organization is considered the “soft stuff”, and includes elements of 
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organizational history and culture, leadership styles, physical workspaces, sources of 
individual power, and verbal communication mechanisms.  Orientation to change would 
consider the organization’s overall preparedness and environment for change, including 
existence of a “burning platform” (pending organizational crisis), history of 
organizational change, goals for transformation, and the overall strategy and 
infrastructure for organizational change.   
 
Formal Organization
• organizational hierarchy and structure
• written communication mechanisms
• formal procedures, rules, regulations 
• technology and technical systems
Informal Organization
Orientation to Change
• sources of individual power 
• organizational history
• organizational culture
• goals of organizational transformation 
• methods of organizational learning 
• history of organizational change 
• decision making processes
• organizational reward systems
• written roles and responsibilities
• verbal communication mechanisms
• organizational leadership styles 
• physical layout of facilities
• infrastructure for transformation
• organizational risk aversion
• “burning platform”

















In order to characterize and describe a positive lean bureaucracy, the definitions of 
Adler’s “Enabling Bureaucracy” (1996), Greiner’s “Elaboration Stage Organization” 
(1972), and Spear and Bowen’s “DNA of the Toyota Production System,” (1999) are 
compared along the dimensions of formal organization, informal organization, and 
orientation to change.  Each of these illustrates a large, complex, and mature bureaucracy 
operating efficiently and eliciting the best characteristics of Max Weber’s (1990) original 
declaration of bureaucracy as the “ideal form of organization.”  An additional source that 
is added to this comparison is the “Learning Organization” as defined by Peter Senge 
(1990).   The Learning Organization is the result of extensive research on small and large 
organizations that are able to effectively learn, evolve, and adapt according to past 
experiences.  (Devanna and Tichy, 1990)  Toyota and other lean producers are noted for 
their ability to learn as an organization, and have been referred by Liker (2004) as “lean 
learning organizations.”  When combined, these four perspectives, Figure 4.7, create a 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   






























































































































































































































































































































































































As a result of this analysis, a more refined definition of a positive lean bureaucracy is 
created: 
o Formal Organization: The formal organization of a positive lean bureaucracy is 
marked by a sense of the whole.  The organization would likely be considered as 
very bureaucratic or post-bureaucratic for its systems, structures, and organization, 
yet each is carefully crafted and evolutionary to both support the whole and 
support the individual.   
o Informal Organization: Teamwork is an important element of the lean 
bureaucracy. Teams create complimentary units for the individual and work 
effectively with other teams to avoid politics and sub-optimization within the 
larger organization.  At the same time, the power of the individual is emphasized  
While red tape connotes the powerlessness of the individual, lean bureaucracy is 
characterized by an extreme emphasis on the individual as truly the most 
significant of resources.  Indeed, individuals are a source of power within an 
organization, as they promote problem solving and a sense of community.  
Servant leadership is an active element of a lean bureaucracy, where the primary 
role of leadership is to empower and enable the individual within the bounds of 
the bureaucracy (Liker, 2008).   
o Orientation to Change:  The orientation to change in a lean bureaucracy is 
recognizable for emphasis on a systematic approach to challenging the status quo, 
even challenging “best practice” methodologies.  Process improvement and 
change are a mechanism for continually improving the organization, refreshing it, 
and training employees.  A lean bureaucracy will not become stagnant if 
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continually challenged and refreshed by a well-trained workforce.  The 
orientation to change is a central element to success of the lean bureaucracy, since 
it provides the energy to combat organizational entropy.  However, this is also a 
tremendous challenge for the organization because it creates a constant sense of 
urgency and need for change.   
 
Developing a Lean Bureaucracy – A Life Cycle Perspective: 
In earlier discussion within this chapter, a positive lean bureaucracy has been defined as a 
large complex bureaucracy that has effectively deployed tenets of lean production.  
Further, the context for transformation to a lean bureaucracy has been identified as a 
purposeful transformation from a Formalization (Stage III) bureaucracy.  Discussion now 
shifts to the lean deployment unit, and its implications to the outcome of transformation.   
 
In a previous chapter, a distinction was made between mechanistic and organic 
mechanisms of deployment, specifically the ways in which a single organization deploys 
lean production.  Organic was noted for learning and evolutionary deployment, 
characterized by deep learning and a relatively slow deployment.  Mechanistic 
deployment was characterized by rapid and widespread deployment, yet a relatively 
superficial understanding of implementation concepts.  The characterization of 
deployment originated from the characterization of organization structure as rigid and 
“machine like” (mechanistic) as opposed to a living, breathing, evolving organism 
(organic).  (Burns and Stalker, 1961)  From the perspective of organizational structure, 
Adler (1996) suggests enabling bureaucracy has the technical characteristics of a 
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mechanistic structure and the social flexibility of an organic structure.  The lean 
bureaucracy is a hybrid mechanistic and organic organization.  This concept can apply at 
the unit of a single geographical site or across a dispersed multi-site corporation.   In this 
chapter we focus on the extended enterprise for a large and complex bureaucracy.   
 
Transformation of a large extended-enterprise often occurs through a purposeful 
organizational change program such as lean deployment or other corporate initiatives.  
Many large and complex Formalization (Stage III) organizations have undertaken a 
transformation towards a lean bureaucracy.  As a result, many have achieved a positive 
and desirable outcome as defined in the previous discussion, but others have experienced 
negative outcomes associated with red tape and bureaucracy in deployment.   
 
We can look at the development of the lean deployment initiative in much the same way 
as we looked at the growth and development of an organization—through the 
organizational life cycle perspective described by Greiner (1972).  An organizational 
initiative is begun as a largely entrepreneurial venture, evolves over time, and may 
achieve an elaboration stage.  If successful, the initiative is simply thought of as part of 
the organizational culture and operating norms.  Therefore, a parallel model can be 
created for the lifecycle of a lean deployment as a bridge from Stage III bureaucracy to a 
Stage IV bureaucracy.  Figure 4.8 illustrates the stages by which an organization may 
transition from a Formalization Stage bureaucracy to an Elaboration Stage bureaucracy 








Stage III Organization: 
Formalization Stage 
Bureaucracy
Stage IV Organization: 
Elaboration Stage 
Bureaucracy
Stage I Transformation: 
Entrepreneurial Stage 
Lean Deployment
Stage II Transformation: 
Formalization Stage 
Lean Deployment
Stage III Transformation: 
Collectivity Stage Lean 
Deployment
Stage IV Transformation: 
Elaboration Stage Lean 
Deployment
Figure 4.8 Life Cycle Metaphor for Lean Transformation 
 
The parallel between maturation of an organization and that of a purposeful 
organizational transformation initiative highlights how an initiative, such as lean 
deployment, evolves through unique stages.  The model of organizational maturation is 
appropriate for comparing the maturation of organizational change programs when the 
initiative is begun by technology innovators and early adopters.  As the deployment 
grows it will engage a larger element of the organizational population until, ultimately, 
the change management tools and techniques are simply absorbed by the organization as 
commonly accepted organizational norms.   
 
In the previous discussion of organizational evolution through stages of development, the 
transition of characteristics (organizational goals, structure, top management style, 
reward and control systems, and crisis to overcome) was presented.  Figure 4.9 offers a 
normative model of lean deployment through the same four phases of evolution: 
entrepreneurial, collectivity, formalization, and elaboration.  This normative model 
characterizes organizations according to: goal of the lean program, perception of the lean 
program, structure of lean deployment, leadership of the lean program, technical tools 
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and techniques applied, social/cultural tools & techniques applied, lean program results 
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Figure 4.9 Normative Model of the Phases of Lean Deployment in an Organization 
 
Consider each of these characteristics of lean deployment in turn:  
o Goal of the Lean Program: the overall purpose of the deployment program during 
this phase of maturation.  As the lean deployment takes roots within an 
organization the primary objective is simply survival of the change management 
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program and understanding the feasibility of lean concepts within the organization.  
The deployment must overcome significant organizational inertia to current 
practices simply to exist.  As deployment is sustained, the objective becomes one 
of growth, and in the Collectivity Stage of deployment a need arises for a strategic 
plan for deployment in order to gain broader acceptance throughout the enterprise.  
During a Formalization Stage of deployment a primary goal for implementation 
would be to achieve internal stability for long-term success and effective seeding 
of the entire organization to culture change of continuous improvement.  The 
ultimate goal of lean deployment in the Elaboration stage is where every worker 
seeks continuous improvement every day as part of the culture and norms of 
operation within the organization.   
 
o Perception of the Lean Program: a general attitude of employees towards the lean 
deployment.  As lean deployment matures within the organization, the perception 
of this change management program will also certainly change.  At the inception 
of deployment, the program is likely met with uncertainty and skepticism by 
employees who may be uncomfortable with organizational change.  As lean 
deployment matures, perception likely shifts to expectation of lean resolving 
specific issues and process challenges throughout the organization, as this is what 
most employees are familiar with regarding change management.  Employees 
may finally realize that all aspects of the organization will be impacted by lean 
deployment as the Formalization Stage is achieved.  Finally, during the 
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Elaboration of deployment all employee’s would be confident the program is not 
simply a short-lived initiative, but a permanent policy for improvement.   
 
o Structure: the organizational makeup of the lean deployment.  The development 
of structure in a lean deployment is similar to that of an organization as it matures.  
Early on in deployment, the structure would be largely informal, with a few 
individuals assuming leadership roles due to their personal interests.  As 
deployment advances, a small program office for lean deployment is likely to 
emerge, yet it would remain largely informal in deployment.  In the Formalization 
Stage of deployment it becomes more critical for formal procedures to guide 
deployment, and the lean capability is established in all major departments.  The 
structure of lean deployment during the Elaboration Stage is an ideal end-state of 
teamwork within the bureaucracy and small-company thinking and flexibility of 
deployment.   
 
o Leadership of the Lean Program: the role of senior leaders leading the lean 
deployment.  At the inception of lean deployment, it is likely only a few 
knowledgeable leaders exist in support of deployment as early adopters and/or 
innovators.  As the deployment seeks to grow, it becomes important to effectively 
enroll senior management in support of deployment.  The most difficult level of 
management to engage in deployment is that of middle management, but this 
must occur in the Formalization Stage if true culture change is to occur within the 
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organization.  Finally, during Elaboration of lean deployment, management at all 
levels of the organization are effectively engaged in deployment.   
 
o Technical Tools & Techniques: technical evolution of lean deployment concepts.  
Upon inception, the technical deployment of lean would resemble disconnected 
process improvements and deployment of very specific technical concepts.  As 
deployment matures, this technical deployment would become more strategic in 
the form of value stream thinking among independent departments, and connected 
by value stream thinking in the extended enterprise in the Formalization Stage.  In 
the Elaboration Stage of lean deployment, the application of technical tools and 
techniques is replaced with a simple, committed pursuit of perfection as applied to 
value stream thinking throughout the entire organization. 
 
o Social/Cultural Tools & Techniques: social evolution of lean deployment 
concepts.  Similar to the evolution of technical tools and techniques, deployment 
of social tools, the other element of the socio-technical nature of lean deployment 
evolves over time.  Socio-technical transformation begins with isolated employee 
engagement; evolving to widespread engagement with only isolated 
empowerment of employees.  During Formalization an organization is able to 
achieve widespread engagement and empowerment, but with isolated 
teambuilding.  Finally, a lean deployment would involve widespread engagement, 
empowerment, and teambuilding throughout the organization during the 
Elaboration Stage. 
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o Program Results and Benefits: the overall benefit to be recognized through lean 
deployment.  Lean deployment may be initially engaged in each organization for 
a variety of reasons, but the desire to achieve waste elimination is paramount.  As 
the deployment matures, many examples of waste elimination may arise 
throughout the organization, as well as a few specific examples of cost reduction 
may emerge.  The Formalization Stage is simply a growth in the number and 
impact of waste elimination and cost reductions.  In the Elaboration Stage, the 
organization recognizes widespread waste elimination, cost reduction, adaptation 
to the environment, and redeployment of resources.   
 
o Crisis to be Overcome: the greatest challenge to the lean deployment that must be 
overcome in order to transition to the next stage of development.  In order for lean 
deployment to transition through stages of deployment, an organization must first 
overcome crises associated with being considered an isolated program.  As it 
matures, the crisis is a failure to develop depth of deployment during Collectivity; 
a failure to develop breadth of deployment and possibly too much red tape during 
Formalization; and ultimately, the desire to accept “good enough”, along with 
possible burnout, in the Elaboration Stage.   
 
Lean Deployment Unit – Enabling and Coercive Design: 
The normative model of lean deployment is useful to understand the evolution and 
development of the process by which organizational transformation occurs.  However, as 
previously discussed, not all lean deployments produce the same results.  Many efforts 
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that attempt to effectively transform the organization to a lean learning organization 
become subject to the same rules and regulations of the bureaucracy they are attempting 
to transform.  This is a similar comparison to Adler’s (1996) work on enabling and 
coercive bureaucracy, reminding us there are various forms of bureaucracy.  Therefore, 
whereas Adler’s analysis was description of enabling and coercive was a characterization 
of bureaucracy.  This concept is extended to consider the implications of an enabling lean 
deployment and coercive lean deployment is introduced.   
 
Adler (1996) identified organizational structure as enabling or coercive.  Similarly, 
organizational change can be conducted in an enabling or coercive manner.  Adler did not 
specifically define organizational change as enabling or coercive, but did identify the 
implementation context by which enabling and coercive organizations could be created.  
This is summarized in Figure 4.10.  Adler considers the dimensions of structure, skills, 
procedures, culture, and strategy.  All of these loosely align to the dimensions of Open 
Systems Analysis, which has been previously discussed: formal organization, informal 
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Figure 4.10 Summary of Enabling and Coercive Bureaucracy in Implementation Context 
 
o Formal Organization: the formal organization in implementation context 
incorporates the variables of structure, worker skills, and procedures.  A coercive 
bureaucracy is developed with an emphasis on rigid constraints, positional 
authority, top-down control and visibility, and fiefdoms for span of control.  An 
enabling bureaucracy is developed through shared information, broad and deep 
expertise, emphasis on problem solving during implementation and the 
consideration of training as an important long-term investment.   
o Informal Organization: the informal organization in implementation context 
incorporates the variables of worker skills, procedures, and organizational culture.  
During the implementation context, a coercive bureaucracy is characterized by 
fear of failure and change management in which mistakes are costly.  Furthermore, 
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quantifiable results are publicized for the aggrandizement of the individual or 
specific business unit.  The informal organization of the enabling context places 
significantly more emphasis on mistakes as learning opportunities and the need to 
progress through collaborative learning across the enterprise.   
o Orientation to Change: orientation to change in the implementation context 
incorporates the variables of culture and strategy.  Within a coercive deployment 
the emphasis is placed upon quickly achieving desired business results of cost 
reductions and reduction in labor force.  Improvements focus at the sub-optimized 
business level, and management is likely to define specific improvements to be 
implemented throughout the extended organization.  An enabling implementation 
occurs through a sharing of knowledge, resources, and technical expertise for total 
organization-wide optimization.  Improvements are made through a participative 
formulation, and the average employee is meant to feel a greater degree of 
ownership to the overall deployment.   
 
Enabling and Coercive Lean Deployment: 
This discussion leads to a question: What does the lifecycle of an enabling and coercive 
lean deployment look like?  To answer this question, we theoretically contrast an 
enabling and coercive deployment through the four phases of the deployment life cycle. 
 
Entrepreneurial Stage of Deployment: 
Figure 4.11 illustrates differences between an enabling and coercive deployment during 
the early entrepreneurial stage when the organization is first being introduced to lean 
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methods.  As noted earlier, in this stage of deployment the initiative is met with 
uncertainty and skepticism, and the overall goal of the program is to learn the basic tools 
to test the waters to see how they may apply.  The structure is informal, the initiative is 
lead by a few knowledgeable individuals focusing on tools deployment and disconnected 
process improvements, isolated employee engagement, with a few individual leaders who 
act as champions.   
 
An enabling deployment at this early stage is characterized by few rules and regulations, 
so as not to impede learning.  An organic and flexible structure would exist with little 
formal reporting of results.  The leadership team would focus on teaching the basics and 
seek out early adopters within the organization who can take on future roles as leaders of 
deployment.  An environment is created that encourages risk taking and learning from 
early mistakes.   
 
A coercive deployment at this stage would be characterized by rules and regulations to 
manage implementation according to a structured plan.  A mechanistic structure would 
exist with rigid roles, responsibilities, and reporting requirements.  A management-
oriented leadership team would be in place to monitor and measure deployment.  A 
highly structured deployment strategy would be developed and enforced to build a 
repeatable model of implementation across the entire organization.  An emphasis would 
be placed on short-term cost-reductions, strict procedures, and an identification of key 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Collectivity Stage of Deployment: 
Figure 4.12 illustrates differences between an enabling and coercive deployment during 
the collectivity stage.  As previously identified, the overall goal of the initiative is to 
spread lean methods in this stage of deployment. The overall perception of the program 
continues to be a “special program to fix isolated problems,” with a mostly informal 
structure and small department for lean deployment.  The role of leadership is to enroll 
senior management, and value stream thinking begins within isolated processes.  At this 
point, the organization has more widespread engagement, though empowerment remains 
in isolated islands.  Many examples of waste elimination exist, and a few specific cost 
reductions are achieved.  The crisis to overcome at this stage is the failure to develop 
depth of deployment.   
 
During the collectivity stage of deployment, an enabling deployment would have rules 
and regulations in place to enable individual learning throughout the organization while 
forms and reporting evolve to support deployment.  A technically-oriented leadership 
becomes more balanced with a management structure to spread deployment throughout 
the organization.  The organization encourages leadership engagement and encourages 
leaders who become engaged.  The orientation to change is characterized by a centralized 
deployment team coaching necessary deployment skills at low-levels throughout the 
organization, with an emphasis and focus on growing lessons learned.     
 
A coercive deployment at this stage would be characterized by rules and regulations to 
manage implementation according to a structured plan.  Standard reporting would be 
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established to assess deployment across the organization, and strategic targets would be 
set for deployment metrics.  Individual performance appraisals would be tied to these 
metrics.  The management-oriented leadership team would consolidate power under a 
lean program office.  Furthermore, employees would be assigned to complete minimum 
quotas of lean training, and leaders who do not support deployment would be punished.  
A continued emphasis would be placed on documenting and capturing cost reductions, 
and expertise would rest with small groups of experts deployed to high-profile initiatives 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Formalization Stage of Deployment: 
Figure 4.13, below, illustrates differences between an enabling and coercive deployment 
during the formalization stage.  In this stage of deployment the overall goal of the 
initiative is to build internal stability and “seeding” of the entire organization.  The 
program has grown to the point that it is recognized as a serious part of the management 
system and managers accept that supporting it is necessary to have a successful future in 
the organization.  Formal procedures are aggressively developed for implementation, and 
capacity to lead lean deployment begins to arise in each department of the organization.  
Middle managers within the organization become active and connected value stream 
thinking begins to occur throughout the entire organization.  There is an attempt to build 
wide-spread employee engagement and empowerment. By this point, many success 
stories have been documented and a cause and effect relationship is accepted between 
lean deployment and movement of key performance indicators.  The crisis to be 
overcome is now failure to develop breadth of deployment and too much red tape within 
deployment.   
 
During the formalization stage of deployment, an enabling deployment would have rules 
and regulations in place to enable sharing of best practices and organization-wide 
learning.  Managers of the lean deployment must achieve a strong balance between 
technical-orientation of continuing to teach deployment, and a leadership-teaching 
orientation to facilitate the deployment.  The primary leadership challenge is to develop 
senior managers.  At this point, lean deployment is considered a viable mechanism for 
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achieving business objectives, and the infrastructure for deployment is dispersed 
throughout the organization.       
 
A coercive lean deployment at this stage would be characterized by even more highly 
developed rules, regulations, metrics, and audits to mandate adherence to best practices.  
Lean would become part of the company’s formal operating procedures supported at the 
level of the CEO.  Lean deployment would still be controlled and managed by experts 
throughout the organization, with little opportunity for variation from the standard 
mechanisms.  Lean leadership would consolidate power, and an emphasis would be 
placed on complying with corporate best practices (the net effect of which would stifle 
continuous improvement efforts).  Additionally, the organization would strive for 
replication of cost reductions throughout the entire organization.  In the end, the intent of 
lean deployment would slowly erode and power players could manipulate the message of 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Elaboration Stage of Deployment: 
Figure 4.14 illustrates differences between an enabling and coercive deployment during 
the elaboration stage.  As previously mentioned the goal is to achieve a culture in which 
every worker is seeking continuous improvement, every single day in this stage of 
deployment.  Lean is considered “here to stay” as part of the day job, and teamwork is 
achieved with small company thinking.  All levels of the organization are engaged 
through deployment and pursuit of perfection, and complete value stream thinking is 
sought through the entire organization.  Widespread engagement, empowerment, and 
teambuilding exist, and waste elimination, cost reduction, and redeployment of resources 
are seen as tangible benefits.  The challenge at this phase of deployment is to overcome 
the notion of accepting “good enough” and possible burnout by the organization.   
 
During the elaboration stage, an enabling deployment would have mechanisms in place 
so that organizations could “pull” best practices.  Furthermore, lean knowledge would be 
dispersed throughout the entire organization.  Senior management would be leading the 
lean deployment by advocating, teaching, and coaching.  Lean deployment would be 
fully aligned to business objectives.  Management would encourage employees to 
challenge the status-quo, while an organizational sense of urgency must be constantly 
renewed in a quest for perfection.   
 
A coercive deployment at this stage would involve senior management regularly 
assessing lean deployment “by the numbers”.  Extensive formal procedures would be in 
place, with emphasis on aligning to structured deployment plan.  Lean deployment could 
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quickly be considered as a standardization initiative throughout the extended organization 
(as opposed to corporate best practices).  As lean deployment gained in political clout 
within the organization, leaders from early stages of deployment could be pushed out by 
corporate power players.  At this phase of deployment, lean could be considered as a 
destination that has been achieved, and many organizations may be prepared to evolve 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This discussion has addressed the four phases of lean deployment, with a detailed 
summary for each.  It began with Stage One, where an organization is first introduced to 
lean.  Finally, it concluded with Stage Four, where lean deployment is simply the way an 
organization now operates.  The life cycle model of lean deployment illustrates that an 
initiative will ultimately become more bureaucratic as time progresses, regardless of how 
it attempts to address enabling and coercive methodologies.  The degree to which Toyota 
is able to exist as an enabling organization with a high-degree of bureaucratization is 
ultimately a paradox from the DNA of the Toyota Production System.  (Spear and Bowen, 
1999)  This chapter will now examine a case study of a large, complex, international 
organization and its lean deployment during the four phases of deployment.   
 
 
CASE STUDY – LEAN DEPLOYMENT AT REMAN 
To further examine the concept of enabling and coercive lean deployment, a case study 
analysis is conducted of “REMAN,” a large naval ship repair organization.  While the 
specific agency or industry of REMAN is not important to case study consideration, the 
organization is extremely large, geographically dispersed around the United States, and 
heavily impacted by global events.  REMAN is an organization of more than 50,000 
employees worldwide and has a well established history as a leader in its specific 
industry.  REMAN initiated a deployment of continuous improvement aligned to the 
principles and practices of the Toyota Production System in 2001.  This case study traces 
the first six years of this lean deployment.  Many other organizations have approached 
REMAN in order to learn from this model of lean deployment.  For these reasons, lean 
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deployment at REMAN is a typical lean production initiative within a large and complex 
organizational bureaucracy.   
 
To provide greater depth of analysis, the case study of lean deployment at REMAN will 
provide a comparison of implementation at the two largest divisions of the organization:  
EarlyAdopter Division and LateToTheParty Division.  EarlyAdopter and 
LateToTheParty are the two largest divisions of REMAN, each representing an 
organization of roughly 20,000 employees at more than a dozen sites across the country 
and having multibillion dollar operational budgets.  REMAN and each of the two 
divisions are headquartered in a major east coast city.   
 
Lean deployment within EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty was heavily influenced by 
guidance and directives from REMAN throughout the six year period.  Initial deployment 
efforts were largely grassroots and organic at EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty, the 
primary difference being EarlyAdopter had roughly a two year head start during the 
Entrepreneurial Stage of deployment.  REMAN initiated an aggressive corporate 
deployment during the Collectivity Stage of deployment, influencing the methodology 
and context for lean deployment.  During the Formalization Stage of deployment, 
headquarters management within both divisions became heavily involved to influence the 
specific content of deployment throughout their divisions.  Neither EarlyAdopter nor 
LateToTheParty Division was able to achieve an “Elaboration” stage of deployment.  The 
primary value in comparing the two organizations is to examine one organization, 
EarlyAdopter, that was largely pro-active in shaping corporate direction for lean 
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deployment; and one organization, LateToTheParty, that was largely reactive in 
responding to corporate direction. 
 
Before examining the two departments, the distinction between intended and unintended 
outcomes should be considered.  Robert Merton (1968) identified how an organization 
would take purposive action to transition from an existing state of performance to a 
desired future state of performance, similar to lean deployment within REMAN.  
However, Merton concluded both intended and unintended outcomes occur, which 
together may result in less than desirable consequences.  Unintended outcomes may 
result from many factors within a bureaucracy.  Some of these factors include the degree 
of: politics, leadership engagement, planning, execution, vested interests, confusion, 
creativity, and communication.  Figure 4.15 illustrates how an organization filter (internal 
organizational distortions) is applied to the purposive change action to create both 
intended and unintended outcomes.  In examining the EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty 
case studies, both what actually occurred and the intended outcomes will be examined.  
The researcher is able to write about the intended outcome of implementation since he 
was a participant observer, an entry level professional position in the REMAN 




































































































Figure 4.15 Intended and Unintended Consequences of Organizational Change 
 
In considering the divergence between intended and unintended outcomes of lean 
deployment, it is important to keep in mind the primary difference between EarlyAdopter 
and LateToTheParty: EarlyAdopter Division initiated deployment two years prior to 
LateToTheParty.  This resulted in EarlyAdopter Division having a deeper knowledge and 
understanding of lean deployment when the influences of REMAN lean deployment 
became more bureaucratic in the Collectivity Stage of deployment.  Additionally, 
EarlyAdopter Division was largely proactive in shaping corporate lean deployment, while 





Case Study Stage I - Entrepreneurial Stage of Lean Deployment: 
The primary normative objective in the Entrepreneurial Stage of lean deployment is to 
learn the basics of lean production.  During this stage, the deployment is largely informal, 
relatively shallow and narrow.  Deployment at this stage focuses on the fundamental tools 
of lean production and disconnected process improvement.  It entails isolated engagement 
of employees and result in isolated waste elimination.  As discussed in the comparison to 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1990), the deployment is still in a relatively fragile state 
where continuation of the lean deployment initiative is not certain.  The result of these 
normative characteristics in an enterprise-wide lean deployment is that each individual 
site or organization acts largely independently and entrepreneurially in initial stages of 
deployment.  This suggests an opportunity for trial and error methods with limited 
corporate oversight and governance - essentially low bureaucracy.  Implementation at a 
specific site is likely to become a function of the leadership style of the site deployment 
leader.  As multiple individual sites within a larger organization continue to develop in 
their lean deployment, they may begin to share techniques and lessons learned with each 
other.  However, their will be a point at which deployment cannot continue to grow 
unless formal energies and resources are applied, so as to build an infrastructure for 
growth of deployment and take deeper roots for transformation.  Figure 4.16 summarizes 
the intended outcome within REMAN and the actual outcomes during the Entrepreneurial 
Stage of deployment at the EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Divisions.   
 
During the Entrepreneurial Stage of lean deployment at REMAN, corporate governance 
was largely non-existent in transformation efforts.  The intended outcome was for 
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individual sites and departments to learn the fundamentals of lean deployment and 
establish a proof of concept within the industry.  Corporate management at REMAN 
supported efforts made by individual sites, but did not wish to officially endorse the 
effort or commit resources.  The intent was for the concept to be proven before corporate 
energies were placed behind the initiative.  Additionally, they wanted sites to take 
ownership by using some of their own funding.  Corporate management did not have 
expertise in any aspect of lean deployment.  The perspective was clearly to “wait and 
see” before proposing intended outcomes.  Beyond lean deployment, corporate 
management at REMAN was largely mistrusted by the EarlyAdopter and 
LateToTheParty Divisions for “meddling” in day-to-day operations.  It was clear process 
improvements needed to be made within REMAN since budgets were continually 
pressurized.  However, corporate management was already invested in a “transformation 
plan” with a few specific targets and initiatives.  They resisted endorsing lean deployment 
to make sure it was not a “flavor of the month,” which would quickly subside.  The 
Entrepreneurial Stage of deployment at REMAN lasted approximately 30 months.  The 
transition to the Collectivity Stage occurred when a large number of managers within 
EarlyAdopter Division petitioned corporate management to become engaged in endorsing 
a formal lean deployment program.   
 
EarlyAdopter Division was the first within REMAN to engage in lean deployment.  This 
occurred when the executive overseeing EarlyAdopter introduced senior leaders to lean 
while on a tour of Toyota’s Georgetown, Kentucky plant.  However, the executive was 
uncertain of how the concepts would apply in this industry, and simply desired to “plant a 
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seed” for lean (not promote an organizational deployment).  Several sites within 
EarlyAdopter Division made positive strides towards learning lean production.  This was 
truly an entrepreneurial effort with little external pressure applied, and no formal rules or 
procedures existed beyond those developed internally.  Over time, knowledge was 
extensively shared throughout various sites at EarlyAdopter Division as the lean 
deployment communities shared lessons learned and examples of success.  Leaders 
considered to be forward thinkers and early adopters of technology (Rogers, 2003) were 
selected to lead the lean deployment.  They were enthusiastic about the opportunity and 
challenge.  Because it was a risk-averse organization, many senior managers resisted 
continuous and rapid improvement techniques of lean deployment.  Each department 
within EarlyAdopter implemented lean differently, often mirroring the personality of 
leadership and culture of the department. Many within EarlyAdopter Division were 
excited about the potential for lean deployment. A need for improvement was recognized 
within EarlyAdopter, especially since budgets had been shrinking on an annual basis.  
Ultimately, EarlyAdopter Division pressured REMAN’s corporate leadership to become 
engaged in lean deployment, and an ideological competition arose among the sites of 
EarlyAdopter Division as to the preferred method of deployment. 
 
LateToTheParty Division initiated lean deployment much later than EarlyAdopter 
Division.  The duration of their Entrepreneurial Stage varied by site, and lasted 
approximately 6-12 months.  As a result, there was much less growth and learning at each 
site within LateToTheParty Division.  The impetus for deployment at LateToTheParty 
Division was also different from that of EarlyAdopter.  Whereas EarlyAdopter had 
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slowly embraced lean internally, the feeling within LateToTheParty was much more of 
reactive urgency as it became clear REMAN was going to become engaged in enterprise-
wide lean deployment.  LateToTheParty Division borrowed significantly from learning 
that occurred at EarlyAdopter Division, including implementation methodologies and 
training materials.  Well-respected managers were selected to lead the lean deployment 
within LateToTheParty Division, but not individuals who would be characterized by their 
individual passion or technical knowledge of the processes.  By the time REMAN was 
ready for a transition to the Collectivity Stage of deployment, there was much less 
personal support, enthusiasm, and proven success for lean at LateToTheParty Division as 
compared with EarlyAdopter.  Budget constraints were not as critical and senior 
management did not embrace the need to deploy lean.  Managers at LateToTheParty 
Division were embracing lean as the inevitable corporate direction, while management at 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Case Study Stage II - Collectivity Stage of Lean Deployment: 
During the Collectivity Stage of deployment, the normative objective is to grow the 
deployment in order to achieve a sense of legitimacy and organizational investment.  At 
this stage, the deployment remains mostly informal with a small department leading the 
lean deployment.  Value stream thinking is applied by individual departments, and there 
is widespread engagement of employees, though perhaps limited or isolated 
empowerment.  In the case study of lean deployment at REMAN, after being encouraged 
by grassroots successes at LateToTheParty, and particularly EarlyAdopter Division, 
corporate management became engaged in deployment.  A senior official with 
EarlyAdopter Division was selected to lead a Task Force that had been established to lead 
leaders from both EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Divisions were asked to join a 
leadership steering committee.  A group of four individuals worked with a corporately 
selected consultant to write a thirty-page formal “Lean Implementation Plan” for 
REMAN.  This implementation plan was endorsed by all senior leaders of REMAN prior 
to distribution.  The plan included terminologies, position descriptions, training modules, 
performance expectations, a suite of metrics, and formal guidelines on implementation.  
Figure 4.17 summarizes the intended outcome and the actual outcomes during the 
Collectivity Stage of deployment at both EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Divisions.   
 
The intended outcome during the Collectivity Stage of lean deployment at REMAN was 
to achieve consistent and results-oriented implementation across the whole of REMAN, 
50,000 employees and over 30 sites.   This was supposed to be achieved through strict 
adherence to the formal implementation plan, including its rigid roles and responsibilities, 
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training curricula, management expectations, reporting metrics, and follow-on audits and 
assessments.  Corporate management at REMAN expected rigid adherence to the 
deployment strategy, and believed that managers at EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty 
Divisions would implement the deployment plan as directed.  As issues arose that were 
not covered in the deployment plan, REMAN developed additional guidance and 
directives.  Corporate management at REMAN understood the business case for change 
and was confident this message would be communicated and embraced by the extended 
organization.  Lean deployment was intended to “overwhelm” the organization as the 
single largest change initiative in the history of REMAN. 
 
Leaders of the lean deployment initiative at both EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty 
Divisions were appreciative of the engagement by REMAN.  Particularly within 
EarlyAdopter Division, it was believed lean deployment had gone as far as it could 
without endorsement and resource allocation from corporate management.  Leadership 
from EarlyAdopter played a major role in the creation of the corporate deployment plan 
and welcomed the legitimacy it brought to lean deployment.  But later it became resistant 
to the controls it placed upon them.  Leaders in EarlyAdopter Division had several years 
of knowledge and experience with lean deployment, and became somewhat rebellious to 
guidance and directives from REMAN when they did not support the direction.  At this 
point a clear division arose within leadership at EarlyAdopter Division.  Many leaders 
sought to execute the REMAN strategy verbatim; however, many of the technically-
oriented lean deployment leaders (who had direct experience with implementation) found 
the guidance rigid and failed to implement the guidance being offered.  The divide was 
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also seen in the culture of deployment between what was communicated to the workforce 
and what was reported to REMAN.  The message to the workforce supported first-level 
employee engagement and empowerment, but reports to corporate management revealed 
little more than “bean counting” the number of events, employees trained, and dollars 
saved.  The orientation to change at EarlyAdopter Division changed dramatically as 
REMAN became engaged.  What had begun as a grassroots effort and “good idea” had 
now become a corporate initiative that was mandated.  Many managers were now forced 
to become involved in deployment, while other power players sought to utilize 
deployment energy to push their desired outcomes.   
 
LateToTheParty Division was now given the guidance for lean deployment, something 
they had been seeking.  Whether a result of desired implementation, a desire to please 
REMAN, or both, LateToTheParty Division was aggressive in implementing the 
corporate deployment plan.  LateToTheParty Division did not possess expertise in lean 
deployment consequently sought out guidance from REMAN and the documented 
strategy of the deployment plan.  LateToTheParty endorsed guidance, directives, and 
assessments from REMAN, performing well in audits and assessments for all areas of 
deployment.  Leadership throughout LateToTheParty was immersed in lean deployment 
in order to adhere to a corporate directive.  The “burning platform” at LateToTheParty 
came from corporate management at REMAN, which was placing pressure to ramp up 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Case Study Stage III: Formalization Stage of Lean Deployment: 
During the Formalization Stage of deployment, the normative objective is to develop 
internal control and stability of the lean transformation.  At this point, the initiative 
should be producing tangible results.  Furthermore, the emphasis shifts to developing 
sustainable internal deployment mechanisms and structure.  A shift in deployment 
infrastructure may be expected from the lean deployment office, to mainstreamed 
capability within the operational organization.  The overall structure and strategy for lean 
deployment in the Formalization Stage will become more focused on the specific context, 
goals, and objectives of the operational organization, whereas in the Entrepreneurial 
Stage the objective was to determine whether the initiative would survive and in the 
Collectivity Stage the objective was to spread deployment throughout the organization.  
In the case study of REMAN, this emphasis on driving results and developing internal 
stability resulted in establishment of specific cross-functional teams to achieve 
operational objectives throughout the extended enterprise.  These cross-functional teams 
became known as “National Value Streams,” each aligned to a specific functional 
operation of the organization.  Each National Value Stream had an independent lean 
deployment infrastructure, and the team lead for each initiative was accountable to senior 
executives at REMAN to deliver results.  As corporate best practices were identified in 
the various functional areas by the National Value Stream teams, they were elevated to a 
“lean release” for mandatory implementation.  The “release” concept was similar to the 
bundling of new technologies in a spiral development of computer software.  Figure 4.18 
summarizes the intended and actual outcomes during the Formalization Stage of 
deployment at both EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Divisions.   
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Corporate management at REMAN was enamored with deployment of National Value 
Stream initiatives and Lean Releases as mechanisms to rapidly deploy lessons learned 
throughout the organization.  Within the various divisions of REMAN, skepticism was 
prominent anytime another site or department claimed a corporate best practice.  The 
intent of the National Value Stream was to both develop and identify best practices for 
corporate implementation.  The expectation within REMAN was for the knowledge-
sharing networks of the National Value Streams to identify these best practices, and for 
the corporation to adhere to all aspects of the best practice technical solution.  
Implementation of best practices would be evaluated through regular corporate audits to 
assess execution.   
 
The National Value Stream and Lean Release approaches at REMAN were initiated with 
relatively enlightened and enabling intentions.  However, as the initiatives continued to 
develop, what began as an effort to share lessons learned in a learning community of 
practice became an extremely coercive deployment with audits and assessments.  For 
each corporate initiative, detailed instructions and audit standards on observable 
characteristics (not the underlying intent) were written.  Similarly, the selection of 
initiatives for “corporate release” was voted on in a largely political manner throughout 
the extended organization.  Further, adherence to the lean release strategy was to be 
executed along with the corporate deployment plan (which identified the mechanics by 
which each initiative was to be conducted).  Lean deployment at REMAN was to be 
driven corporately by adherence to change pace requirements and audits to assess 
adherence to the National Value Stream initiatives and Lean Releases.  
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Within EarlyAdopter Division, the Lean Release approach was initially implemented 
with great energy and hope.  Leadership within EarlyAdopter had largely become 
disenfranchised with the corporate deployment practices of REMAN, and they saw the 
lean release approach as a mechanism to refocus deployment on strategic operational 
business objectives.  EarlyAdopter Division established a small, but powerful 
bureaucracy to deploy lean best practices and oversee implementation across the 
department.  The division had never before had such specific guidelines for adherence to 
corporate process standards as those set forth in the lean release.  It became clear within 
EarlyAdopter Division that the original leaders of lean deployment were being pushed 
out by the management group of the National Value Streams.  Over time, it also became 
clear that this management group consisted of heavy-handed power brokers within 
EarlyAdopter Division who were able to interpret corporate guidance in their own way 
and use this mechanism to achieve personally desired outcomes throughout EarlyAdopter 
Division.  Lean deployment within EarlyAdopter Division had become an end unto itself 
as managers were now able to achieve nearly any desired outcome as long as it was 
associated with “lean”.  The original expertise and intent of lean deployment had largely 
been lost within the bureaucracy.  Those seeking truly enabling and empowering 
continuous improvement, the original leaders of lean deployment within EarlyAdopter 
Division, were left to work small initiatives under the radar of corporate management.   
 
At LateToTheParty Division, similar to EarlyAdopter Division, knowledge-sharing 
networks were established to deploy lean lessons learned according to the National Value 
Stream context.  However, LateToTheParty Division lacked the broad experience and 
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deep understanding of lean that EarlyAdopter Division had learned in their early years of 
the Entrepreneurial Stage.  National Value Stream initiatives were more difficult and 
complex than standard improvement initiatives, both in terms of technical complexity and 
political savvy required to make them successful.  Overall, National Value Stream efforts 
failed to make any significant impact within LateToTheParty Division.  Results were not 
deployed beyond the original organizations.  Central management and oversight of this 
effort was not nearly as strong as it had been at EarlyAdopter Division.  Finally, change 
agent leaders lacked the technical ability to make them successful.  However, corporate 
management at REMAN was not aware of failure to implement, and the issue went 
largely unnoticed.  With regards to adherence to the Corporate Deployment Plan: 
LateToTheParty Division, which had initially lagged behind EarlyAdopter Division in 
overall deployment, began to question guidance from corporate REMAN in much the 
same way as EarlyAdopter Division had previously.  Encumbered by quotas to 
deployment pace and corporate oversight, LateToTheParty Division no longer enjoyed a 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Case Study Stage IV - Elaboration Stage of Lean Deployment: 
The Elaboration Stage of lean deployment was identified earlier as the post-bureaucracy 
period of deployment.  At this stage of maturity, organizational structures, corporate 
deployment strategies, and new initiatives cease to drive deployment.  Lean is simply 
“here to stay” and “part of the day job,” while improvement initiatives are aligned 
directly to measurable strategic business objectives.  Ultimately, a lean deployment that is 
able to achieve the Elaboration Stage successfully results in a lean learning organization, 
or a positive lean bureaucracy, in which every worker seeks continuous improvement 
every day.  Neither the EarlyAdopter nor the LateToTheParty Divisions of REMAN were 
able to achieve the Elaboration Stage of deployment due to coercive influences within 
deployment and the overall organization, for these reasons it is doubtful they ever will be 
able to achieve the Elaboration Stage of deployment.   
 
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The case study of lean deployment at REMAN, with detailed profiles of two large 
divisions (EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty) is an example of how one large complex 
bureaucracy seeks to transform itself through principles and practices of the Toyota 
Production System.  The case study of lean deployment at REMAN is similar to 
purposeful transformations at many other large organizations.  Whether they are private 
or government, industrial or service.  The intent to transform towards a lean bureaucracy 
(which has been shown to parallel definitions of a Learning Organization, Enabling 
bureaucracy, and Elaboration Stage Organization) is characteristic of transition from a 
bureaucratic stage organization (Stage III) to a post-bureaucratic stage organization 
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(Stage IV).  This case study offers deep understanding of the transition process towards a 
lean bureaucracy, distinguishing between an enabling and coercive transformation.   
 
As can be seen in the case study, coercive lean deployment became a way of life within 
REMAN.  The well-intentioned initiative to transform a large and complex bureaucracy 
ultimately became a function of the bureaucracy.  This is not to say lean deployment was 
a failure, there are many very positive outcomes from six years of lean deployment, so 
much so that many other organizations looked to REMAN as a model to emulate.  
However, deployment likely will never achieve a truly transformational effect within the 
organization.  Indeed it may fail to create a positive lean bureaucracy.  This discussion 
will: identify the enabling and coercive nature at each stage of lean deployment within 
REMAN, offer some understanding to the unique stories of the EarlyAdopter and 
LateToTheParty Divisions, identify the influences to enabling and coercive deployment, 
and ultimately attempt to characterize the degree of success at lean deployment at 
REMAN.    
 
Characterization of Deployment at REMAN - Enabling and Coercive: 
The case study of lean deployment at REMAN offers an inside look into the enabling and 
coercive mechanics by which an organization transforms itself.  To support discussion, in 
Figure 4.19 each stage of deployment at EarlyAdopter Division and LateToTheParty 
Division is characterized by the degree to which enabling and coercive characteristics are 
deployment are observed.  These characterizations are based on qualitative observations 
made during deployment, analyzing the frequency and impact of enabling and coercive 
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characteristics defined in earlier discussion; ratings are made on a scale of: low, low-
moderate, moderate, high-moderate, and high, for the degree to which enabling and 
coercive characteristics of deployment are observed.  A discussion and detailed 
description of each rating is included in the following analysis.  In general, both 
organizations experience a decline in enabling characteristics and an increase in coercive 
characteristics as deployment matures.  The shift in implementation from enabling to 
coercive at LateToTheParty Division was much more rapid and significant than the shift 
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Figure 4.19 Enabling/Coercive Deployment at EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty 
 
Entrepreneurial Stage of Deployment at REMAN - Enabling and Coercive: 
During the Entrepreneurial Stage of lean deployment at REMAN corporate governance 
and oversight of lean deployment efforts were non-existent.  Deployment in this phase 
was truly entrepreneurial in nature as each organization attempted different 
methodologies and formulas in order to achieve success.  The leaders of the program 
were largely “salesmen” of the effort as much as they were technical experts trying to 
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push the fundamental concepts of lean production.  The Entrepreneurial Stage of 
implementation lasted approximately three years at EarlyAdopter Division, while it lasted 
a single year at LateToTheParty Division.  The intent of implementation at 
LateToTheParty Division was more coercive than that at EarlyAdopter.  While 
EarlyAdopter had truly initiated a grassroots effort to improve performance, 
LateToTheParty desired to impress senior management within REMAN when it became 
obvious that corporate guidance would soon be offered on lean deployment.  In both 
departments, implementation was largely enabling in nature, which contrasted with the 
general coercive organizational structure and tendencies of the larger organization. 
 
In considering the degree of enabling characteristics observed in the Entrepreneurial 
Stage of lean deployment, EarlyAdopter Division would be considered high, with 
LateToTheParty Division considered high-moderate.   
 
In both departments the primary task was simply to learn lean production, and forward 
thinking and enthusiastic leaders were selected to lead the deployment.  In the case of 
EarlyAdopter Division, there existed a general absence of formal rules and procedures for 
implementation beyond those developed internally for use by implementers.  Each 
department implemented lean differently, often mirroring the personality and culture of 
the department.  There existed significant trial and error of implementation with energies 
shifting to parts of the organization exhibiting interest and commitment to the changes.  
Within EarlyAdopter Division, the implementation leaders were technically 
knowledgeable of lean fundamentals, but were not interested in organization building or 
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required reporting.  Significant knowledge-sharing existed within EarlyAdopter Division.  
Many of these lessons were passed on to LateToTheParty Division as they sought to 
catch up with EarlyAdopter in implementation. 
 
In considering the degree of coercive characteristics observed in the Entrepreneurial 
Stage of lean deployment, EarlyAdopter Division would be considered low, and 
LateToTheParty Division would be considered low-moderate. 
 
In the Entrepreneurial Stage of deployment, coercive characteristics of implementation 
were minimal, yet did exist largely as a result of organizational infrastructure.  Within 
EarlyAdopter Division, many senior managers resisted continuous improvement and 
rapid improvement techniques.  In many instances second-tier managers (not the A-
players) were selected to lead deployment and an ideological competition rose within 
EarlyAdopter Division.  Within LateToTheParty Division, much less individual growth 
and learning occurred since they were catching up with EarlyAdopter.  This resulted in 
coercive tendencies of implementation as emphasis was placed upon “deploying lessons 
learned,” and not internal learning.   
 
Collectivity Stage of Deployment at REMAN - Enabling and Coercive: 
In the Collectivity Stage of deployment at REMAN, corporate leadership formed a Lean 
Deployment Task Force and became actively involved in deployment at each division.  A 
Lean Implementation Plan was written, and it quickly became a corporate “program” to 
be implemented across the enterprise.  Individual divisions lost much of their autonomy 
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in technique and reporting of improvement status with the heavy handed approach to 
cookie-cutter implementation.   
 
In considering the degree of enabling characteristics observed in the Collectivity Stage of 
lean deployment, EarlyAdopter Division would be considered high-moderate, and 
LateToTheParty Division considered low.   
 
Appreciative for REMAN’s corporate acknowledgement and involvement, EarlyAdopter 
Division considered corporate involvement to be a further enabler of implementation and 
played a major role in the creation of the corporate deployment plan.  Early on, leaders of 
lean deployment within EarlyAdopter Division were able to heavily influence the 
corporate message, and the message was an enabler to implementation in the way it 
required senior management’s attention.  EarlyAdopter division was now able to acquire 
the resources and management attention it had been missing.  However, as time went on, 
and the REMAN management team became more experienced, the relationship with 
EarlyAdopter Division changed.  What began as a high-powered corporate initiative they 
could control soon grew to a threat to EarlyAdopter Division as the energies and focus of 
REMAN shifted.  Within LateToTheParty Division, the issuance of the lean Corporate 
Deployment Plan, a textbook instruction for implementation, created a very coercive 
deployment - the only enabling characteristics of deployment were the senior leadership 
commitment it required. 
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In considering the degree of coercive characteristics observed in the Collectivity Stage of 
lean deployment, EarlyAdopter Division would be considered moderate, and 
LateToTheParty Division considered high-moderate.   
 
The lean corporate deployment plan issued by REMAN scripted a highly coercive 
deployment strategy.  In this document were quotas for the required numbers of 
personnel to be trained, the number of improvement events to be conducted, the speed at 
which implementation must occur, amount of dollars to be saved, and metrics to be 
reported.  Adherence to this plan was to be audited by REMAN leadership, with senior 
managers at EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty reprimanded if performance levels were 
not achieved.  Within EarlyAdopter Division, this was a significant threat to building on 
the successes of implementation that had been achieved.  Initially, EarlyAdopter 
leadership was able to shape the corporate implementation and/or ignore guidance, 
becoming somewhat rebellious.  As time went on, this became more difficult to do and 
they became more heavily influenced by the coercive corporate deployment plan.  Within 
LateToTheParty Division, the corporate deployment plan was endorsed as a document to 
be carried out with verbatim compliance.  LateToTheParty had not experienced any 
significant learning internally during their brief Entrepreneurial Stage.  As such, they 
appreciated the detailed guidance offered during the Collectivity Stage.  At 
LateToTheParty, the coercive corporate deployment plan (with its guidance, directives, 
and assessments) was fully endorsed.  Little internal assessment or filter of directives 
occurred at LateToTheParty, and to a lesser degree EarlyAdopter.  Lean deployment 
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quickly became a “box to be checked off,” and the only “burning platform” was to 
appease corporate mandates to increase pace of deployment. 
 
Formalization Stage of Deployment at REMAN - Enabling and Coercive: 
The Formalization Stage of deployment within REMAN was dominated by pressures 
from corporate leadership to reduce costs as a result of improvement initiatives.  In order 
to answer these pressures and develop more standard improvement initiatives, the 
concept of “deploying best practices” became the rally cry for lean deployment within 
REMAN.  This was also a bit of a reversal to the corporate deployment plan introduced 
during the Collectivity Stage of deployment.  In Stage II, REMAN leadership provided 
guidance on the desired mechanics of lean deployment.  In Stage III, division leadership 
provided guidance as to the specific topics and high-profile initiatives to be undertaken 
within both EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Divisions.   
 
In considering the degree of enabling characteristics observed in the Formalization Stage 
of lean deployment, EarlyAdopter Division would be considered moderate, and 
LateToTheParty Division considered low.   
 
Within EarlyAdopter Division, a small but powerful bureaucracy was created to oversee 
deployment and replication of successful improvement initiatives and various “best 
practices.”  This management board was strongly divided into two groups - those who 
wanted to use this mechanism as an enabling tool to create knowledge-sharing 
communities of practice and improved communication, and those who desired to 
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consolidate power and control along a functional segment of the business.  The extreme 
dichotomy of perspectives was fascinating to observe, with “lean purists” endorsing 
(enabling) knowledge-sharing and “traditional managers” seeking the (coercive) control 
of transformation.  The result of this effort in EarlyAdopter Division was a blend of 
enabling and coercive, dependent upon which personalities impacted that element of the 
business.  Where knowledge sharing networks were created, a powerful tool for cross-
functional teamwork, small business thinking, and enabling lean deployment was created.  
An additional characteristic of enabling lean deployment was the way in which 
EarlyAdopter Division resisted the influence of the REMAN corporate guidance; 
EarlyAdopter Division had created a small, but effective barrier between the Division and 
corporate influences.  Within LateToTheParty Division, there were very few 
characteristics of enabling deployment.  Lean had largely become an end unto itself, with 
the objective to hit the metrics and achieve audit scores.   
 
In considering the degree of coercive characteristics observed in the Formalization Stage 
of lean deployment, EarlyAdopter Division would be considered high, and 
LateToTheParty Division considered high as well. 
 
As previously mentioned, a struggle took place within EarlyAdopter Division as to 
whether the deployment of best practices would take place in an enabling or coercive 
manner.  In the end, those desiring a coercive power grab under the guise of lean 
deployment gained greater support.  However, for the most part, these efforts at 
standardization and consistent deployment of initiatives across the Division received 
 254 
tremendous resistance and were implemented inconsistently across the organization.  
Lean deployment had become a source of significant power for these managers to 
manipulate the “system” and achieve their desired outcomes in the name of corporate 
improvement initiatives.  Now that lean deployment had achieved significant political 
capital, original leaders of the deployment were now being pushed out of the power 
center and replaced with more significant power brokers within the organization who 
deviantly interpreted corporate guidance to achieve desired outcomes.  In this instance, 
the power brokers had little knowledge and/or interest in enabling lean deployment, but 
saw this as a tool to achieve organizational change they had previously desired.  Within 
LateToTheParty Division, senior managers had similarly attempted to push for 
widespread deployment of successful initiatives.  However, the deployment techniques 
within LateToTheParty remained very immature, and they were unable to successfully 
deploy complex initiatives across organizations.  The central management and oversight 
within LateToTheParty was not strong and did not have a major impact on transforming 
operations.  At this point, LateToTheParty Division also realized the coercive nature of 
the corporate lean deployment plan and pushed back on quotas for the deployment pace 
and corporate oversight.   
 
Understanding the Different Outcomes in EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Division: 
The divergence in outcomes between the EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Divisions 
offers some interesting insights into enterprise transformation through lean deployment.  
The two divisions operated in similar environments, with similar size, infrastructure, and 
missions.  The most distinctive difference regarding this case study is that EarlyAdopter 
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Division had a three-year Entrepreneurial Stage of deployment, while LateToTheParty 
had only one.  The key element of the Entrepreneurial Stage is there was little external 
pressure and/or expectations of deployment.  As such, a healthy period of natural growth 
and evolution of learning could occur.  This took place during the three-year period at 
EarlyAdopter Division when they developed internal expertise on deployment of lean 
production.   
 
Within LateToTheParty Division, the learning cycle was cut short by external influences.  
Not only did pressure exist to catch up with EarlyAdopter Division, but guidance from 
REMAN leadership followed shortly after transformation efforts were initiated.  As a 
result, LateToTheParty was an organization in which few individuals had any knowledge 
of lean deployment beyond what was presented / mandated to them by corporate 
leadership.   
 
As previously identified, the primary objective is to “learn lean production” during the 
Entrepreneurial Stage of deployment.  As a result of external influences, LateToTheParty 
Division was forced to mature beyond the Entrepreneurial Stage without effectively 
achieving this primary objective.  Consequently, LateToTheParty Division lacked 
internal knowledge and expertise to discern the intent of corporate direction and was 
easily influence by external coercive influences.  This can be seen as enabling 
characterization of deployment rapidly went from high-moderate in the Entrepreneurial 
Stage to low in both the Collectivity and Formalization stages.  A similar reversal 
occurred in the coercive characterization of deployment.  Meanwhile, EarlyAdopter 
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Division was able to maintain enabling characterization levels of high-moderate and 
moderate during advanced deployment.  EarlyAdopter Division had clearly achieved 
enough internal lean expertise to counter the coercive external influences of the greater 
organization, while LateToTheParty Division had not. 
 
Understanding the Influences on Enabling and Coercive Bureaucracy at REMAN: 
Significant emphasis has been placed upon external influences to the lean deployment, 
and the coercive influence they have on the transformation process.  Two major sets of 
external influences occurred in the lifecycle of lean transformation at REMAN: 
o The first set of external influences was corporate pressure to create an enterprise-
wide transformation effort, which resulted in the creation of the REMAN Lean 
Deployment Task Force.  This first set of external influences had the effect of 
transitioning lean deployment at the EarlyAdopter and LateToTheParty Divisions 
from the Entrepreneurial to Collectivity Stages of deployment.   
o The second set of external influences was corporate pressure to produce tangible 
and significant cost reductions, which resulted in division leadership becoming 
aggressive in prescribing corporate initiatives to be undertaken.  This second set 
of external influences had the effect of transitioning lean deployment at 
EarlyAdopter Division and LateToTheParty Division from the Collectivity to 
Formalization Stages of deployment.   
 
Figures 4.20 and 4.21 illustrate the impact these external influences had on the degree of 
enabling and coercive elements through the stages of the deployment lifecycle.  As can 
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be seen each of these external influences had a significantly coercive impact on 
deployment within the organization.  It is believed these coercive influences are largely a 
function of the overall management culture at REMAN, which would be characterized as 
a coercive bureaucracy according to Adler (1996).   
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Understanding Lean Deployment at REMAN as a Success or Failure: 
The case study of REMAN illustrates the way in which an organization sets out to 
transform the organization, but ultimately does not achieve their desired outcome of 
positive transformation.  The challenge in developing a lean bureaucracy lies in 
optimizing the positive influences and overcoming the negative ones.  For some 
organizations the objective of culture change and establishment of a learning organization 
may not be the objective for lean deployment.  In some instances, the objective may 
simply be to reduce expenses at all costs.  Many organizations do operate in this way, but 
the long-term implications of this short-term thinking are likely harmful to the success 
and longevity of an organization.  In terms of REMAN, the objective was not cost 
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reduction at any consequence.  In many large bureaucracies this occurs regularly, and is 
known as a “budget wedge.”  REMAN had been through many of these arbitrary cost 
reductions in the past, but management was largely attracted to lean deployment because 
they felt it offered an alternative to their past behavior and resultant negative implications.   
 
Therefore, if the objective for lean deployment at REMAN was to create a lean learning 
organization, how and why did they go astray?  Was the failure in planning or execution?  
Was the failure a result of internal or external influences?  Was the failure a result of the 
intended, or unintended, outcomes?  The simple answer to all these questions is, yes.  
REMAN is a large and complex enterprise-wide bureaucracy, with strong tendencies 
towards coercive management behavior.  The lean deployment began with excellent 
intentions, which were largely observed at EarlyAdopter in the Entrepreneurial Stage of 
deployment.  But, when the program was put under pressure to perform and new decision 
makers and influencers were introduced to the deployment, the intent of lean deployment 
passed through the organizational filter, as described by Merton.  As the organization 
sometimes distorted the intended outcome of lean deployment, the unintended outcome 













































































Figure 4.22 Intended and Unintended Consequences of Lean Deployment : Path to 
Coercive Bureaucracy 
 
In considering the specific case study of lean deployment at REMAN, numerous 
elements of the organizational filter lead to the breakdown of intended outcomes.  These 
of course, could cause deployment to shift from the intended outcome of a lean 
bureaucracy to the unintended outcome of a coercive bureaucracy.  Among these reasons 
are the following: 
o Pressure to Create Immediate Results: As observed in analysis of EarlyAdopter 
Division and LateToTheParty Division, the most significant shift towards 
coercive behavior came when external pressures were applied.  These external 
pressures came in the form of a need to rapidly create a corporate transformation 
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initiative and the need to deliver immediate results.  When senior management 
was put under these pressures they responded with coercive organization norms of 
behavior.  Because of this, coercive behavioral characteristics of command-and-
control were rapidly infused into the lean deployment.  
o Poor Planning and Execution: To some degree, lean transformation within 
REMAN, but particularly LateToTheParty Division, failed due to a lack of 
technical expertise and knowledge about successful lean deployment.  In some 
instances, improvement initiatives were poorly selected, poorly prepared for, or 
poorly executed.  These are all basic skills which that must be learned by an 
organization over time.   
o Confusion and Breakdown in Communication: The message of empowerment, 
teamwork, and rapid improvement is not part of the underlying culture or DNA of 
REMAN, a command-and-control bureaucracy.  As the message gets further 
dispersed throughout the organization, it undoubtedly gets twisted and 
manipulated, leading to possible confusion and inappropriate action. 
o Organizational Politics and Power Play: Power and politics are alive and well in 
any organizational transformation or shakeup where there are likely “winners” 
and “losers.”  (Roskies, Liker, Roitman, 1988).  As observed in the case study of 
REMAN, many senior managers did not wish to engage in the lean deployment 
effort until it became clear it would endure.  Similarly, once it was identified that 
powerful political energy did exist for lean transformation, many opportunistic 
individuals sought to use this energy to achieve their desired outcomes, regardless 
of whether or not their idea of transformation aligned to the lean deployment. 
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o Vested Interests and Orientation to Change: As previously mentioned, in any 
significant organizational transformation there will be “winners” and “losers,” 
suggesting a large percentage of the population may be deeply committed to 
maintaining the status quo.  As observed at REMAN, some employees, often low-
level managers, may intentionally undermine the message and intent of 
developing a lean bureaucracy, so they can protect the position they have 
achieved in the organization. 
o Creativity: Perhaps the greatest challenge associated with creating a positive lean 
bureaucracy is that of continually endorsing empowerment and creativity, while 
maintaining some aspect of control over the extended deployment effort.  It is 
believed this is the reason “culture change” is emphasized in much of the lean 
transformation literature (Liker, 2007).  If the organization culture is pulling the 
deployment towards coercive ends, as was seen in the REMAN case study, the 
initiative will become coercive. 
 
As a result of these issues, the deployment that began with very positive intentions 
became largely coercive, resulting in REMAN’s failure to achieve the desired lean 
learning organization.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The phenomenon of lean bureaucracy; in which an organization desires to become an 
efficient learning organization and can achieve this outcome through enabling lean 
deployment; yet many organizations create a coercive deployment and simply feed the 
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bureaucracy they are trying to transform with added layers of departments, procedures, 
rules, and regulations.  This chapter has sought to better understand this phenomenon by 
defining a lean bureaucracy; encompassing ideal concepts of organization from multiple 
social science thinkers; developing a concept of a transformation life cycle, much like the 
growth and evolution of a bureaucracy itself; and defining the enabling and coercive 
manner in which that transformation may occur in an organization.  All of this, along 
with the case study of lean transformation at REMAN has highlighted the dynamics of 
organizational change and lean transformation. 
 
The case study of lean deployment at REMAN (its growth, evolution, and ultimate 
decline) is not unique.  Many organizations undergo similar challenges and opportunities.  
As seen in these examples, many coercive forces exist that challenge the desired enabling 
lean deployment.  A list of barriers and enablers to lean transformation are identified and 
discussed below with respect to enabling/coercive deployment.  Also included is a 
framework for relating: positive lean bureaucracy, coercive bureaucracy, organic lean 
deployment, and cost reduction programs. 
 
 
Barriers to Lean Transformation – Discussion from Enabling/Coercive Perspective: 
The following eight characteristics have been observed in the case study of REMAN and 
other organizations as barriers to successfully developing a positive lean bureaucracy.  
Each characteristic is identified for the ways it may impact a lean deployment and make 
it more coercive.   
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o Doing what comes naturally:  To employees in many large and complex 
organizations, the notion of management by command and control is simply a 
way of life.  From an employee’s perspective, if the new “lean program” is rolled 
out in a coercive manner, it seems like business as usual.  They will comply and 
do what is necessary to check the box that they have “done lean” and go about 
their business the way they always have.  From a manager’s perspective, there is a 
tendency to deploy lean production using the same management tools as any other 
program.  This creates a particular challenge, especially since a major element of 
successful lean deployment is an enabling and empowering culture, a required 
shift for most organizations that ultimately require a break from what comes 
naturally.   
o “Wait for me - I’m your leader”:  Many managers, particularly those coming 
from strong command-and-control organizations, may feel it is a show of 
weakness among their peers or others to enable employees to make key decisions.  
Likewise, some employees might question a manager’s authority.  These 
managers may feel threatened by this and question whether empowering 
employees makes them replaceable to the organization.  The essence of lean is to 
distribute leadership broadly to encourage learning and continuous improvement.  
This requires managers to become teachers, an uncomfortable role for some in a 
coercive bureaucracy. 
o Feeding the bigger fish:  There are institutional characteristics of a lean 
deployment by which senior management will want to both review progress in 
continuous improvement and promote successes to superiors.  However, as a lean 
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deployment matures, and potentially more levels of a hierarchy become engaged, 
a tendency will exist for metrics to become more coercive in nature (i.e. “bean 
counting”).  Furthermore, metrics may less directly enable transformation within 
the organization. 
o Supporting the masses: As previously discussed, perhaps the single greatest 
challenge to effective enterprise-wide lean transformation is the delicate balance 
between employee empowerment and “management” of deployment.  It is 
important for consistency in message and methodology of a corporate deployment, 
but this can become exponentially more difficult as an organization gets larger 
and more complex.  Lean deployment across an enterprise will ultimately require 
crossing significant organizational, and possibly geographic, boundaries.  The 
broader the deployment, the greater the opportunity for coercive forces to 
undermine deployment.  The minds and hearts of individuals within each 
subgroup of the organization must be won over to the culture change of an 
enabling organization.  It is for the specific reason of maintaining consistency in 
“managing” a program that Max Weber (1990) considered bureaucracy so 
powerful.  Yet, despite the best intentions, the enabling aspect of lean deployment 
may become blurred as the “lean message” and deployment spread throughout an 
organization. 
o Power grab: As was seen in the case study of lean deployment at REMAN, some 
managers may not desire to empower employees, or even implement lean, but 
they will embrace the deployment and organizational energy it creates as a means 
to achieve their own ends for organizational change.  This is a particular challenge 
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since these managers are likely to use traditionally coercive management 
techniques in championing their efforts.  As employees observe managers making 
a power grab under the guise of “lean deployment,” the credibility and purpose of 
the overall deployment will be questioned. 
o Ignore it, and it will go away: Some managers and employees will intentionally 
create a coercive environment for lean deployment, simply because they do not 
believe in it or do not desire to be bothered with a perceived “program of the 
month.” This behavior will create a particularly coercive environment for 
deployment, an environment that may undermine long-term success of the effort. 
o Common to all, useful to none:  As observed in many organizations, a 
traditionally coercive deployment strategy for any initiative may involve 
developing a highly structured and rigid strategy for widespread dissemination of 
tools and techniques.  In some instances, as organizations seek to develop a 
“system” of deployment, they may create a strategy that becomes so vague, 
general, and watered down to the point it provides little value to anyone.  As seen 
previously, this belief in a standard strategy may undermine implementation as 
managers and employees place too much emphasis and faith in “the system,” and 
fail to recognize shortcomings or seek out more appropriate deployment 
techniques.   
o Justifying a management position when technically ignorant of lean deployment: 
In some cases, the lean deployment manager may not be technically 
knowledgeable of lean and disinterested in learning.  This individual must be a 
champion, spokesman, and teacher for the intent of deployment.  If this individual 
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cannot empower employees in an enabling way through lean deployment, they 
may revert to long-learned techniques of command-and-control by developing an 
elaborate bureaucratic management structure for lean deployment. 
 
Enablers to Lean Transformation – Discussion from Enabling/Coercive Perspective: 
The following list of seven characteristics has been observed in the case study of 
REMAN and other organizations as enablers to successfully developing a positive lean 
bureaucracy.  To some degree, each of these characteristics could be true of any 
management-led initiative, but they are particularly important in developing a positive 
lean bureaucracy.  Each is discussed for the way it causes a lean deployment to become 
more enabling.   
• “How can I help?”:  Servant-leadership is a key to developing an enabling lean 
deployment (Liker, 2008).  Many leaders exhibit a common hubris of management 
that when they put on the “management hat” they become more important and 
knowledgeable of an organization.  From the perspective of creating an enabling lean 
deployment, the most important characteristic of management is the ability to remove 
roadblocks to successful transformation. 
• Technical expertise leading the lean deployment:  Lean deployment, as well as any 
other significant transformation with an organization, is by definition a new way of 
working and behaving.  Leadership for this effort must therefore possess a technical 
skill-set that is not simply aligned to “business as usual.”  Management should be 
able to instruct all levels of the organization on the new way of doing business.  
Leadership of the lean deployment must represent the thought leadership within the 
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organization if a lean bureaucracy is to be achieved.  Management must constantly be 
teaching and coaching in order to avoid an organization reverting to traditionally 
coercive tendencies of bureaucratic command-and-control in deployment.   
• Senior Leadership engagement:  Many senior leaders have shown a propensity to 
“delegate” organizational transformation with weekly or monthly reports from their 
deployment leadership.  The distinction between senior leadership support (“I support 
what you are doing”) and senior leadership engagement (“I am going to commit my 
personal time and energy”) cannot be understated for the key role it plays in creating 
a successful transformation and a positive lean bureaucracy.  The adage of needing to 
“walk the talk” by senior management is critical to a successful enabling lean 
deployment. 
• Support for middle management:  Organizational transformation will typically place 
tremendous pressure on middle management to maintain execution and performance, 
while promoting transformation and change at the same time; all while obtaining 
information second or third hand regarding the details of deployment.  It is critical to 
support middle managers in this challenging period of transformation so they can 
ultimately support changes and enabling lean deployment may prosper.   
• “What gets measured, gets done”:  The adage of “what gets measured, gets done” 
holds true in considering organizational transformation.  Many employees may not 
understand the overall intent of lean deployment, but they will be able to understand 
the metrics used by superiors to assess performance.  Building the right metrics as an 
enabler to building the right behaviors is critical for developing an enabling lean 
deployment in support of leading implementers.  This is a particular challenge in 
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building an enabling lean deployment, since many of the easiest and most common 
metrics to be gathered are some form of “busy-ness” metrics.  These metrics are 
valuable to senior management so that they understand the activity going on within 
their organization.  However, they are typically coercive from the perspective of 
front-line implementation.  A key to developing an enabling lean deployment is to 
develop a metrics dash board that can support the needs of both senior management 
and enable the front-line implementer.  In the case of enabling organizations, metrics, 
metrics goals, and methodologies for achieving those goals are negotiated and agreed 
upon at each level of the organization.  (Liker, 2008)  
• Staying Power:  Perhaps a circular argument, but lean deployment must be enabling 
to become truly transformational; and it must be truly transformational to be sustained 
as a long-term shift in culture.  Therefore, it must be enabling in order to have staying 
power.  As can be seen in the case study of REMAN, many coercive organizational 
influences will exist in deployment, including existing organizational inertia and 
would-be opportunists who align to the transformation program in order to achieve 
their desired transformational outcomes.   
• Unite the masses:  In order to achieve long-lasting success with an enabling lean 
deployment, a requirement is to win over the hearts and minds of a majority of 
employees.  An element of this is to enable, empower, and engage front-line workers, 
not simply technical experts, in the lean deployment.  When transformation energies 
are expended only by a small team of managers or expert change-agents, this may be 
perceived as a coercive effort by someone else to “improve” an activity of which they 
have little to no understanding.   
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Typology of Lean Deployment: 
• This chapter has largely focused on distinctions between early-stage and advanced 
lean deployment, as well as enabling and coercive deployment, all within the context 
of a large, complex, and mature bureaucracy.  A typology of transformation 
initiatives is created utilizing the dimensions of “change typology,” as enabling or 
coercive, and the point of maturation, nascent or mature.  Figure 4.23 illustrates this 
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Figure 4.23 Typology of Lean Deployment 
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Organic Lean Deployment:  A lean deployment that is in the early stages and is 
enabling would resemble an organic deployment (as introduced in chapter three of 
this dissertation).  Organic lean deployment is recognized for its evolutionary learning 
over time and “spiral deployment” as initiatives grow from model areas to impact 
larger elements of the organization.   
 
Cost Reduction Program: A lean deployment that is in the early stages and is 
coercive in nature would resemble a traditional cost reduction program.  In a 
traditional cost reduction program, the methodology for improvement is seemingly 
inconsequential as compared to the outcome of cost reduction.   
 
Transformation to a Lean Bureaucracy: A lean deployment that is mature in the 
Formalization Stage or beyond, and is characterized as enabling would represent the 
ideal of developing a positive lean bureaucracy.  This deployment, which would 
effectively  impact a large population of the organization in an empowering and 
enabling way, would suggest that the organization is well on its way to becoming an 
Elaboration Stage (Stage IV), post-bureaucratic organization.  
 
Mechanistic Lean Deployment: A lean deployment that is mature, yet characterized as 
coercive in nature, is similar to the deployment observed in the case study of 
REMAN.  This deployment would be considered mechanistic in nature.  While it 
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would impact a large segment of the organization it would ultimately lead to the 
development of a coercive bureaucracy.   
 
ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
This chapter has sought to shed understanding to the phenomenon by which large and 
complex bureaucracies are transformed (or not) through deployment of lean production, 
and the impact an enabling or coercive deployment of improvement initiatives can have 
on the overall success of transformation.  As a result of this study, several key 
contributions have been made to the academic literature in the areas of bureaucracy 
theory, organizational change, and lean manufacturing. The following contributions to 
academic literature in these areas have been made: 
• Aligned organization design models of Greiner (Elaboration Stage Bureaucracy, 
1972), Adler (Enabling Bureaucracy, 1996), Spear & Bowen (“DNA” of Toyota, 
1999), and Senge (Learning Organization, 1990) to relate the close similarities in 
their description of the “ultimate form” of organization. 
• Adapted an organization life cycle model to develop a detailed four-stage 
normative life cycle model of lean transformation within an organization. 
• Adapted organizational design concepts of enabling and coercive bureaucracy to 
develop a dynamic model for the intended and unintended outcomes of 
organizational transformation.   
• Developed a typology of organization transformation aligned to continuous 
improvement methods.  This framework utilizes key dimensions of “change 
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In chapter three of this dissertation we examined how deployment occurs within a single 
organization.  In this paper we examine how deployment occurs in a large and extended 
bureaucracy.  Future research should focus on the uniqueness of Toyota as a lean 
bureaucracy; examining the historical mechanics by which their internal culture was 
established, and examine the impact rapid growth in North America has had on the lean 
bureaucracy within the organization.  A particularly fascinating study of this could occur 
by examining Toyota as they set up a factory for initial production, such as their new 
assembly plant in Mississippi.  Additionally, further case studies beyond REMAN of 
smaller, less-bureaucratic organizations that have made the transformation to a positive 













CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The primary objective of this has been to better understand the opportunities, challenges, 
and methodologies by which lean production tools and techniques can be successfully 
applied in the remanufacturing context.  This question has been examined from a socio-
technical perspective at three distinct units of analysis.  Summarized below are the 
research objectives and key findings for each study at the single process, single facility, 
and extended enterprise levels. 
 
LEAN REMANUFACTURING: ADAPTING LEAN TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
TO THE REMANUFACTURING CONTEXT 
 
 
Unit of Analysis: Lean remanufacturing within a single process, shop floor level. 
Research Objective: The objective of this research study was to de-mystify the question 
of if, and how, it is appropriate to apply concepts such a lean manufacturing in the 
remanufacturing context.  This study sought to better understand the appropriate technical 
design of lean manufacturing tools and techniques in the remanufacturing context.   
Key Research Findings: 
• The remanufacturing context is very broad and diverse:  It is important to shift the 
discussion of lean remanufacture away from one that simply compares OEM and 
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remanufacture; this is an oversimplification of the issue and can lead to misleading 
generalizations and stereotypes. 
• Lean methods do apply in all instances of remanufacturing, but the specific solutions 
must be tailored to the specific context according to characteristics of product 
variability: In the case of high-variability lean remanufacturing: the buffers will be 
bigger, parts supermarkets will get broader, engineers will be more integrally 
involved, fixtures will be less specialized, and cross functional teams will support 
each other to address variability in production processes.  In the case of low-
variability lean remanufacturing, the process may closely resemble OEM operations: 
technical instructions will be simplified, one-piece flow will occur, materials and 
tools will be kitted to precision, andon signals will be responded to immediately, 
specialized fixtures will improve quality and reduce setups, and multi-skilled workers 
will continuously improve processes to achieve takt time. 
 
• Lean manufacturing techniques work effectively to create improved performance in 
the remanufacturing context:  In each case study significant performance 
improvements were recognized through application of lean methods.  This is not to 
suggest all attempted implementations will be successful, but that success is not 
technically prohibited. 
 
• Lean is arguably a different “production paradigm” than CIM and advanced mass 
production:  Lean, CIM, and advanced mass production have been shown to be so 
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divergent in application, it is believed they must be considered as different production 
paradigms, and possibly even divergent production paradigms.   
• Mass production and CIM take a mechanistic view, while lean takes an organic view: 
A close examination of the structural characteristics of lean, CIM, and advanced mass 
production suggests a mechanistic application of technology in CIM and advanced 
mass production, while lean is more organically driven by production employees. 
 
• Lean actually moves a production process within the PPM space; mainly along the 
process axis, allowing flexibility and efficiency simultaneously:  The implementation 
of lean methods has been shown to effectively move a production process within the 
PPM space.  Specifically, in each case examined, the application of lean methods 
effectively moved the process in the direction of continuous flow. 
 
• Lean manufacturing effectively challenges the concepts of a production trade-off 
between quality and cost; volume and variety; efficiency and customization: the PPM 
is grounded in economies of scale production paradigm, suggesting a required 
tradeoff exists between quality/customization and output/efficiency.  However, in 
examining the PPM, lean methods have been shown to effectively offer a new set of 
efficient production options, such that a tradeoff is not required between the key 
variables.   
 
• A tremendous growth opportunity exists to apply lean production methods to the 
generally immature remanufacturing industry:  Remanufacturing has been considered 
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as “the next great opportunity for boosting U.S. productivity” and “the ultimate form 
of recycling.”  This paper has shown the potential for lean production methods to play 
a significant role in this important environmental and economic opportunity to come 
to fruition. 
 
COMPARATIVE CASES OF LEAN MANUFACTURING DEPLOYMENT:  
ORGANIC VERSUS MECHANISTIC APPROACHES 
 
Unit of Analysis: Lean remanufacturing within a single facility/factory.   
Research Objective:  The objective of this research study was to answer the fundamental 
question of how to begin a lean remanufacturing deployment, and to better understand the 
methodology and mechanisms by which lean remanufacturing is appropriately deployed. 
Key Research Findings: 
• Need for Balance Between Organic and Mechanistic Deployment:  An organic 
approach is required for deep understanding and organizational learning, but it fails if 
it is not supported by appropriate infrastructure.  A mechanistic approach will enable 
widespread awareness and implementation, yet it must be augmented with deeper 
change at the technical and cultural level and organizational learning.  
 
• Existence of Equifinality:  Ultimately, there is no “one best way” to deploy Lean 
Manufacturing, but it is advisable that a long-term balance between organic and 
mechanistic strategies is required for continued successes to occur.   
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• Begin with Organic Deployment:  An organic approach is more appropriate when 
uncertainty exists regarding the deployment, specifically questions about the 
objective, longevity, benefits, scope, timeline, etc.  As the deployment begins to take 
hold within an organization, and the idea of “Lean Deployment” is better understood 
and embraced, uncertainty regarding the deployment is reduced and the infrastructure 
of a more mechanistic approach can begin to take hold. 
 
• Technical and cultural change go hand-in-hand:  Technical changes have been 
shown to lead to social changes.  Social changes in turn enable greater technical 
changes.  Therefore, deployment strategies that limit engagement to only social or 
technical changes are shortsighted and do not appreciate the interconnectedness of the 
two.   
 
• Exponential benefits with depth of deployment:  As the organization progresses to 
advanced social and technical tools of lean, including flow of value, 
flexible/interconnected processes, WIP reduction, and a team construct, the benefits 
are more significant than in initial tool implementation like 5S and brainstorming.   
 
• No wasted failures, only failures to learn: This adage, attributed to a senior leader 
within Toyota, is relevant when one looks at the evolution in both the organic and 
mechanistic approaches.  An organic approach is certainly more dynamic and 
evolutionary, but with mechanistic deployment of tools there is still the opportunity 
for considerable learning about how to use the tools and their limitations. 
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• There is no crystal ball in deployment:  In large, complex organizations it is hard to 
predict the long-term future for lean implementation, adoption, and learning.  
Successful Lean implementation requires an organization to challenge their history of 
norms, procedures, and ways of doing things.  While it is simple to talk about an 
organization evolving, it is much more complex to talk about each organization as a 
large number of individuals who must similarly let go of their own history of norms, 
procedures, and successes.  One particular element of this is that in a large complex 
organization, positive energy may be effectively created for lean manufacturing 
deployment, yet, if the message is not closely preserved the energy and enthusiasm 
behind the message may be high jacked by a manager looking to advance his/her own 
ideals.  Successful lean deployment requires significant focus and energy for an 
extended period of time.  Success and failure cannot be easily predicted.   
 
 
DEVELOPING A LEAN BUREAUCRACY: ENABLING VERSUS COERCIVE 
TRANSFORMATION FROM AN ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLE 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Unit of Analysis: Lean remanufacturing within a complex extended enterprise.   
Research Objective:  The objective of this research study was to better understand the 
ways in which a large and complex bureaucracy is transformed (or not) through 
deployment of lean production, and the impact an enabling or coercive deployment of 
improvement initiatives can have on the overall success of transformation.   
Key Research Findings: 
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There are many influences within a large bureaucracy which will pull a lean deployment 
towards coercive characteristics of controlling, yet, some positive influences that can 
serve to overcome this negative pull are:  
• “How can I help?   Servant-leadership is a key to developing an enabling lean 
deployment (Liker, 2008).  From the perspective of creating an enabling lean 
deployment, the most important characteristic of management is the ability to remove 
roadblocks to successful transformation. 
 
• Technical expertise leading the lean deployment:  Leadership for a lean deployment 
must possess a technical-skill set that is not simply aligned to “business as usual.”  
Leadership of the lean deployment must represent the thought leadership within the 
organization.  It must constantly be teaching and coaching in order to avoid an 
organization reverting to traditionally coercive tendencies of bureaucratic command-
and-control in deployment.   
 
• Senior leadership engagement:  The distinction between senior leadership support (“I 
support what you are doing”) and senior leadership engagement (“I am going to 
commit my personal time and energy”) cannot be understated for the key role it plays 
in creating a successful transformation and a positive lean bureaucracy.  The adage of 




• Thawing the “Ice Cream Sandwich”:  Senior management and front-line employees, 
who are typically supportive of deployment, are the “soft, warm, and chewy 
chocolate part”; middle management is the “frozen middle.”  Organizational 
transformation will place tremendous pressure on middle management to maintain 
execution and performance, while promoting transformation and change at the same 
time; all while obtaining information second or third hand regarding the details of 
deployment.  It is critical that first-line level of management support changes so that 
enabling lean deployment may prosper.   
 
• “What gets measured, gets done”:  Many employees may not understand the overall 
intent of lean deployment, but they will be able to understand the metrics used by 
superiors to assess performance.  Building the right metrics as an enabler to building 
the right behaviors is critical for developing an enabling lean deployment in support 
of leading implementers.   
 
• Staying power:  Perhaps it is a circular argument, but lean deployment must be 
enabling to become truly transformational; and it must be truly transformational to be 
sustained as a long-term shift in culture.  Therefore, it must be enabling in order to 
have staying power.  Many coercive organizational influences will exist in 
deployment, including existing organizational inertia and would-be opportunists who 
align to the transformation program in order to achieve their desired transformational 
outcomes.   
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• Need to unite the masses:  In order to achieve long-lasting success with an enabling 
lean deployment, there is a requirement to win the hearts and minds of a majority of 
employees.  An element of this is to enable, empower, and engage front-line workers, 
not simply technical experts, in the lean deployment.  When transformation energies 
are expended only by a small team of managers or expert change-agents, this may be 
perceived as a coercive effort by someone else to “improve” an activity of which they 
have little to no understanding.   
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation has examined lean manufacturing applications in the remanufacturing 
industry.  Aspects of this research have served to advance our theoretical understanding 
of lean production methodologies and challenges in deployment, while other aspects have 
served to advance our more practical knowledge of lean methods as they apply in the 
remanufacturing context.  Future research to build upon this study would include: 
 
• Additional study into interesting and unique contexts for lean production methods:  
The remanufacturing context is a very unique and colorful context for application of 
lean methods, but still more unique applications exist.  Three particular contexts of 
interest are the application of lean methods in the health care industry; research and 
design environments; and lean methods as applied in daily living, to highlight popular 
methods of eliminating wasted resources in daily life. 
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• Additional study of design for life cycle maintenance and methodologies to project 
life cycle costs in design:  Many long-term decisions for lifecycle maintenance and 
cost are made very early in product design.  The implications of design for life cycle 
maintenance as well as the life cycle cost implications of integrated and modular 
product architecture should be examined; as well as the financial and technical 
implications to closed-loop manufacturing/maintenance/disposal life cycle models.   
 
• Comparison in the application of lean methods in the manufacture and 
remanufacture of common components:  This research has highlighted the application 
of lean methods to the remanufacturing of various components.  At the same time, 
OEM’s for those same products are likely making great strides through application of 
lean methods.  It is believed a significant contribution of future research would be a 
comparative study of lean methods as applied in manufacture and remanufacture of 
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